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A work is never written by one person alone. This work in particular is indebted 
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individuals. Your confidence in my pursuits and endless encouragement has made all of 
this possible and worthwhile. I could never finish an account of all you have done, but I 
am hopeful you know. From the Midwest, a special thank you to Ashton Mouton whose 
friendship kept everything in the proper perspective. And from the desert: Katie Kitchen 
and Nicole Quezada, who have been with me since the beginning and never once 
wavered in their support.  
Finally, endless thanks to my partner, Donovan Irven, to whom I have far too 




Finale. – The only philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in the face of despair is 
the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the 
standpoint of redemption. Knowledge has no light but that shed on the world by 
redemption: all else is reconstruction, mere technique. Perspectives must be fashioned 
that displace and estrange the world…The more passionately thought denies its 
conditionality for the sake of the unconditional, the more unconsciously, and so 
calamitously, it is delivered up to the world. Even its own impossibility must at last 
comprehend for the sake of the possible. But beside the demand thus placed on thought, 
the question of the reality or the unreality of redemption itself hardly matters.  
 
Adorno, Minima Moralia 
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This study develops a philosophy of communication by investigating the crisis of 
directionality that follows from the dissolution of foundationalist metaphysics. Drawing 
from fundamental ontology and philosophical hermeneutics, this project suggests we shift 
our understanding of communication as a process of information exchange toward 
communication as an enactment of testimony. This leads to an examination of the 
rhetorical figure of hyperbole. It is argued that hyperbole offers unique insight into the 
ground of communication as all communicative acts are, in their ontological structure, 
hyperbolic. Moreover, this hyperbolic characterization of communication highlights the 
role of excess, inexpressibility, risk, and extravagance central to communicative praxis. 
To illustrate this, a reading of three figures in American Transcendentalism—Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, and Walt Whitman—is offered. By thinking 
communication as testimony, as a making sense in common, the relationship between 




CHAPTER 1. OPENING 
In what follows I offer a philosophy of communication at the boundaries of 
disciplinarity. Philosophy and communication have long been neighborly, especially 
given the nearly simultaneous emergence of rhetoric and philosophy in the ancient Greek 
context. As Calvin O. Schrag and David James Miller have argued, philosophy and 
communication have been in a state of “convergence without coincidence.”1 In other 
words, the study of communication and the study of philosophy are inextricably linked in 
the kinds of questions each asks, even if historically they have found themselves in 
spirited disagreement during the unfolding of disciplines within the development of the 
modern university system. We must be careful to clarify what we mean by philosophy of 
communication.2 Too often when we hear of “philosophy of” X, it means deploying the
                                                
1 Calvin O. Schrag and David James Miller, “Communication Studies and Philosophy: 
Convergence without Coincidence,” in The Critical Turn: Rhetoric and Philosophy in 
Postmodern Discourse, eds. Ian Angus and Lenore Langsdorf (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1993). 
2 Throughout this project I will use “we.” Although this we is not particularly royal, it is 
richly meaningful in particular ways. First, we functions to acknowledge that I am never 
only myself; to speak in the singular is always already to speak in the plural. I speak only 
because I dwell within language as the shared opening of world disclosure that makes any 
historical language possible. Moreover, I speak within a context set forth by others—the 
we indicates their contribution as much as my own and demonstrates the circumstances 
into which my voice has room to be heard. Third, the we marks the relationship between 
myself and the reader. Together we are attempting to develop a horizon of understanding. 
Finally, the we signifies those who think as I do, that is, other scholars who are indebted 
to the same philosophical movements and projects as I am. Where necessary I have tried 
to structure my claims so that which we is at issue is made clear. 
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resources of philosophy to explore an area of human activity outside of philosophy itself; 
for example, philosophy of religion, philosophy of the social sciences, and the like. To be 
sure, this project draws heavily from the philosophical tradition and the resources it offers, 
but it does so by giving equal attention to the experience of communication as it is 
embodied and lived. In particular, this project attempts to merge philosophy, understood 
as a way of life, with communicative ethics, understood as the practice of negotiating a 
world in common.  
To undertake this task, I wish to take as our point of departure a claim by the late 
French philosopher Jacques Derrida. This claim will serve as an opening in a dual sense: 
it is the idea with which this project begins and attempts to trace throughout, but it is also 
an insight that I am hopeful will position us to understand communication anew. 
Although this dissertation is not itself a project in deconstruction, it draws from the 
insights deconstruction offers. By this I mean that I will draw inspiration from 
deconstruction as a philosophical movement but I do not aim to add to the literature on 
deconstruction and its relation to communication.3 Rather, this project aims to complicate 
our everyday understanding of communication and ethics and enrich it with the virtues of 
hyperbole. Hyperbole, we shall come to see, is at work in a philosophical approach to 
communication and functions as a figure through which we can come to conceptualize 
communication otherwise as a practice of testimony. Said differently, this work 
                                                
3 For an excellent account of the resources deconstruction offers to thinking 
communication philosophically, see Briankle Chang, Deconstructing Communication: 
Representation, Subject, and Economies of Exchange (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996).  
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highlights the hyperbolic elements at work in communication as testimony and enriches 
what the concept has to offer both philosophy and communication studies.  
Let us turn then to Derrida’s provocation. In a dialogue with several scholars he 
offers the following insight (or incite): “Testimony, which implies faith or promise, 
governs the entire social space.”4 In coming to understand this provocation we might 
open ourselves to a new horizon of meaning with regard to the practice of communicative 
ethics.  
Before we fully appreciate what is at work in Derrida’s provocation, we need to 
step back and see the larger context within which Derrida would utter such a claim. 
Deconstruction is philosophy that takes place between the possible and the impossible; or 
rather, it is the philosophy which discloses the impossible within the possible. The 
concepts central to deconstruction—for example, hospitality, justice, ethics, democracy, 
the gift—all function within the same quasi-transcendental logic: an economy of meaning 
and the transcendence or impossibility that underlies this economy.  
Let us take the simplest example of the interplay between possibility and 
impossibility, the gift. At the most basic level giving a gift requires that A (the giver) give 
X (something) to C (the recipient) without the expectation of return. X must get all the 
way to C without remainder (A cannot keep something of the gift for herself). In order 
for it to be a gift and not something else (a bribe, a commercial exchange, theft, a loan, et 
cetera) A must wish to give and must not be coerced; she cannot confirm that X has been 
given; she cannot calculate the giving. All of these conditions must be met or the gift that 
is given is not a gift, but a calculated exchange of some kind. However, once C receives 
                                                
4 Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley, Questioning Ethics (London: Routledge, 1999), 82.  
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the gift from A, she is now indebted to her: a debt of gratitude. And A feels a sense of 
generosity. C must repay the debt of gratitude, either by giving a gift of her own (surely 
A’s birthday will come around eventually or another holiday will suit the purpose), or by 
expressing this gratitude with some kind of thanks. Thus, as soon as the gift is given it 
begins to annul itself as it is caught up in an economy of exchange. A pure gift is 
impossible as the moment it is given it falls into this exchange. Even if one were to give a 
gift unintentionally, the receiver of that gift is still in a position of debt. Consequently, we 
can say that what animates the giving of a gift is precisely its impossibility. The gift-
giving takes on a quasi-transcendental logic: it is neither purely transcendental nor purely 
empirical, but somewhere in between the two. In other words, the practice of gift-giving 
must, out of necessity, push up against its impossibility and remains at the limit of the 
empirical. This is not to say we should not attempt to give gifts. On the contrary, it is this 
impossibility that urges us to give all the more. Because the gift is impossible we can 
never have given enough.  
This logic underwrites more than gift-giving; so too is hospitality buoyed by its 
impossibility, democracy by its never being able to arrive, and ethics by the irreducible 
difference between treating someone as absolutely singular and simultaneously equal. 
And most importantly for this project, so too is communication itself built upon 
impossibility—a phenomenon marked by the concept of testimony. Before we turn to the 
concept of testimony proper, let us examine two sites of the impossibility of 




Différance, Derrida claims, is neither a word nor a concept, thus making its 
explanation a difficult task. The introduction of the letter a to the French différence—an 
introduction only to be seen but not heard (highlighting the primacy of writing over 
speech)—produces a neologism, or neographism, which brings into relief its double 
meaning of differing and deferring. In one sense, différer is “the action of putting off 
until later, of taking into account, of taking into account of time and the forces of an 
operation that implies an economical calculation, a detour, a delay…” as well as 
“temporalization and spacing, the becoming-time of space and the becoming-space of 
time.”5 In another sense, more commonly held, différer refers to difference, to an element 
of otherness. Différance serves as a neographism which holds both of these meanings 
together and refers to both deferring and differing in one breath. Moreover, this double 
meaning housed in one space is then utilized to critique constituted ideas of presence and 
essentialism.  
Through explicating the notion of the sign, Derrida demonstrates that the sign 
always only represents as it is never the thing to which it is referring; that is, “the sign 
represents the present in its absence […] the sign, in this sense, is deferred presence.”6 A 
problem arises here, as Derrida highlights how a notion of the sign presupposes that there 
was a first-order thing which once had presence and is now absent, that the sign attempts 
to re-present. In this way, différance points to a failure—the failure at the heart of 
signification. To be sure, it is the primacy of presence that Derrida aims to problematize 
because it is a primacy without justification. Furthermore, difference is simultaneously at 
                                                
5 Jacques Derrida, “Différance,” in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984), 8.  
6 Derrida, “Différance,” 9.  
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work for the signs which are used to represent the deferred presence are themselves 
arbitrary. In other words, central to the theory of linguistics Derrida is drawing from 
(mainly Saussure), is the recognition that what words we use to refer to things are not 
essential givens. Rather, they are arbitrary determinations that then become socially 
agreed upon. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, any given word is intelligible 
only because it is a “network of oppositions” with other words. We search and find the 
words we are looking for through other words. For example, the term “cat” has no 
inherent meaning, instead we know what it means by virtue of other words such as 
“animal,” “dog,” or “lion” to which it itself does not correspond.  So, the purity of what is 
present is lessened by being caught up in a chain of differences with what it is not 
(differing) and tempered by temporality (deferring). Thus there is no pure presence in 
itself as it is caught up in the play of différance. There is nothing ‘behind’ différance, no 
presence that could be unconcealed. Derrida writes, “Thus one comes to posit presence—
and specifically consciousness, the being beside itself of consciousness—no longer as the 
absolutely central form of Being but as a ‘determination’ and as an ‘effect.’”7 There are 
no moments of arrival but only points of departure. Différance hints at the perpetual 
movement of departure within which we always find ourselves.  
To ask “what is différance?” is to ask a question failed from the start by 
différance itself. Derrida writes,  
Différance is not. It is not a present being, however excellent, unique, principal, or 
transcendent. It governs nothing, reigns over nothing, and nowhere exercises any 
                                                
7 Derrida, “Différance,” 16.  
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authority. It is not announced by any capital letter. Not only is there no kingdom 
of différance, but différance instigates the subversion of every kingdom.8 
Différance is an-archic; it actively subverts all attempts at the governance of being. He 
writes, différance “in a certain and very strange way, (is) ‘older’ than the ontological 
difference or than the truth of Being.”9 Nevertheless, différance functions 
transcendentally within the text as the unnamable, non-conceptual, as the conditions for 
the possibility of naming and conceptualization. Différance sets loose the play of 
possibilities that then give the world a sense of structure. We must be careful, however, 
as différance does not determine our relations within the world, but simply makes those 
relations possible—différance opens us up to the possibilities of the play of signification 
and meaning within which we make a life for ourselves. Différance makes impossible the 
pure presence that communication so desires.  
 In “Signature Event Context” Derrida approaches the impossibility of 
communication from a different perspective, that of boundaries or limits. There he takes 
issue with the classical theory of communication which presumes communication is the 
transference of meaning from one subject to another, in this case represented by the work 
of Condillac. The primary medium of this transmission is typically thought to be speech, 
whereas writing allows for this transmission but with the absence of the 
receiver/addressee. In this way, writing carries within it an extension of presence (the 
receiver who is potentially unknowable and who is not there).  Indeed, it is the point of 
writing to share something with someone who is not there. Furthermore, in writing both 
                                                
8 Derrida, “Différance,” 21-22. 
9 Derrida, “Différance,” 22. 
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the receiver and the writer are absent (though both are represented, presumed, in the 
words of the text). The written word thus breaks from its context as neither writer nor 
receiver need to be present. In order for writing to be possible multiple conditions need to 
be met: it must be legible and it must be iterable (repeatable) beyond the presence of both 
the receiver and the writer. Even though writing presupposes the bringing together of the 
writer and the addressee, it is built upon their having distance between them. Indeed, it 
must presuppose this distance so as to be the narration of an event (rather than the event 
itself). Most importantly, any written mark is unable to be enclosed within a particular 
context. It must continually remain open to the possibility of being cited or grafted 
elsewhere in another context. Of great importance to this project, no written mark is ever 
exhaustible as it is always open to emplacement within another context. Derrida extends 
this thinking on writing to communication as such through an analysis of speech act 
theory. Although we need not work through that argument here, it is important to note 
that this necessity of iterability and escaping the boundaries of context is still at work. 
Communication itself is impossible because it must, as a result of its repeatability, go 
beyond the direct sharing of an experience.  
With these two accounts of the impossibility of communication in mind, let us 
hear Derrida’s claim once more: “Testimony, which implies faith or promise, governs the 
entire social space.” Testimony is a word with which we are familiar in an everyday 
sense. As a term it functions in religious, juridical, and historical discourse; testimony is 
the word, spoken or written, of a witness (testis: a witness, one who attests). Furthermore, 
testimony is also an act: someone testifies, offering words or actions which attest to 
something at the heart of experience. Testimony implies the relating of what has been 
  
9 
seen or heard to another. In other words, testimony implies both a teller and one who is 
told. As a result, testimony functions for the sake of judgment; it extends beyond the 
mere recording of facts and demands that the hearer makes a judgment (at bare minimum 
that she believes the teller to be telling the truth). One testifies so as to offer evidence or 
proof, perhaps of an event or experience. However, an attestation itself is never sufficient 
proof—it necessarily falls short of that which is being testified to. It is an account of an 
experience that has since passed.  
In the context of a religious experience, the testimony is the residuum of one’s 
spiritual encounter or commitment, an experience so transcendent it cannot be expressed 
in full. As Paul Ricoeur puts it in “The Hermeneutics of Testimony,” the philosophical 
problem of testimony is that of “joining an experience of the absolute to the idea of the 
absolute.”10 There is an unavoidable disjuncture between the experience, which 
necessarily is historical and finite, and the idea which at least with regard to religion is 
beyond temporality. Furthermore, Ricoeur distinguishes between two forms of religious 
testimony: prophetic and kerygmatic. In the prophetic dimension of testimony meaning 
irrupts into history in a four-fold manner: (1) the testimony “comes from somewhere else” 
(the divinity who speaks through the prophet, for example); (2) testimony is not offered 
about some contestable fact but the “radical, global meaning of human experience”; (3) 
testimony is “oriented toward proclamation,” that is, testimony is oriented toward the 
sharing of wisdom with as many others as can listen; and (4) testimony “implies a total 
                                                
10 Paul Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutics of Testimony,” in Essays on Biblical Interpretation, 




engagement of not just words, but acts.”11 For the prophet, the concept of testimony 
negotiates both the confession of faith and the commitment to the narrative of that which 
has been experienced. Kerygmatic testimony, on the other hand, centers around the 
confessional, for example, confessing to having been witness to the miracles of Christ. 
Here the figure of the martyr is most pressing. The words and acts of the witness testify 
to a commitment to one’s faith. In both these dimensions, prophetic and kerygmatic, one 
must navigate the tension between a confession of faith and the narration of facts 
embedded in historical circumstances.   
In juridical testimony, testifying is brought into relation with judgment. 
Eyewitness testimony remains insufficient proof alone and must be supported by 
additional facts of the case in order for a sound judgment to occur. Here the testifier is 
able to both testify that something did or did not occur, and the details of the occurrence, 
as well as to testify for something (either in favor of or against possible guilt). In this 
regard, testimony and the idea of the trial are intricately linked. One testifies so as to 
bring about a judgment.  
Lastly, we have testimony within an historical context. Here testimony follows 
the same logic but with regard to the experience of historically significant events, in 
particular instances of trauma. Indeed, it is here where the bulk of contemporary research 
on testimony is being performed.12 The figure of the witness is linked to trauma and the 
                                                
11 Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutics of Testimony,” 131.  
12 Early academic interest in testimony studies stems from discourses of vulnerability and 
trauma, particularly within Holocaust studies, African American studies, women’s 
studies, and subaltern studies. Here testimony emerges both as a result of and in response 
to traumatic circumstances. For keen insight into contemporary testimony studies I highly 
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experience of the inconceivable, often the inconceivable occurrence of horrific violence. 
Testimonies of those who experienced the Shoah often stand as exemplary case studies. 
In this situation, historical testimony functions to confirm the existence of an experience 
of something that we would otherwise find unthinkable (the systematic and knowing 
desolation of an entire population, for example). Testimony rages against the potential of 
revisionist histories. It makes palpably clear the happening of a trauma so that it is 
recorded in memory for the sake of the future.  
Testimony is, in all three ontic contexts, linked to a cause. In particular, it is 
linked to the cause of being believed for the sake of some future action. As a result, as 
Ricoeur illuminates, suspicion is always on the heels of testimony. In asking for belief 
there is always the possibility that the veracity of the testimony is lacking. In other words, 
testimony occurs only where things are uncertain. As Ricoeur writes in Oneself as 
Another, “Whereas doxic belief is implied in the grammar of ‘I believe-that,’ attestation 
belongs to the grammar of ‘I believe-in.”13 And this believing-in is always susceptible to 
doubt. The one testifying tells us “I was there – believe me.” As Ricoeur puts it, “The 
typical formulation of testimony proceeds from this pairing: I was there. What is attested 
to is indivisibly the reality of the past thing and the presence of the narrator at the place of 
its occurrence. And it is the witness who first declares himself a witness.”14 In other 
words, testimony is as much an attestation of oneself as it is the occurrence of things past.  
                                                                                                                                            
recommend the 2003 special issue in Discourse 25, no. 1 & 2. The essays there focus on 
the interplay between trauma, narrative, and literature.  
13 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 21.  
14 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David 
Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 163-164.  
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Regardless of whether we examine the religious, juridical, or historical context, 
testimony implies a faith or promise. We readily admit of the element of faith in religious 
discourse, but Derrida’s great insight is to acknowledge that this faith imbues all contexts, 
not merely the religious. Indeed, he goes so far as to say it governs the entire social space. 
There is as much faith in the New York Stock Exchange as there is the penitent in prayer, 
perhaps even more so. Our faith in our dialogue with one another is no less than the faith 
in the divine. At the barest minimum we have the faith that what the other tells us is true. 
When we testify, we promise the truth; we are under an oath, whether sacred or mundane. 
Derrida writes, “In testimony, truth is promised beyond all proof, all perception, all 
intuitive demonstration.”15 When we testify we make a promise, as the finite beings we 
are, that is rather difficult to keep. Nevertheless, as we shall see, it is this promise that 
makes possible any communicative situation. It is this faith, which testimony has at its 
core and brings into relief, that governs that space which we can properly call 
communicative. Testimony, Ricoeur tells us, “is hermeneutic in a double sense. In the 
first sense it gives to interpretation a content to be interpreted. In the second sense it calls 
for an interpretation.”16 In other words, testimony simultaneously indicates the aspect of 
manifestation present in the proclamation of one’s words and deeds and it demands the 
working through of the meaning of the event.  
This faith, this religiosity that is beholden to no historical religion, is intimately 
connected to language and the practice of hermeneutics. As I shall argue, language is 
                                                
15 Jacques Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits 
of Reason Alone,” in Religion, eds. Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), 63.  
16 Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutics of Testimony,” 143.  
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revelatory—it reveals the world, and as such it reveals the conditions for the possibility 
of revelation in a strictly religious sense. Furthermore, it is language which bonds us 
together, not any discrete language of course, but that linguisticality which allows for the 
movement and shifts of particular languages across cultures and time. Language as the 
sharing forth of a world in common.  
With this at hand, my project aims to move beyond testimony as the ontic practice 
with which we are readily familiar, to an understanding of testimony in its ontological 
manifestation. Said differently, I aim to argue that testimony, or testifying, marks the 
ontological condition of communication itself. In other words, testimony is not one 
product of communication among countless others, but communication is at root 
testimonial in nature. In thinking through the web of references that testimony provides 
we will be guided toward the conditions of possibility for communication. Furthermore, 
and in so doing, we will run up against the nature of the impossible. Indeed, testimony 
stands as the concept which finds the conditions for the possibility of communication in 
its impossibility.  
Derrida’s insight, paired with Ricoeur’s explanations, provides an opening, a 
space to begin, but not the final word. What this project contributes is a series of sketches 
of the contours of communication as testimony. Although Derrida is quite clear about the 
reach of testimony, it remains to be seen what testimony looks like. In particular, this 
project highlights the hyperbolic dimensions of language, which I shall argue most 
clearly brings the dimensions of testimony into relief. In Chapter One we shall set the 
scene for our contemporary communicative circumstances by way of examining both 
what is at stake and what we are up against. It will demonstrate the socio-political 
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ramifications of misunderstanding communication through an articulation of the dual 
problems of fundamentalism and cynicism, each of which have a particular 
communicative comportment. Testimony, we shall see, is the understanding of 
communication necessary in the uncertainty we face following the dissolution of 
metaphysics. Following this, in Chapter Two we will examine the philosophical ground 
necessary for theorizing communication as testimony. This historical overview will take 
us through the philosophical movements of fundamental ontology and philosophical 
hermeneutics, more generally known as the linguistic turn in philosophy. We shall focus 
primarily on the contributions to theorizing communication from Martin Heidegger, Karl 
Jaspers, and Hans-Georg Gadamer. These three thinkers provide the necessary theoretical 
ground, in a non-foundationalist world, for developing testimony as a philosophical 
concept. Chapter Three turns to the hyperbolic character of language that points to the 
testimonial nature of all communicative acts. The epistemological, ethical, and 
ontological dimensions of hyperbole will be explored with an eye toward their 
contributions to thinking about communication. Hyperbole functions as a figure that 
discloses our comportment as testifying. Finally, in Chapter Four we will turn our 
attention to three unlikely theorists of testimony and hyperbole: Ralph Waldo Emerson, 
Henry David Thoreau, and Walt Whitman. A reading of these three 
(quasi)transcendentalists will offer sketches of the contours of testimony and more 
explicitly link testimony to democratic practice. The structure of testimony and that of 
democracy will take on a similar form with regard to the impossible. Said otherwise, each 
are called forward by the same ethical force.  
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As a work within the tradition of philosophy as a way of life, my dissertation does 
not propose a systematic program for understanding communication through an analysis 
of a singular figure or movement in philosophy. Throughout his work, but in particular in 
his books Philosophy as a Way of Life and What is Ancient Philosophy?, Pierre Hadot 
draws a distinction between discourse about philosophy and philosophy as a way of life. 
Philosophical discourse is something with which we are well familiar: the development 
of systems of logic, metaphysics, epistemology, and value theory—the standard areas of 
examination in philosophy departments worldwide. As such, philosophical discourse 
often serves to extend the history of philosophy in the practice of clarification, system-
building, and occasionally, genuine revolutions in thought. For Hadot, and I find myself 
in agreement with him, this practice is necessary but not sufficient for a full 
understanding of philosophy. What often remains lacking in philosophical discourse is 
the call to live a good life. Philosophy as a way of life, on the other hand, is “a mode of 
existing-in-the-world, which [has] to be practiced at each instant, and the goal of which 
[is] to transform the whole of the individual’s life.”17 Here, philosophy is not pure 
theorizing for the sake of clarifying conceptual systems, but an enterprise always already 
entwined with praxis. To draw from Socrates once more on the task of philosophy, “What 
is at stake is far from insignificant. It is how one should live one’s life.”18 What could 
matter more? In this sense, the lessons of existentialism resound all the more clearly 
today. Now is always the time for doing philosophy.  
                                                
17 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, trans. Michael Chase (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, 1995), 265.  
18 Plato, “Republic,” trans. Paul Shorey in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including 
the Letters. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairnes, Eds. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1980), 352d. 
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Although Hadot most often localizes philosophy as a way of life within the 
Hellenistic and Roman periods wherein various schools of thought and action developed 
in response to the Socratic dialogues, we would do well to remember that philosophy as a 
way of life did not end at its beginning. Rather, the promise of philosophy as a way of life 
as an existential practice of learning to live well reached its highest and most celebrated 
moment for those welcomed into philosophic communities (among them the Cynics, 
Stoics, Epicureans, and other post-Socratic movements), but it is not, as we will see, the 
conclusion of this approach to philosophy. In other words, philosophy as a way of life has 
continued, as an impulse throughout the discipline for as long as philosophy itself has 
been practiced. Importantly, in the development of schools in ancient Greece and early 
within the Roman empires, ways of life were promoted rather than discursive systems of 
conceptual apparatuses.  
This is not to say these post-Socratic schools were without intricate and highly 
rigorous philosophical discourse. Far from it. Rather, the point is that philosophy also 
required substantial work on oneself in order to live in accordance with such principles. 
To simply understand the conceptual system but fail to live rightly was as much a failure 
of doing philosophy as misunderstanding the discourse altogether. In this way, 
philosophy is a form of preparation. We are well familiar with the assertion that 
philosophy means learning how to die, but equally philosophy is the preparation for a 
more just world to come. Consequently, as Hadot puts it in a series of interviews, 
philosophy consists in a “pole of discourse and a pole of action.”19 Discourse and life are 
                                                
19 Pierre Hadot, The Present Alone is Our Happiness, trans. Marc Djaballah (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2009), 110. 
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inseparable. However, with the rise of Christianity and Scholasticism in the Middle Ages, 
philosophy understood as a way of life took a turn inward toward philosophical discourse 
and became the philosophy with which we are most familiar today—a disciplinary 
activity striving to extend an historical trajectory. From the medieval period forward, 
philosophy became a subject taught in universities and caught up in the training of 
specialists. Philosophy consequently becomes tied to the university structure and 
becomes a profession wherein one might become an expert. It is against this strain of 
philosophy that my dissertation finds its spirit.  
Consequently, as a work of philosophy as a way of life, I intend to take a more 
liberatory approach, drawing insights and inspirations along the way from a multitude of 
thinkers. To this end, this dissertation is a kind of experiment and one that aims to 
provoke and incite. By experiment here I do not mean a process governed by a strict 
method (whether historical, scientific, or otherwise), but an attempt to see and think 
something anew from what the tradition has already given us. In this respect, this project 
is more akin to an aesthetic work than a science. This is most noticeable through the use 
of epigraphs in structuring the project. These epigraphs will be drawn from thinkers other 
than those whose conceptual work is central to this project as all can contribute a verse. 
Furthermore, I shall draw from realms complementary to philosophy: literature and 
poetry. I do so in the main to allow our insights to be iterated again and again in any form 
that will allow. Indeed, I might have written this dissertation as a poem, were I to have 
talent in the genre. But such is not my form; instead, these epigraphs shall serve as 
openings to our understanding. Although the work that follows these epigraphs will not 
  
18 
explain them in full, it is my hope that the epigraphs speak in a different register and 
contribute to a theory of testimony.  
 Let us then draw an insight from literature and get on our way. Recently, I had an 
encounter with Oscar Wilde, in particular his brilliant essay “On the Decay of Lying” 
wherein he speaks to the project we are attempting to undertake here. In this essay, as 
humorous as it is insightful, Wilde offers a dialogue between two friends: Cyril and 
Vivian. Cyril suggests they leave the stifled library and spend some time out of doors, to 
which Vivian responds with near horror as he finds nature to be a most uninteresting 
thing. It turns out he has recently written an article on the subject and offers to read it to 
Cyril instead, in the hopes they might remain indoors. The main thrust of his argument is 
that art is superior in all ways to nature (what is the sunset, she ponders, other than a 
second-rate Turner painting?) because art breaks free “from the prison-house of 
realism.”20 Art stretches beyond the confines of everyday life and shows us something 
extra-ordinary. Indeed, for Vivian, we begin life with “a natural gift for exaggeration 
which, if nurtured in congenial and sympathetic surroundings, or by the imitation of the 
best models, might grow into something really great and wonderful.”21 Unfortunately, 
however, we often fall “into careless habits of accuracy or [take] to frequenting the 
society of the aged and the well informed,” both of which are disastrous for the 
imagination. It is the exaggeration that art produces that gives life its vitality and beauty. 
In a wonderful twist of the essay, we learn that art is meant not to represent the world, but 
to demand the world conform to it. In this sense, art has the power to alter nature. The 
                                                
20 Oscar Wilde, “The Decay of Lying” in Intentions (New York: Brentano, 1905), 9.  
21 Wilde, “The Decay of Lying,” 3.  
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artist, or the liar as they are of the same kind, both gives pleasure and surpasses nature. 
For Vivian, this is reason enough to revive the art of lying. “Nature is no great mother 
who has borne us. She is our creation. It is in our brain that she quickens to life,” Vivian 
states, “Things are because we see them, and what we see, and how we see it, depends on 
the Arts that have influenced us. To look at a thing is very different from seeing a 
thing.”22 The lie that art gives is a greater truth than the truth of nature itself.  
 It is with the spirit of the artist then that I undertake this task. I will try to offer a 
way of seeing communication anew, by focusing on some features over others. This is 
key as at times my discussions, in particular of hyperbole, will seem themselves an 
exaggeration. This is correct as I am aiming to point at the truth of the matter, something 
which underlies the phenomenon, rather than making a claim about fact. Not every 
speech act is hyperbole, and yet, it has something hyperbolic about it. And this 
“something hyperbolic” is what brings us to understanding communication as testimony.
                                                
22 Wilde, “The Decay of Lying,” 12.  
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CHAPTER 2. A CRISIS OF DIRECTIONALITY 
Now if, today, the ‘question of religion’ actually appears in a new and different 
light, if there is an unprecedented resurgence, both global and planetary, of this 
ageless thing, then what is at stake is language, certainly… 
Jacques Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge” 
 
2.1 In the Wake of Disaster 
If man is ever to solve that problem of politics in practice he will have to 
approach it through the problem of the aesthetic, because it is only through beauty 
that man makes his way to freedom. 
Friedrich Schiller, Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man 
 
The single most important moment for contemporary philosophy is Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s proclamation of the death of God. Few moments in the history of philosophy 
are parallel to the force of Nietzsche’s words. Indeed, as will become clear, it is my 
conviction that all responsible philosophy attempting to speak of the human event has 
had to come to terms with Nietzsche’s declaration and it is from out of this understanding 
that philosophy must continue to fulfill its promise as the love of wisdom and the practice 
of learning how to live.  
To be sure, we find talk of the death of God and its consequences throughout 
Nietzsche’s work, though it is most explicit in Thus Spoke Zarathustra and The Gay
 Science—the former a work of philosophical fiction, the latter a book of aphorisms and 
poetry. The most well-known and consequently misrepresented iteration is published as 
aphorism 125 of The Gay Science, titled “The Madman.”1 Although I am aware of the 
                                                
1 I offer the entire aphorism in full so that we have recourse to its genius for the 
interpretive work to follow:  
The madman.—Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright 
morning hours, ran to the market place, and cried incessantly: “I seek God! I seek 
God!”—As many of those who did not believe in God were standing around just then, he 
provoked much laughter. Has he got lost? asked one. Did he lose his way like a child? 
asked another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? 
Emigrated?—Thus they yelled and laughed.  
The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. “Whither is 
God? He cried; “I will tell you. We have killed him—you and I. All of us are his 
murderers.  
“But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us this 
sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this 
earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all 
suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward in all directions? Is 
there still any up or down? Are we not straying as though through an infinite nothing? Do 
we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is it not night 
continually closing in on us? Do we not need to light lanterns in the morning? Do we 
hear nothing as yet of the noise of gravediggers who are burying God? Do we smell 
nothing as yet of the divine decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. God 
remains dead. And we have killed him. 
“How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was 
holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our 
knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? 
What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the 
greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to 
appear worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed; and whoever is born after us—
for the sake of this deed he will belong to a higher history than all history hitherto.” 
Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners; and they, too, were 
silent and stared at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern on the ground, and it 
broke into pieces and went out. “I have come too early,” he said then; “my time is not yet. 
This tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears 
of men. Lightening and thunder require time; the light of the stars requires time; deeds, 
though done, require time to be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant from them 
than the most distant stars—and yet they have done it themselves.” 
 It has been related further that on the same day the madman forced his way into 
several churches and there struck up his requiem aeternam deo. Led out and called to 
account, he is said always to replied nothing but: “What after all are these churches now 
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boldness of such a claim, that one might declare a most important moment for 
contemporary philosophy, I am nonetheless convinced very little in the history of 
philosophy—short of Platonic metaphysics and Cartesian epistemology—has had such a 
profound consequence not only for the discipline itself, but also for modern life generally. 
With this clarion call against all fixed foundations, a new modernity was ushered forward. 
Before turning to the content of Nietzsche’s insight, let us examine its form as it bears 
within it a kind of reading protocol or recommendation for its interpretation for those 
who are concerned with both philosophy and communication.  
Nietzsche offers this philosophical proclamation to us as an aphorism. Aphorisms 
are a distinct literary form and one that offers a particular style otherwise than the 
standard propositional argument so popular within the history of philosophy. In other 
words, aphorisms speak differently from other rhetorical forms. In his essay “The 
Aphorism: Fragments from the Breakdown of Reason” Gary Saul Morson draws a 
distinction between riddles, dictums, and aphorisms so as to clarify the potential of 
aphorisms for extensive philosophical thought.2 First, the riddle although productive of 
multiple interpretations, always has an answer and this condition of an answer recursively 
shapes the form of a riddle. Take for example the Sphinx’s famous riddle to Oedipus: 
what is the thing whose voice is one, and whose feet are four and two and three? The 
answer of course is human beings as they live out their finitude (we first crawl, then walk 
upright, and finally utilize a cane in old age). Along the way to solving the riddle we are 
                                                                                                                                            
if they are not the tombs and sepulchers of God?” Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 
trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), aphorism 125. Italics FN. 
2 Gary Saul Morson, “The Aphorism: Fragments from the Breakdown of Reason,” New 
Literary History 34(3): 409-429.  
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opened to a multitude of insights and readings—for example, a lesson about the 
metamorphoses of human being and finitude— but at the end of the day the riddle has a 
single answer. As Morson puts it “If life were a riddle, everything could be solved.”3 
Thankfully things are not so simple. Although Nietzsche’s writing is playful, indeed he 
returns play and a sense of style to the philosophical tradition, he does not present his 
readers with riddles; he has no concern with solutions or at least not permanent ones. The 
dictum, lacking in all mystery, resembles the answer to a riddle. The dictum reduces 
complexity to a simple statement. Among Morson’s numerous examples is Karl Marx 
and Friedrich Engel’s claim in the Communist Manifesto that “the history of all hitherto 
existing society is the history of class struggles.”4 What we do with the dictum is no 
doubt complex and layered with conflicts of interpretation, but the dictum itself is 
transparent. There is little confusion over what the author intended or how the statement 
is to be understood even beyond authorial intention. Moreover, for Morson, dicta have 
totalizing tendencies that prohibit exceptions. They aim, in covering everything, to be 
both clear and certain, avoiding all doubt and complexity when possible.  
Contrary to both the riddle and the dictum the aphorism values above all the 
preservation of mystery. The force of mystery initiates the open style of the aphorism to 
which the words point again and again. Morson writes, “Despite their variety in tone, 
form, and language, aphorisms all share a sense that what is most valuable to grasp lies 
beyond our reach.”5 In other words, the aphorism always points beyond itself, beyond the 
world of the text, and into the to and fro of our own existence. The truth of an aphorism is 
                                                
3 Morson, “The Aphorism,” 415.  
4 Morson, “The Aphorism,” 415. 
5 Morson, “The Aphorism,” 421. 
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obscure and expansive; it raises entanglements rather than clarifies, perplexes rather than 
soothes. For Morson, the opening lines of the Tao Te Ching come to mind when 
searching for examples. It reads: “The Way that can be spoken of/is not the constant 
way./ The name that can be named/ is not the constant name./ Mystery upon mystery/ 
The gateway of manifold secrets.”6 This aphorism opens us out upon a world imbued 
with mystery, into a world about which it is difficult to speak.  
Nietzsche’s aphorisms, I believe, function in a similar manner. Moreover, and 
moving beyond Morson, it is this mystery that makes the pronouncing of any dicta 
possible. Mystery comes first, incites us, and moves us to speak. In On the Genealogy of 
Morals Nietzsche writes of his own aphoristic style:  
People find difficulty with the aphoristic form: this arises from the fact that today 
this form is not taken seriously enough. An aphorism, properly stamped and 
molded, has not been ‘deciphered’ when it has simply been read; rather, one has 
then to begin its exegesis, for which is required an art of exegesis.7  
Unlike the propositional argument, the aphorism asks the reader to work (rather than 
merely comprehend) and provide an interpretation of the text before her. In other words, 
the aphorism requires from the start a hermeneutic posture toward understanding the text 
against the backdrop of a multiplicity of interpretations. That is to say, the aphorism as a 
form demands that we learn how to read. Learning to read in this sense has little to do 
with deciphering marks on a page, but is more broadly concerned with making meaning 
                                                
6 Morson, “The Aphorism,” 420. 
7 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter 




within and beyond the text. Importantly, the art of exegesis here does not refer to finding 
some meaning lying latent in the text (and, as we shall see, Nietzsche had some doing in 
this insight). Nietzsche’s hermeneutics are not that of early biblical and legal textual 
interpretation. On the contrary, exegesis is not a process of discovery but of production. 
Reading and ruminating on an aphorism means producing (and reproducing anew each 
time) its meaning in relation to other possible meanings and contexts. Working through 
an aphorism requires reflection on historical context, not only the chronological context 
within which the aphorism was written but even more so the larger historical 
conversation into and against which the aphorism is speaking. Nor can we ignore the 
individual hermeneutic context between the reader as someone who has lived a life (that 
is, has a history of her own) in relationship to the text. Among the greatest lessons of 
hermeneutics is that a text discloses itself in response to the questions asked of it. In short, 
in reading one must come to terms with the ever-shifting rhetorical landscape and the 
hermeneutic layers spanning from the individual to the epochal, all of which is embedded 
in a shared history.  
Moreover, aphorisms open up new lines of interpretation and thought; they tend 
to unfold outwards rather than spiral inward toward a singular interpretation. In her essay 
“Nietzsche and the Art of Aphorism” Jill Marsden notes that, “Nietzsche’s aphorisms are 
escape routes from convictions, byways into the labyrinth of the unforeseen. Deriving 
from the Greek term aphorismos, meaning ‘definition’ (from aphorizein to define, from 
horos, boundary), the aphorism emerges in Nietzsche’s writings as a new ‘horizon’ for 
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philosophy, that which sets the limit rather than that which is defined by a limit.”8 That is 
to say, Nietzsche’s aphorisms in particular break away from unquestioned assumptions 
and everyday modes of understanding and try to make a space for understanding the 
world otherwise. By taking up a little used form, Nietzsche breathes life once more into 
the philosophical project and offers a new way of doing philosophy, what I argue is a 
form of philosophy as a way of life. In giving philosophy a new horizon, Nietzsche gives 
philosophy an alternative way of orienting and envisioning itself.  
Unlike the proposition, the aphorism is irreducible to a single meaning and 
instead opens outward into larger webs of significance. Marsden notes that “for the active 
reader the aphorism, like the arrow, is thought in flight. If we are moved by the aphorism 
we return to it again and again as something that has the power to move.”9 Consequently, 
aphorisms are not merely to be read, but to be digested and put to work; they move the 
reader, incite her. It is of little surprise then that Nietzsche turns to the cow as the 
exemplar of hermeneutic consciousness—one must ruminate on a text, chew it again and 
again, in an effort to extract its wisdom (wisdom which is, we must note, potentially 
different in each ruminating iteration). In this sense, when dealing with an aphorism we 
go beyond textual comprehension and seek understanding, i.e., putting the text into 
conversation with other texts and contexts. An aphorism has the power to move us, to 
orient our understanding and guide us to action. The force of the thought is paramount. 
This is, perhaps, what makes reading Nietzsche and other aphorists so exciting—
something, be it ourselves or our understanding, which amount to one and the same, is 
                                                
8 Jill Marsden, “Nietzsche and the Art of the Aphorism,” in A Companion to Nietzsche, 
ed. Keith Ansell Parson (Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 22.  
9 Marsden, “Nietzsche and the Art of the Aphorism,” 31.  
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moved. Our understanding is transported from one horizon to another and we might then 
find ourselves at the vista of new meanings. As Gilles Deleuze, reader of Nietzsche par 
excellence, writes in “Nomadic Thought,” 
An aphorism is a play of forces, a state of forces which are always exterior to one 
another. An aphorism doesn't mean anything, it signifies nothing, and no more has 
a signifier than a signified. Those would be ways of restoring a text's interiority. 
An aphorism is a state of forces, the last of which, meaning at once the most 
recent, the most actual, and the provisional-ultimate, is the most external. 
Nietzsche posits it quite clearly: if you want to know what I mean, find the force 
that gives what I say meaning, and a new meaning if need be. Hook the text up to 
this force.10  
Central to Deleuze’s description is the productive power of an aphorism. Sufficient 
rumination requires moving beyond the words in the text to the impetus that exhorted the 
meaning in the first place. This impetus is not the author’s intention, but we might 
understand it as their inspiration. In other words, the impetus is the set of circumstances 
and forces that moved or spurs Nietzsche to write, or the insight that demanded some 
form of worldly expression. Marsden complements this insight stating,  
In the aphorism something is felt which is as yet unexpressed. It is this charge 
which ignites other thoughts, prompting other associations, which ultimately may 
stray far beyond the “sense” of the initial aphorism. No longer privileging familiar 
                                                
10 Gilles Deleuze, “Nomadic Thought,” in Desert Islands and Other Texts (Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e), 2004), 256. Italics GD. 
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habits of recognition, we come to trust our peripheral vision, the judgments of our 
remote receptors, our new sensory horizons.11 
Thinking through Nietzsche gives us a new vocabulary for philosophy; not issues of 
propositions and arguments, but excitations, forces, expressions, impetuses, and the 
movement of thinking. What thoughts, then, does “The Madman” ignite, especially for 
those who wish to think otherwise about philosophy and communication? 
 Let us follow one line of thought, among many others, here. The aphorism begins 
with a question that implicates the reader: “Have you not heard?” From the very start, 
time feels out of joint—how long ago did the story’s events unfold? Should we have 
heard by now? Have we somehow been left out of the loop so to speak or are we at fault 
for not already having known of these events? The opening line requires we come to 
terms with it and situate ourselves in response as the aphorism unfolds. Regardless of 
how we take up this task, we are confronted with a madman carrying a lantern at daylight 
(for daylight is no promise that everything is illuminated) exhorting a group of non-
believers. That the madman is speaking to non-believers is crucial and all too often 
overlooked. He decries with nearly cruel mocking not the believer, but those who have 
already lost or given up their belief. This is imperative: the madman is not concerned 
with the faithful, but with those who think themselves beyond faith. He is taking to task 
those who believe themselves certain. While he seeks God, the others jeer at him and 
mercilessly poke fun. The madman’s seekings, however, are somewhat disingenuous—a 
set-up for a performance not to be matched. He seeks for something he knows is not there 
and never will be, if it ever was. His seeking fails in advance of its performance. God is 
                                                
11 Marsden, “Nietzsche and the Art of the Aphorism,” 36.  
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not missing, not on the run or hiatus, not somewhere else with the hopes of return; he is 
dead and the witnesses to this event are incriminated in the murder. “We have killed him.”  
 But who is this God we have killed? The most common misreading of this 
passage, particularly within pop culture interpretations but sometimes still found lurking 
in philosophy departments, is that the god who has been killed is merely the God of 
monotheism. This is true, but not sufficiently so. What makes Nietzsche so interesting is 
his ability to show that this god goes by many names. Not merely God the Father or 
Yahweh or Allah, not merely the God that metes out justice or salvation, but likewise 
those metaphysical gods of Platonism and positivistic science to which we are far more 
addicted. Indeed, perhaps these gods more than anything else. Were the God who dies 
only the God of monotheism, we might actually be able to handle such a death. Rather, 
with this death all solid foundations crumble; it is the death of foundation as such. With 
this death of God we witness the dissolution of metaphysics. Indeed, it is this dissolution 
that gives force to Nietzsche’s thought and it is the force to which we must connect this 
text.  
 By metaphysics I mean something rather general. The term, as the story goes, 
comes from a quandary over what to do with Aristotle’s writings that followed those on 
nature and the characteristics of movement (i.e., physics). Thus they received the label of 
meta- (after or post) physics. Continuing with Aristotle, metaphysics was the study of 
things that did not change, first causes, or being as such. Consequently, metaphysics had 
a wide scope in the history of philosophy as it tried to ground philosophy itself. With the 
Christianizing impulse in medieval philosophy, metaphysics concerned that which was 
not-nature or not in flux, namely the divine. Metaphysics investigated that which was 
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beyond the natural world and was the source for the natural world’s existence. As a result, 
it was concerned with organizing entities within the categories of being by way of 
understanding the nature of substance, that which undergirded all empirical phenomenon. 
By the time we reach Kant, whose metaphysics Nietzsche will scrupulously critique, 
metaphysics has become the science of the supra-sensible.  
 This relationship between monotheism, Platonism, and positivistic science share a 
metaphysics of objectivity wherein truth is an objective fact, whether grounded in divine 
or secular transcendence. Nietzsche has little, if any, patience for truth of such a kind. 
Indeed, in Twilight of the Idols he offers a direct link between these historical trajectories 
in “How the ‘Real World’ Finally Became a Fable, Or the History of an Error.” Here 
Nietzsche traces the lineage of the idea of truth. First there is “the real world — attainable 
for the wise man, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives in it, he is it” which corresponds to 
Plato (and Platonism’s) conception of the forms. This morphs into “the real world — 
unattainable for now, but promised for the wise man, the pious, the virtuous man,” or the 
promise of Christianity. Then we find “the real world — unattainable, unprovable, 
unpromisable; but the mere thought of it — a consolation, an obligation, an imperative,” 
or the Kantian thing in itself. Following this “the real world — unattainable? At any rate 
unattained, and since unattained also unknown,” what Nietzsche attributes to the earliest 
forms of positivism. At this point, Nietzsche speaks to the historical and philosophical 
moment he is trying to inaugurate: “The ‘real world — an idea with no further use, no 
longer even an obligation — an idea become useless, superfluous, therefore a refuted idea: 
let us do away it!” Upon which follows “The real world — we have done away with it: 
what world is left? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the real world we have also 
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done away with the apparent one.”12 The aphorism of the death of God and the fable of 
the true world ought to be read together as they each speak to the dissolution of 
objectivity. When Nietzsche speaks of the death of God, we understand him to be 
speaking of the death of objective truth itself, the death of foundation as such, which is 
what makes this death so unbearable.  
Even more unsettling as a consequence of the dissolution of metaphysics we find 
simultaneously the dissolution of any ethical theory built on a now defunct 
foundationalism. Lacking the ground for objectivity—whether in an afterlife, realm of 
ideas, or a necessary condition of reason—ethics seemingly loses its force. Without fixed 
and stable rules we are left then wondering what, if anything, is prohibited and what, if 
anything, is required of us. This is of course the threat of nihilism and its aberrations of 
unbridled relativism and fatalism. It might well be the case that all is permitted and 
nothing prohibited, if it is the case that only a fixed foundation allows us to ground our 
understanding and practice. With nihilism we have recourse to no stable ground, no 
recourse to the horizon to which we orient ourselves and from which we undertake our 
practical actions has vanished—we have wiped it away. The Madman laments, 
But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us this 
sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained 
this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away 
from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward in 
all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as though 
                                                
12 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. Duncan Large (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 20. 
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through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not 
become colder? Is it not night continually closing in on us? 
Without a horizon we are unable to position ourselves against a fixed point wherein we 
would always have the ability to orient ourselves in any given circumstance. Everything 
becomes, in the flash of a moment, uncertain. Without a foundation we have no guarantee 
of what we must do. On the contrary, we must work within a multitude of possible 
options, each as present as the next and none able to promise itself as the best option. 
Without a stable ground, everything is a risk. As we shall see in the chapters that follow, 
it is philosophical hermeneutics which allows us to make sense of and dwell within this 
risk.  
Let us pause for a moment and note that Nietzsche speaks of what has already 
occurred (“How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers?”); 
metaphysics has, in its trajectory, dissolved itself. Nietzsche has not dissolved 
metaphysics, rather he has described the situation as he sees it in dissolution. He offers an 
interpretation of the current circumstances but by no means shatters metaphysics on his 
own. Indeed, it is this fact that allows us to understand claims by Heidegger and his 
inheritors that Nietzsche is the last metaphysician of the West.13 Nietzsche sees, with 
unmatched clarity, the crumbling of the “true world” but is not yet beyond it. He simply 
rings the bell and proclaims the death he sees in the philosophical landscape surrounding 
him. He feels its force and attempts to give voice to it for those who might be ready to 
                                                
13 In particular, see Martin Heidegger’s lectures on Nietzsche in Nietzsche, vols. 1-4, 
trans. David F. Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1991-1992).  
  
33 
hear. Said differently, he voices the transformation of Platonism and monotheism to its 
inevitable movement into nihilism. 
I claimed this aphorism was the single most important moment in contemporary 
philosophy precisely because this aphorism leaves no philosophy unscathed. Nietzsche’s 
proclamation of the death of God illuminates what I shall call throughout this project a 
crisis of directionality. Unable to tell up from down, forward from backward, we are left 
spinning uncontrollably through webs of meaning without fixed reference or rest. If we 
take Nietzsche to be correct in the opening sections of On the Genealogy of Morals, that 
human beings are always in search of meaning and that the one thing we cannot bear is 
meaninglessness—in particular, suffering without reason of some sort—then it is 
imperative we understand our attempts to give meaning to this situation which brings all 
meanings into question. In order to bear this crisis of directionality, this complete and 
utter disorientation, we must invent new “fixed” points that acknowledge their 
hermeneutic malleability or cling helplessly to the original foundations which we no 
longer have. Moreover, this aphorism, and the idea of directionality that it infers, will 
ground the theoretical work to follow not only as its inspiration but as an image that gives 
sense to a philosophical concept. 
The crisis of directionality the death of God leaves us in is a veritable disaster 
(“who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What 
festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of 
this deed too great for us?”). It is worth recalling that the etymology of disaster is to be 
away from or unable to see the stars; that is, in a disaster we are without recourse to any 
orienting principle. We are adrift, searching for anything that might provide us a way. 
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Furthermore, it is an event for which we have yet to become worthy (Must we ourselves 
not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?). After Nietzsche’s proclamation of the 
death of God philosophy must face the pressing question of its new purpose and task; it 
must seek new constellations to illuminate and give direction to its path. Becoming 
worthy of this deed requires a reexamination and shattering of our so-called certain 
foundations and the development of now orienting principles that are sensitive to the 
foundationless ground upon which they rest. Said otherwise, to become worthy we need 
to turn to the insights of hermeneutics. The death of God leads, necessarily, to a 
perspectival and interpretive approach to philosophy; it requires philosophy to embrace 
its hermeneutic dimensions.  
This is a disaster to which we have no recourse. We cannot turn our backs, as if 
we had never heard, nor can we return to some pre-modern that never was. More so, the 
problem with this disaster, as I shall show in the sections that follow, is that our responses 
to it have in the main been restricted and insufficiently reflective. The orienting principles 
toward which we have turned have led us even more astray, if such a thing were possible.  
2.2 From Fundamental Ontology to the Ontology of Actuality 
But the point is, first, you have to ask the question, “What is it that is going on?” 
and then find out how to respond in the fitting way.  
Calvin O. Schrag, “From the Loving Struggle to the Struggle to Love” 
 
Whatever task philosophy could take up after Nietzsche, one thing was certain: 
things needed to be re-thought and nothing so much so as the concept of being, that 
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founding idea with which philosophy has struggled for so long.14 No one took up this call 
with more gusto and precision than Martin Heidegger. Not simply in Being and Time, but 
throughout all his writings and the various stages of thought, the concept of being 
received radical reformulation. Raising anew the question of the meaning of being, as 
being is something about which we have become “perplexed,” Heidegger unhinges being 
from its relationship to predication and substance. Being is not something that belongs to 
an entity like an attribute of some kind, nor is it the content of the entity itself. Being and 
Time discloses many philosophical possibilities, but foremost among them it is an 
unflagging critique of substance ontologies. Since Platonism, for Heidegger, being has 
been conflated with beings; that is, the fact of existence itself, the to-be, is understood as 
a kind of supreme entity under which all other entities are subsumed. Being has been 
made ontic, rather than properly ontological. In order to remedy this unparalleled mistake 
in the history of philosophy, a mistake that Nietzsche clears the way to see, Heidegger 
proposes fundamental ontology as the route through which we can ask, with clear-eyed 
earnestness, of the question of the meaning of being.15   
In addition to mistaking being for a discrete being of some sort, substance 
ontology also overlooks the being for whom this distinction is an issue. The question of 
the meaning of being must be formulated, and consequently, only human beings—i.e., 
                                                
14 I have decided in this project to no longer retain the capitalization of being as Being 
unless using a direct quote. I fear this grammatical distinction risks reifying being into a 
supreme Being or at the very least a being among other beings—precisely that which 
fundamental ontology and phenomenological hermeneutics has overcome in the history 
of metaphysics. When discussing ontic beings the term will either be used in the plural or 
it will be noted we are dealing with an ontic entity. 
15 Heidegger’s concept of being will be further, and more intensely, explored in the next 
chapter where the relationship between being and communication is raised. 
Consequently, my discussion of being here is cursory and incomplete.  
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Dasein—can take up this charge. In this regard, for Heidegger Dasein is in the privileged 
position as being the only one who can raise the question of the meaning of being. There 
is a coincidence of question and questioner. As a result, Dasein is ontically distinctive in 
that it is ontological. That said, this privilege is simultaneously a problem as Dasein is 
paradoxically in the position of being ontically closest to itself, while ontologically the 
farthest away.  
Phenomenology, for Heidegger, and more specifically fundamental ontology, is 
the route through which the question of the meaning of being can be raised. Here 
Heidegger departs from the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl and develops 
instead a hermeneutic of Dasein as the style or way (but not quite a method) to approach 
being. Indeed, the whole of Being and Time discloses the ground upon which 
phenomenological talk of subjects and objects is made possible and in that respect 
undermines the subject/object distinction as the foundation of experience. We shall return 
to this in the following chapter; for now, however, we must simply note that being still 
remains an issue of utmost philosophical importance.  
 Taking up both Nietzsche and Heidegger, contemporary Italian philosopher 
Gianni Vattimo has suggested the task of philosophy, after overcoming substance 
ontology through phenomenology and philosophical hermeneutics, ought now be an 
“ontology of actuality.” He borrows this phrase from Michel Foucault who in his 1983 
lecture (that would later be edited in English into his essay “What is Enlightenment?”) 
writes that one must choose between “a critical philosophy which presents itself as an 
analytical philosophy of thought in general and a critical thought which will take the form 
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of an ontology of ourselves, an ontology of actuality.”16 Although of a similar spirit, 
Vattimo intentionally moves the project in a different direction. He takes up the phrase as 
a response to Heidegger’s call to recollect being, or as Heidegger puts it in his 
Introduction to Metaphysics to address the question: “How does it stand with Being,” or 
more colloquially, “How’s it going with Being?”17 In other words, an ontology of 
actuality describes being as it is understood within a particular epoch. Vattimo writes in 
Nihilism and Emancipation: “An ontology of actuality abandons all foundational claims 
and offers politics a certain vision of the ongoing historical process and a certain 
interpretation (free and not without risk) of its positive potential, judged to be such on the 
basis not of eternal principles but of argumentative choices from within the process 
itself.”18 The practice of philosophy is historical through and through—there is no 
separation between philosophy and temporality, most pressingly when it comes to the 
question of being. Furthermore, philosophy is now required to take note of rhetoric and 
rhetorical theory. An ontology of actuality rests on rhetorical choices and argumentation.  
In this respect, and in clear distinction from Heidegger, doing philosophy 
becomes an avowed political task from the start. That is, one does not merely do political 
philosophy, as if it were a choice between different philosophical domains (metaphysics, 
                                                
16 This lecture would later be edited into his provocative essay, building on Kant, “What 
is Enlightenment?” However, in the editing process Foucault removed this sentence and 
discussed instead “an historical ontology of ourselves” rather than “an ontology of 
actuality.” Nevertheless, Vattimo continues to use the phrase. Cf. Michel Foucault, 
“Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?,” Dits et ècrits II, 1976-1988 (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 
1506-1507. 
17 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 41. 
18 Vattimo, Nihilism and Emancipation: Ethics, Politics, and Law, trans. William 
McCuaig (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 88. 
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axiology, ethics, et cetera). One, in doing philosophy, is always already doing political 
work. In particular, this work is generative and reconstructive in the face of the 
breakdown of metaphysics and the modernization of the human experience. An ontology 
of actuality responds to the call of being in our age. Vattimo writes,  
Ontology of actuality” assumes the status of a mission, that of revealing, within 
the aperture of Being typical of modernity, the traits of a new aperture which 
would have among its constitutive characteristics the possibility of a 
reconstruction of the unitary sense of existence beyond the specialization and 
fragmentation proper to modernity.19  
An aperture is an opening, as in the aperture of a camera wherein light can enter the 
instrument. An aperture of being, then, is the opening through which Being can be 
revealed for our time. In tracing the contours of being, the ontology of actuality takes on 
a double significance, that of  “making oneself aware of the paradigm into which one has 
been thrown yet suspending its claim to definitive validity and heeding Being as that 
which remains unsaid.”20 Our aperture of being must go beyond the specialization and 
fragmentation of modernity, as Vattimo notes, but to understand this requirement we 
must first turn our attention to that which constricts our access to being; that is, we must 
examine what contracts or deflects our vision. This restriction is communicative and it is 
also communication that presents a way out.  
 
 
                                                
19 Vattimo, Nihilism and Emancipation, 12. 
20 Gianni Vattimo, A Farewell to Truth, trans. William McCuaig (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011), 32.  
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2.3 Narrowed Horizons 
“To hell with it all” and “let’s pray that it lasts” are the two sighs heaved 
alternately by the same civilized distress. 
The Invisible Committee, To Our Friends 
 
In what follows I shall explicate what I see to be the two predominant forces in 
our age that restrict an accomplished response to the call of being after the death of God: 
fundamentalism and cynicism. Each embodies a set of communicative practices that 
narrow the apertures of being and each is that from which we must find our way. Neither 
of these phenomena, in their myriad forms, is particularly new; rather, each has been with 
us for quite some time having consequence not only for the practice of philosophy but for 
the experience of everyday life. In other words, both fundamentalism and cynicism are 
deeply rooted in our being in the world and not something easily overcome. Nevertheless, 
as historical and communicative phenomenon they are open to change. Although these 
approaches to the call of being are distinct as they have a series of exclusive traits, they 
also have a great deal in common as my investigation will demonstrate.  
2.3.1 Fundamentalism 
 Although the events of September 11, 2001 brought fundamentalism to the 
forefront of the American public’s mind, fundamentalism is by no means reducible to the 
global politics of the early twenty-first century. Fundamentalism runs much deeper, to the 
core of our desires and our insecurities; fundamentalism is a response to freedom. It is an 
ideological position into which we fall easily and out of which is a difficult journey. As 
contemporary psychoanalyst Adam Phillips quips, “We are all fundamentalists about 
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something.”21 There is always something about which we are unwilling to see otherwise, 
something we hold so dear we are unwilling to allow it to change. The varieties of 
fundamentalism we are faced with today include, at the very least, religious, scientific, 
and economic fundamentalism. I shall address each in turn before addressing 
fundamentalism as a whole.  
 Religious fundamentalism is likely the fundamentalism with which we are most 
familiar not least because it is the one that receives the greatest media attention. Religious 
fundamentalism is a response to the modernization and secularization of the West. 
Historically, with the rise of global travel and networked communications, the world 
becomes demystified and religion plays a smaller role in the shaping of identity with the 
increased exposure to alternate ways of life. This demystification or relativizing of the 
world, however, received a backlash. Fundamentalist movements can be found on nearly 
every continent and within multiple religions, among them: Evangelical Christianity, 
militant Zionism, sects of Shia Islam, and circles of Hindu and Buddhist practice. 
Although definitions of religious fundamentalism abound, sociologist Gabriel Almond 
and his colleagues offer a particularly strong rendering that suits our hermeneutic 
interests. Fundamentalism is “a discernable pattern of religious militance by which self-
styled ‘true believers’ attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity, fortify the 
borders of the religious community, and create viable alternatives to secular institutions 
                                                
21 Adam Phillips, “On What is Fundamental,” in On Balance (New York: Farrar, Straus, 
and Giroux, 2010), 65.  
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and behaviors.”22 Fundamentalism, then, is an inoculation against the flux of time. 
Furthermore, according their well-known study of seven world religious traditions in 
“Fundamentalisms: Genus and Species,” fundamentalist groups are shaped by nine 
characteristics:  
(1) Reactivity to the marginalization of religion: the religious tradition is perceived as 
under attack by the modernization and secularization;  
(2) Selectivity: fundamentalism selects and reshapes aspects of the religion that helps 
to mark it in contradistinction from modernity; 
(3) Dualistic worldview: fundamentalism takes on a kind of Manichaeism wherein 
the world is separated into good/evil, light/dark; 
(4) Absolutism and inerrancy: the sacred text is unquestionable and free of error; 
(5) Millennialism and messianism: there is a belief in the end of time or the return of 
the holy one;   
(6) Elect, chosen membership: members of fundamentalist movements see 
themselves as called to take up this task to separate themselves from the secular 
world in defense of this tradition;  
(7) Sharp boundaries: clear rules to determine in- and out-groups;  
(8) Authoritarian organization: organized around charismatic leaders and numerous 
followers 
(9) Behavior requirements: rules about appropriate action and belief.23  
 
Although religious fundamentalism is practically as old as religion itself as it is an 
orientation toward orthodox tradition, scholars have speculated that the current forms of 
religious fundamentalism may have gained traction in the early 1990s as a replacement 
for Marxist-Leninism, National Socialism, and anti-colonialism, the former ideological 
                                                
22 Gabriel Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, Strong Religion: The Rise of 
Fundamentalisms Around the World (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 
17.   
23 Gabriel Almond, Emmanuel Sivan, and R. Scott Appleby, “Fundamentalisms: Genus 
and Species,” in Fundamentalisms Comprehended, eds. Martin Marty and R. Scott 
Appleby (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 399-424. This edited work is 
volume one of a five-part project that traces the roots of fundamentalism across 




responses to the rise of the liberal-capitalist world order of the West.24 In other words, 
religious fundamentalism is a response to the modern capitalist ethos and the 
fragmentation of orthodoxy. Consequently, religious fundamentalism often yearns to 
return to a mythical golden age when the norms of the fundamental tradition were most 
prevalent, but by no means perfect. Whether the era of the prophet Muhammad and the 
immediate successors for Islam or the bygone days of the 1950s for American 
Evangelicals, fundamentalism shares a curious relationship to nostalgia. Nostalgia, from 
the Greek, is a painful yearning to return home. Recalling Nietzsche, this nostalgia is a 
desire—however misplaced—to have one’s feet on solid ground, to have a fixed space 
from which to act rather than the muddled chaos of life in modernity. The religious 
fundamentalist denies the crisis of antifoundationalism and acts as if the madman’s words 
had never been proclaimed. In other words, the fundamentalist is one who has not heard.  
 Let us remember, however, that it was not the believers with whom the madman 
was speaking but the non-believers, those who we might call the inheritors of 
Enlightenment reason and objectivity. In this regard, a claim of scientific fundamentalism 
seems to be oxymoronic. Science and faith have been pitted against each other for ages, 
where science unabashedly champions progress over religious tradition. Nevertheless, 
when scientific practice falls into scientism, we are faced with situations eerily close to 
the religious fundamentalism science seeks to overcome. Linda Wiener and Ramsey Eric 
Ramsey offer a succinct account of scientism in their Leaving Us to Wonder: An Essay 
on the Questions Science Can’t Ask. Scientism is marked by the belief “that science is the 
                                                
24 Malise Ruthven, Fundamentalism: A Search for Meaning (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 4-5. 
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proper and exclusive foundation for thinking about and answering every question.” 
Scientism, they continue, is “a world view characterized by its authoritarian attitudes, its 
totalizing drive to encompass every question, and its disregard and disdain for alternative 
views…By scientism we understand a way of thinking and the public statements 
associated with it that extend the legitimacy of scientific thinking as such to issues and 
contexts outside the purview of science as a practice.”25 Wiener and Ramsey ground their 
argument in an investigation of the genetic determinism and sociobiology promoted by 
popular scientists such as Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett (both advocates of “ultra-
Darwinism”), Randy Thornhill, and Craig Palmer. For these scientists, our genetic 
configuration not only explains our biological processes, but dictates our moral action. 
Scientific fundamentalism suffers the same problem as religious fundamentalism, 
substituting the inerrancy of the divine word made manifest for the utilization of the 
scientific method as the only route to acquire an understanding of the human experience. 
Of course, most science is not practiced in this manner, just as most religious practice is 
not fundamentalism.  
An offshoot of scientific fundamentalism is the belief in the supremacy of 
economic determinism and neoliberal globalization. Nothing has ascended to replace the 
groundlessness left in the wake of the death of God in our age than the mechanisms of the 
market. Nothing has captured the American public—not the Christian ethos or 
Enlightenment rationalism—quite like the authority of economics and a belief in self-
interest. In 1947, social philosopher Karl Polanyi warned of the dangers of a market 
                                                
25 Linda Wiener and Ramsey Eric Ramsey, Leaving Us to Wonder: An Essay on the 
Questions Science Can’t Ask (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 15.  
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mentality. Industrialization required a reorganization of human existence and morality, 
but elevating the economic sphere as a mechanism through which experience could be 
understood reduces social relations to the safeguarding of individual interests. Polanyi 
writes, “Single out whatever motive you please, and organize production in such a 
manner as to make that motive the individual’s incentive to produce, and you will have 
induced a picture of man as altogether absorbed by that motive…The particular motive 
selected will represent ‘real’ man.”26 A kind of individualist ethos like that of genetic 
determinism, the market mentality reduces the individual to a single property. The market 
mentality prioritizes and rewards conflict and competition to the derision of communal 
interest and support. This was the concern in 1947 and since then market mentality has 
only intensified with the development of neoliberalism.  
In A Brief History of Neoliberalism, David Harvey offers a succinct account of the 
political and economic impetus to contemporary neoliberalism. Beginning his 
examination in the post-World War II reconstruction era and the preventative measures 
against the re-emergence of national rivalries that led to the war, he traces the rise of 
“embedded liberalism.” Within embedded liberalism, states regularly “intervened in 
industrial policy and moved to set standards for the social wage by constructing a variety 
of welfare systems.”27 Although it delivered high rates of economic growth in the 1950s 
and 1960s, embedded liberalism began to break down in the late 1960s, growth slowed, 
and advanced capitalist countries saw a mix of heavy inflation and unemployment due to 
a crisis of capital accumulation. Harvey situates neoliberalism as a project of 
                                                
26 Karl Polanyi, “Our Obsolete Market Mentality,” Commentary 3 (1947): 113.  




disembedding liberalism from the state that gained primacy in the 1980s.  It is important 
to note that Harvey adamantly argues the rise of neoliberalism was from the very 
beginning a project to restore class divisions in the face of redistributive social policies 
after the war.  
Because capitalism depends on the accumulation of capital without end, problems 
arise whenever the economy does not expand at a high rate of growth. As Harry Magdoff 
and Paul Sweezy argue in Monopoly Capital, stagnation is an ever-present threat to 
capitalism. Consequently, contemporary capitalism needed to account for the stagnation 
after the 1950s and found a highly efficient method for doing so: financialization. 
Financialization, or “the shift in the gravity of the economy from production to finance” 
has been increasingly gaining ground since the late 1970s. 28  John Bellamy Foster and 
Fred Magdoff in their collection of Monthly Review essays, The Great Financial Crisis, 
trace the rise, and now its potential fall, of financialization. Indeed, the presence of 
financialization is so great Harvey makes it a constitutive feature of neoliberalism stating, 
“Neoliberalism meant…the financialization of everything.”29 Various crises of capitalism, 
such as unemployment recessions, and stock market crashes are all tied to capitalism’s 
tendency to stagnation. Pushing this further, and aligning themselves with Magdoff and 
Sweezy, they argue stagnation is inherent in capitalism itself, and not merely an external 
problem capital faces at particular moments. Mechanisms, then, are put into place to 
overcome stagnation, such as imperialism, developments in technology, globalization, 
and the refined development of a debtor system. The financial situation with which we 
                                                
28 John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff, The Great Financial Crisis: Causes and 
Consequences (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009), 18.  
29 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 33.  
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are so familiar—predatory lending and the housing bubble, egregious levels of financial 
speculation in stocks, futures, derivatives, and currency—is all linked, on their account, 
to the attempt to avoid stagnation. Moreover, they see this as a new iteration of capitalism, 
and deserving of a new name: monopoly-finance capital. Monopoly-finance capital has 
implemented the following practices in an effort to avoid stagnation: 
(a) extending more and more loans to the general public and corporations; (b) 
lending to low-income people under very unfavorable and hard to understand 
terms; (c) adding debt to corporations through leveraged buyouts (making the 
companies more financially fragile and demanding cutbacks in jobs, wages, and 
benefits to compensate); (d) unbalancing trade with the rest of the world, 
requiring enormous sums of money to be invested in the U.S. from abroad; and (e) 
placing huge bets on almost anything imaginable.30 
As Foster and Magdoff continue, with a damning understatement: “A lot of people are 
making money off of these activities—except for those at the bottom who are left to foot 
the bill when problems arise.”31 Surprisingly, the neoliberal revolution in the United 
States and Great Britain has been achieved through more or less democratic means. Said 
otherwise, neoliberalism presents itself as common sense and not a radical reorganization 
of power and capital for an elite few. It is pervasive in our understanding of everyday life, 
giving shape to our interpretations of the world and our actions. Neoliberalism, as 
common sense, highlights the profound faith the public has in a market mentality that 
assumes our motives are born of economic self-interest. Moreover, without this faith in 
                                                
30 Foster and Magdoff, The Great Financial Crisis, 61.  
31 Foster and Magdoff, The Great Financial Crisis, 61. 
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economic determinism, neoliberalism would appear absurd; it is the orthodoxy of this 
belief that keeps in place the hegemonic element on which the system relies. Economic 
self-interest appears as a natural condition of human being in the world rather than one 
motive or mode of life among many.  
 Fundamentalism, whether religious, scientific, or economic, functions as a 
preservation of that which matters most after the secularization and fragmentation 
brought on in modernity: a sense of certainty. For religious fundamentalism, certainty 
rests in the belief in an all-powerful God; for scientific fundamentalism certainty rests in 
the trustworthiness of the scientific method to provide answers to the most pressing 
questions; for economic fundamentalism certainty rests in the conviction that economic 
motives underlie and ground our relationships with one another. What all three forms of 
fundamentalism demonstrate is the attempt to develop an unshakeable ground from 
which we might then give our lives stable meaning. Adam Phillips illustrates this when 
he writes, “The fundamental things are the things that upset us; and even though we think 
of our civility as constituted by our fundamental beliefs, our civility and our fundamental 
beliefs are easily at odds with one another.”32 Said differently, the fundamentals are those 
things we wish to preserve (a faith, a trust, an explanation) yet in this preservation we risk 
falling into mere reactionary habits. In this regard, fundamentalism tends to preserve the 
status quo:  
For the Fundamentalist…the structures of constraint [between what is and is not 
permissible] are by definition not always being drawn and redrawn, are not 
subject to whim or circumstance or competing vested interests. For the 
                                                
32 Phillips, “On What is Fundamental,” 65.  
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Fundamentalist, in this sense, there can be no such thing as progress, except 
perhaps the progress of keeping things as they are, under pressure: under the 
pressure of secularization, globalization, modernization.33  
Fundamentalisms attempt to provide a foundation in an anti-foundationalist world, an 
impossible task, and a dangerous one. Fundamentalism more generally is a hermeneutic 
comportment. One wherein the believer (whether religious, scientific, or economic) is 
unable or unwilling to see beyond her traditions—her sacred texts, rites, and methods—
and becomes myopically ensconced in the preservation of the status quo.  
2.3.2 Cynicism 
 Whereas fundamentalism attempts to offer a foundation when none can be 
promised, cynicism is a mode of being that accepts this groundlessness with a sense of 
resignation. Strangely similar to fundamentalism, cynicism is a reactionary position and 
one with a long history that has changed dramatically over time. Although cynicism has a 
complicated history, I shall focus here only on its modern articulation. No one has traced 
the contours of cynicism more masterfully than German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk 
whose lengthy tome Critique of Cynical Reason is widely considered to be the landmark 
study in cynicism. For Sloterdijk, modern cynicism (in distinction to its kynical 
counterparts rooted in ancient Athens) finds its source in Enlightenment rationality—at 
the height of the metaphysics we examined earlier. The force of the Enlightenment was 
its power of critique, an unflagging march against illusions. Sloterdijk goes further and 
demonstrates how this relentless criticism led the way for new forms of dogmatism. He 
writes, “Enlightenment does not penetrate into social consciousness simply as an 
                                                
33 Phillips, “On What is Fundamental,” 67.  
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unproblematic bringer of light. Where it has an effect, a twilight arises, a deep 
ambivalence…the atmosphere in which, in the middle of a snarl of factual self-
preservation with moral self-denial, cynicism crystalizes.”34 He characterizes eight waves, 
or unmaskings, of critique—by examining each briefly we will have a better sense of the 
context within which cynicism developed and that from which we must find room to 
twist-a-way.  
 The first critique, the critique of revelation, attacks the presumption that texts (in 
particular Holy Scripture) are divine and absolute. Enlightenment critique investigates 
this claim and demands evidence to ground the revelatory nature of the texts. Sloterdijk 
writes, “With the question ‘How can we know that?’ enlightenment severs the roots of 
revelatory knowledge quite elegantly, without being particularly aggressive,” and 
consequently all texts call for interpretation and are exposed to conflicts of 
interpretation.35 The absoluteness of the Absolute is brought into question. Texts become 
something about which we must offer a reading rather than the pure manifestation of the 
divine Word that requires no explanation. Consequently, we see the rise of biblical 
hermeneutics. The second unmasking, the critique of religious illusion, goes after 
religious phenomena more sharply. Here, what is uncovered is not whether or not God 
exists, but the attributes such a God might have. That is to say, this critique exposes the 
anthropomorphic characteristics of God, in particular the images of family and 
procreation (i.e., production) at the core of our understanding of the divine. It 
demonstrates that the various conceptions of God are human projections. Moreover, this 
                                                
34 Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, trans. Michael Eldred, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 22.  
35 Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, 25.  
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critique exposes the deceptions of the priestly class by asking “Whom does religion serve, 
and what function does it serve in the life of society?”36 This understanding of an 
instrumentalist theory of religion is essential for the development of modern, self-
reflective cynicism as it shows that one can “suffer a delusion and also, undeluded, use it 
against others.”37 One only need think of Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor to get a sense 
of the mechanism for this deception. Here one can see the functional necessity of 
illusions and Christianity becomes not merely a matter of faith, but a program of power 
and knowledge.  
 Moving beyond the religious sphere, the third unmasking, the critique of 
metaphysical illusion, demonstrates the limitations of reason. Whereas it was 
enlightenment rationality undertaking the first two movements of unmaskings, now 
enlightenment thinking itself is under question. As Sloterdijk explains, in investigating 
the ideals beyond reason, all metaphysical alternatives are of “equal value and 
undecidable: determinism and indeterminism; finiteness versus infinitude; the existence 
of God versus the non-existence of God; idealism versus materialism; and so forth.”38 In 
other words, we are left with a series of aporias with little guarantee of a sure way out. 
Enlightenment rationality leaves the individual knower in a cul de sac of paradoxes 
without any solution. Following this, the critique of idealistic superstructure is the fourth 
unmasking. Here, of course, we have the work of Marx and his critique of the ahistorical 
status of idealism. Consciousness is not purely free; it is comprised of social interests 
through and through, in particular economic relations and the power of labor. With this 
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38 Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, 35.  
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unmasking we receive the idea of false consciousness, the necessity of ideology that 
supports and keeps mystified the ground of class society, which will become crucial to 
the development of modern cynicism (and which we saw was already at work in a 
nascent form in the critique of religious illusion). In this unmasking the entire history of 
philosophy, from Plato onward, is understood to have been founded on the backs of the 
subjugated. The fifth unmasking, the critique of moral illusion, takes us from Marx to 
Nietzsche by way of Christianity. This critique demonstrates the way in which morality 
works through double-standards (for example, rules for men of power and for those who 
are ruled) and reductive simplifications. Morality, upon this critique, no longer stands as 
a pure source of authority. Furthermore, morality is no longer something which is pure, 
but is the instantiation of rules that benefit the powerful elite. 
 The critique of transparency, or the sixth unmasking, moves us back toward the 
individual and the discovery of the unconscious and the final hermeneut of suspicion. 
When Freud and psychoanalysis more generally explicated the work of unconscious 
processes in all our forms of thinking and acting, he demonstrated a rift between act and 
intention. No longer could one claim that they know themselves better than anyone else; 
on the contrary, with the critique of transparency of the ego it becomes clear that we may 
well know ourselves the least. The seventh and related unmasking, the critique of natural 
illusion undermines the naturalness of what is given. In other words, it highlights the 
arbitrariness of human existence—that we are as we are as a result of social processes 
and not because it is our essence. There is no human nature to which we might have 
recourse; this foundation is gone and perhaps never was. The last critique against illusion 
is the critique of the illusion of privacy. Here the sovereign ego is under attack and 
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consequently the idol of identity. Sloterdijk shows, through a discussion of political 
identity, the way in which each class in history creates its own type of subject. In other 
words, referring to the previous unmasking, there is no pure identity. Sloterdijk writes,  
The mania for ‘identity’ seems to be the deepest of the unconscious 
programmings, so deeply buried that it evades even attentive reflection for a long 
time. A formal somebody, as bearer of our social identifications, is, so to speak, 
programmed into us. It guarantees in almost every aspect the priority of what is 
alien over what is one’s own. Where ‘I’ seem to be, others always went before me 
in order to automatize me through socialization. Our true self-experience in 
original Nobodiness remains in this world buried under taboo and panic.39  
Subjectivity itself comes under criticism and the insecurity of selflessness is brought to 
the fore. No longer reliable is the promise that we might know who we are, or that there 
is even a “we” after all.  
 I have rehearsed these eight unmaskings or critiques of illusion in order to set the 
stage for the advent of modern cynicism. Furthermore, these waves give further depth 
into the crisis of directionality to which Nietzsche gives voice. Each of these unmaskings, 
we might say, marks another juncture where indeterminacy seeps into the human 
experience and rattles each of us to the core. Each is a moment of disorientation. The 
ethos of enlightenment present throughout these critiques is then repudiated in the 
beginning of modern cynicism, on Sloterdijk’s account. With enlightenment rationality 
comes mistrust, mistrust of religion, morality, and eventually the self—eventually we are 
left with little more than suspicion and suspicion is at the core of cynicism. This 
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suspicion is born out of the Enlightenment’s pursuit of rationality against the 
pervasiveness of superstition; however, in its cynical form this suspicion is so widespread 
that it is nearly without content—we begin to see suspicion for suspicion’s sake. To put it 
another way, it is not that suspicion itself is inherently problematic (there is, no doubt, 
much about which we ought to be suspicious), but when we allow suspicion to run 
rampant we find ourselves corned into cynicism. Furthermore, the problem with critique 
is that it is always fragmented into localized movements, without the ability to build a 
substantial front; indeed, as Sloterdijk argues, Enlightenment turned on itself and took 
itself to be its main opponent. This happens by way of a series of “breaks” in the 
Enlightenment, in particular the main break through “the hegemonic powers’ politics of 
antireflection, which consciously tries to preserve the naïveté of others.”40 Enlightenment 
critique brings an understanding of the knowledge of power to a wider audience, but 
nevertheless it morphs into a kind of self-denial of morality, of a disappointment without 
recourse to wide-scale change. In other words, enlightenment leads to a kind of 
disenchantment with the world. Thus Sloterdijk writes, “Discontent in our culture appears 
today as universal, diffuse cynicism.”41 A cynicism that nearly feels inescapable at times.  
Following his discussion of Enlightenment’s turn on itself, Sloterdijk offers 
sketches of various characters we find in cynicism. Diogenes of Sinope, Mephistopheles, 
and the Grand Inquisitor all make a showing, but here I shall focus only briefly on his 
final characterization—the Anyone to which all belong. Sloterdijk writes, with a crushing 
clarity, “On earth, existence has ‘nothing to search for’ except itself, but where cynicism 
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rules, we search for everything but not for existence (Dasein). Before we ‘really live,’ we 
always have just one more matter to attend to, just one more position to fulfill, just one 
more temporarily more important wish to satisfy, just one more account to settle.”42 
Furthermore, in the face of this structure of postponement and deferral, the system which 
makes these dreams deferred continues to run unimpeded. This insight leads us to the 
subject of modern diffuse cynicism: the Anyone. Sloterdijk explicitly works upon 
Heidegger’s discussion of the They (das Man) in Being and Time to give a sense of 
character to the Anyone.43 Sloterdijk writes,  
It [Anyone] exists, but there is ‘nothing behind’ it. It is there like modern, 
nonfigure sculptures; real, everyday, concrete part of a world but not 
referring at any time to an actual person, a ‘real’ meaning. Anyone is the 
neutreum of our ego: everyday ego but not ‘I myself.’ It represents in a 
certain way my public side, my mediocrity.44 
The Anyone represents our public persona, the mask we present to others but underneath 
which nothing much remains. The Anyone is an individual, indeed the suspicion at the 
core of cynicism prevents a trust in being-together from developing and reduces any 
given person into an isolated cogito. The cynic embodies Thatcher’s commentary that 
“[There is] no such thing as society, only individual men and women.”45 Consequently, in 
the mode of cynicism we are rarely ever with another, even if they are standing right by 
                                                
42 Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, 194. 
43 A more thorough discussion of the They, from Heidegger’s perspective, is provided in 
the following chapters.  
44 Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, 197. 
45 Douglas Keay interview with Margaret Thatcher, Women’s Own, Sept. 23, 1987. 
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us. Rather than in solidarity, we are at worst at odds and at best in a relationship of utility. 
Sloterdijk notes that “alienation is…the mode of being of Anyone.”46 This alienation, 
however, is viewed by the cynic without any moral coloring; rather, we simply are 
alienated and there is nothing we can do about it. The Anyone is uncanny, without a 
sense of authenticity, but equally without a clear desire for authenticity. The cynic is thus 
caught between a kind of self-certain suspicion and a muted sense of being-together. 
 Drawing from Marx, Sloterdijk defines cynicism as “enlightened false 
consciousness.” Sloterdijk continues,  
It is that modernized, unhappy consciousness, on which enlightenment has 
labored both successfully and in vain. It has learned its lessons in enlightenment, 
but it has not, and probably was unable to, put them into practice. Well-off and 
miserable at the same time, this consciousness no longer feels affected by any 
critique of ideology: its falseness is already reflexively buffered.47  
In other words, cynicism is marked by a recognition that our experience and 
understanding of the world is shaped by the dictates of enlightenment-turned-neoliberal 
global capital, and yet we rarely do anything to change our circumstances.  
 In this way, the contemporary character under cynicism is also marked by a deep 
and abiding sense of resignation. We know better than we do and yet we do not actualize 
such knowledge. I do not wish to argue here that the resignation stems from a feeling that 
we believe we deserve the way things are, and thus attempt to cope with them. Rather, 
this resignation develops from the belief that we simply have to “be realistic” about the 
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way things are and understand that no sweeping changes can be made.48 There is, it 
seems, a distrust of all attempts at solidarity, or the assumption that any political 
unification will, from the start, fail to accomplish its goals because the force of 
neoliberalism is too pervasive. Adorno, in his short essay “Resignation” tries to come to 
                                                
48 Adorno and Horkheimer give us a clear look at this phenomenon in a fictionalized 
conversation between two young people, A and B. Person A is beholden to a kind of 
either/or logic and keeps pressing person B to make ridiculous claims about his future.  
A. You don’t want to be a doctor? 
B. By their profession doctors have a lot of to with dying people; that 
desensitizes them. Moreover, with advanced institutionalization the doctor 
represents business and its hierarchy vis-à-vis the patient. He is often tempted 
to act as an advocate of death. He becomes an agent of big business against 
consumers. If one is selling automobiles it’s not so bad, but if the commodity 
being administered is life and the consumers are the sick, that’s a situation I’d 
prefer not to be in… 
A. So you think there shouldn’t be any doctors, or that the old charlatans ought to 
come back? 
B. I did not say that. I just have a horror of being a doctor myself…Nevertheless, 
I do, of course, think it better to have doctors and hospitals than to leave sick 
people to die. I would not want to be a public prosecutor, yet giving a free run 
to armed robbers would seem to me a far greater evil than the existence of a 
body of people who put them in prison. Justice is reasonable. I am not against 
reason; I only want to investigate the form it has taken. 
A. You are in contradiction with yourself. You yourself constantly make use of 
the advantages provided by doctors and judges. You are as guilty as they are. 
It is just that you don’t want to be burdened with the work which others do for 
you. Your own life presupposes the principle you are trying to evade.  
B. I do not deny it, but contradiction is necessary. It is a response to the objective 
contradiction of society. In a division of labor as complex as that of today, 
horror can manifest itself in one place and bring down guilt on everyone. If 
word of it got about, or if even a small proportion of people were aware of it, 
lunatic asylums and penal institutes might finally be superfluous. But that is 
not the reason why I want to be a writer. I just want to be clearer about the 
terrible state in which everything is.  
A. If everyone thought as you do, and no one wanted to get his hands dirty, there 
would be neither doctors nor judges, and the world would be even more 
dreadful… 
“This conversation,” Adorno and Horkheimer write, “is repeated wherever someone 
refuses to give up thought in face of praxis.” Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. Edmund 
Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 198-199.  
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terms with the political demand in the late 1960s milieu and his distrust of activism. He 
states of the perception of the intellectual, “Whoever only thinks, removes himself, is 
considered weak, cowardly, virtually a traitor.”49 In addition to the societal distrust of the 
intellectual and the often false conception that she does little more than hide out in her 
ivory tower, in times of political action the refusal to jump headlong into a political 
program is not only scoffed at, it is derided. Adorno notes, “Praxis is needed, they say, 
precisely in order to do away with the domination by practical people and the practical 
ideal. But then this is quickly transformed into a prohibition on thinking.”50 For Adorno, 
though, what is needed now more than ever is not blatant social action, but the courage to 
think. Resignation, on his account, is not the seclusion of the intellectual, but the 
exceeding hatred of thought. He continues, 
The uncompromisingly critical thinker, who neither signs over his consciousness 
nor lets himself be terrorized into action, is in truth the one who does not give in. 
Thinking is not the intellectual reproduction of what already exists anyway. As 
long as it doesn’t break off, thinking has a secure hold on possibility. Its insatiable 
aspect, its aversion to being quickly and easily satisfied, refuses the foolish 
wisdom of resignation.51 
What follows, then, is an attempt at thinking; it is an attempt at thinking beyond 
fundamentalism and cynicism and toward a comportment that embraces simultaneously 
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Nietzsche’s dissolution of metaphysics and the ethical call that is issued forth every 
moment we encounter one another.  
2.4 Finding Our Way 
We are like Gulliver lying stranded on the Lilliputian shore with every part of his 
body tied down; determined to free himself, he looks keenly around him: the 
smallest detail of the landscape, the smallest contour of the ground, the slightest 
movement, everything becomes a sign on which his escape may depend. The most 
certain chances of liberation are born in what is most familiar. Was it ever 
otherwise? 
Raoul Vanegeim, The Revolution of Everyday Life 
 
We are not over the death of God; on the contrary, as Nietzsche’s madman 
reminds us, we might not have even heard. “I have come too early…my time is not yet. 
This tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering,” the madman laments. Any 
attempt to find our way out from this disaster must travel an arduous path avoiding both 
fundamentalism and cynicism in all its various manifestations.  
Despite the death of god, we are not without faith. To be sure, faith is all around 
us. The fundamentalist still has faith, the faith of orthodoxy that comes too close to 
certainty when none can be granted. It is an unwise faith, but faith nevertheless. The 
cynic too has a strange faith, the faith in self-interest and suspicion as profitable modes of 
being-with others. Underlying each of these forms of faith, however, is a more elemental 
faith that is central to experience itself. This faith is a-theistic and unhinged from any 
historical religion. It is the faith to which testimony points: the faith that words still 
matter, even if we throw them around on the cheap. Even the most self-interested cynic 
presupposes some kind of faith in the other with whom she talks, a faith that her words 
are true. Certainly the cynic might aim to undermine these words and approach them with 
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suspicion, but in order for language to be intelligible we must already have faith in the 
hermeneutic texture of the world. Our faith in the meaningfulness of things allows any 
one thing to be meaningful in a particular way. This faith is bare, yes, and maybe even 
weak, but it makes possible so much, we might even say everything, that matters.   
Let us turn to one final orienting concept to set us on our way. Gianni Vattimo in 
his discussions of the dissolution of metaphysics makes much of the German word of 
Verwindung (“overcoming” or “twisting-free”). He finds the earliest expressions of the 
concept in Nietzsche as a kind of surpassing that does not leave behind that which is 
being moved beyond. In Verwindung something is retained, Vattimo argues, like the way 
in which a body retains the traces of an illness even after one’s symptoms have subsided. 
Vattimo goes beyond its expression in Nietzsche and moves to Heidegger’s 
hermeneutical philosophy. Vattimo writes, “Being is none other than the trans-mission of 
historico-destinal disclosures which constitute the possibility of access to the world for 
humanity in each epoch. The experience of being, as the experience of responding to and 
of receiving, is always An-denken (re-thinking, meditative pondering, loving recollection) 
and Verwindung (overcoming, getting over, recuperating).”52 Experiencing being, as a 
receiving, is a recuperating and overcoming; it is, in other words, a working through the 
past so as to move beyond it. However, rather than overcome or twist-free as the word 
implies, I suggest we coax the German a bit for our own purposes and consider twisting-
a-way as a more tempered term.  
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Twisting-a-way more clearly retains the inescapable tether we have to history and 
tradition, to the existential situatedness we have in a particular place. Indeed, twisting-a-
way sees place for what it is: the true starting point for ontology and communicative 
ethics. We only are who we are because we are ensconced within a series of 
circumstances and institutions, because we are entwined within history and language. It is 
from out of this having-been placed, our emplacement so to speak, that we have the 
freedom necessary to act. To twist-free, rather than twist-a-way, would be to escape this 
emplacement. Such a thing is, of course, impossible. Nevertheless, we must twist-a-way 
from the inheritance which grants us little freedom to move, fundamentalism and 
cynicism. However, we find our possibilities of recourse from within the tradition that, at 
times, is so constraining. We twist-a-way from one element of the tradition toward 
something else. The tradition serves as a kind of pathway that leads us elsewhere, toward 
a future that is more promising than the status quo.  
In order to address these dual hermeneutic comportments of restricted 
understanding—fundamentalism and cynicism—I suggest we twist-a-way through 
approaching communication from the perspective of testimony and hyperbole. 
Underlying both fundamentalism and cynicism is a functionalist approach to language as 
an exchange of information. For the fundamentalist, one is caught between absolute 
acceptance (of the divine word or the dictates of science or the market). The cynic, on the 
other hand, is either speechless in the face of a world without absolutes or, perhaps worse, 
treats language as another tool in the project of enlightened false consciousness. 
Furthermore, each rests upon a kind of self-certainty that is no longer suitable after the 
dissolution of foundationalist metaphysics: the self-certainty of absolutism for the 
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fundamentalist, and the self-certainty of self-interest for the cynic. Recalling our 
discussion of Derrida in our opening, the curious thing about our contemporary global 
circumstance is that it rests upon a faith which testimony highlights. Not the absolute 
faith of the fundamentalist, or the faith in self-interest of the cynic, but a broader faith 
which underlies them both—a faith which communication presupposes. Twisting-a-way, 
then, must negotiate between these twin polls of disaster and come to terms with this faith. 
To do so, we must examine the resources we have to understand communication 
otherwise.  
 Nothing, of course, seems more difficult than this. Twisting-a-way requires a 
unique interpretation of our historical communicative circumstances. Furthermore, it is a 
thoroughly hermeneutic position as it requires grappling with the horizon of 
understanding we have before us and negotiating the pluralism of possible responses. 
Unfortunately, making our way must occur without the foundation Nietzsche so 
scrupulously critiqued. There are no dictums here, only the endless unfolding of 
mysteries to guide our way. In this regard, I suggest we approach our task of twisting-a-
way aphoristically, that is, we allow it to be tempered by the uncertainty and limitlessness 
of experience rather than the self-certainty of either fundamentalism or cynicism. Let us 
then attempt to think of communication aphoristically—not of the communication genre 
of the aphorism, but of communication itself as textured by the rationality of the 
aphorism. 
Thankfully our paths to undertake this task of twisting-a-way are many. John 
Holloway in his recent book Crack Capitalism speaks to this point writing,  
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There is no Right Answer, just millions of experiments: There is no single correct 
answer to the desperate (and time-honoured) question of what is to be done. 
Perhaps the best answer that can be given is: ‘Think for yourself and yourselves, 
use your imagination, follow your inclinations and do whatever you consider 
necessary or enjoyable, always with the motto of against-and-beyond capital.’ For 
some, this will mean throwing themselves into the preparations for the next anti-
G8 summit. For others, it will mean trying to open up perspectives of a different 
world for the children they teach in school. Others will join with their neighbours 
to create a community garden, or take part in the activities of the nearby social 
centre. Some will dedicate all their energies to organising opposition to the 
extension of a motorway that threatens the livelihood of thousands of peasants, 
some will devote themselves to permaculture or creating free software, others will 
just play with their children and friends, or white a book on how to change the 
world. All of these are cries of hope, projections towards a different way of living, 
attempts to do something better with our lives than creating capitalism.53  
The route I shall take is my own, but not mine alone. It belongs rather to a very long 
lineage of those who find themselves concerned with the role language and 
communication plays in our dwelling together with others. It is through deepening and 
clarifying our understanding of this ubiquitous phenomenon that we can twist our way, 
with a modicum of grace, through the crises of our time. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE MEASURE OF BEING: APPERTURES AND APPROACHES 
Of a discourse to come – on the to-come and repetition. Axiom: no to-come 
without heritage and the possibility of repeating. No to-come without some sort of 
iterability.  
Jacques Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge” 
 
3.1 Being and Communication 
The understanding of Being is nothing other than an understanding of others, 
which means, in every sense, understanding others through “me” and 
understanding “me” through others. One could say even more simply that Being 
is communication. But it remains to be known what ‘communication’ is. 
- Jean Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural 
 
Philosophy, as the ancients taught us time and again, begins in wonder. An object 
of wonder rattles and provokes us. The wonder may have been brought on perhaps by 
witnessing a passing comet, the intricacies of a molecule, the majesty of a natural 
landscape or an artwork. Regardless of its originating source, wonder stirs something in 
us, excites us, and, I believe, moves us to speak. Wonder gives direction. For the ancient 
philosophers and many others, the greatest wonder was provoked by the totality of 
existence, namely the question: why is there something rather than nothing? In other 
words, the greatest wonder was the question of being. The question of being and the 
meaning of communication have within the history of philosophy existed in a state of 
continual convergence and separation both as fields and objects of study. The most 
succinct contemporary articulation of this relationship comes from French philosopher  
 Jean-Luc Nancy in his book Being Singular Plural, which is his re-working of 
Heidegger’s most communicatively-oriented concept, being-with, in the fundamental 
ontology of Being and Time. As Nancy writes in the epigraph above, being is 
communication. Yet what still needs to be uncovered philosophically is what 
communication means. Consequently, this chapter shall explore through forays into 
fundamental ontology and philosophical hermeneutics what such a claim might hold and 
develop a shared vocabulary for the work that remains. In other words, I shall draw from 
the thinkers discussed here to cultivate the ground for the philosophical approach to 
communication I shall contribute. The next chapter will continue this insight and offer a 
philosophical account of what communication means by drawing together this 
philosophical history with elements from rhetorical theory to propose a theory of 
hyperbole.   
Despite our philosophical confusion, the concept of communication appears to be 
self-evident—we can point to instances of communication with relative ease. 
Nevertheless, its ubiquity is no guarantee that the concept can be pinned down and 
sufficiently understood. Few words carry such weight in modern society and have such a 
broad scope. Communication extends from multi-billion dollar global industries to the 
intimacy of interpersonal relations and therapeutic sessions. Communication is a term 
frequently applied not only to human beings, but with greater force each day to other 
animals and now even plants. However, what is most striking about communication is not 
its pervasiveness, but that it manages to occur at all. That human beings are in relation to 
each other, in a social space saturated with the faith that makes words possible, is rather 
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miraculous. That is to say, that we say something rather than nothing is as much a wonder 
as being itself.  
This wonder is lost or at the very least diminished, I believe, when we narrow our 
conceptualizations of communication to the modernist and industrialist versions with 
which we are so familiar and that fundamentalism and cynicism attempt to name. As a 
nascent discipline in the 1940s, communication research nobly focused on achieving a 
society with a minimum of communicative failures. However, with the rise of the 
telecommunications industry in the twenties and the development of information theory, 
communication came to be understood as a form of information exchange over or 
through particular channels. This desire for universal intelligibility, together with 
attempts at objectivity, led to what we now call the transmission model of communication. 
As even a passing familiarity with the discipline’s history demonstrates, with Claude 
Shannon, Warren Weaver, and Norbert Weiner leading the way, communication became 
more an issue of mathematics and engineering than wisdom and phronesis as was the 
case with its earlier roots in rhetorical practice.  
Largely unchallenged until much later in the discipline’s history, the transmission 
model posits that communication is essentially a functional process of the transference or 
exchange of information (i.e., a message) between a sender and a receiver. This model 
rests on a Cartesian understanding of the subject/object distinction. In this model a sender 
(i.e., a subject) encodes a message (i.e., an object) and transmits through a channel that 
may contain within it some kind of noise or destabilizing force, to a receiver (i.e., another 
subject) who then decodes or translates the message. At issue is not whether 
communication can take this form (it can), but whether this is indeed communication in 
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its most basic form. That is to say, is communication reducible to information exchange. 
Furthermore, this model fails to take into account the conditions for its possibility (how 
does the sender craft the message? How does the receiver receive it? That is, what makes 
such a practice possible?). Moreover, because this understanding is focused on “the 
extension of messages in space” and “imparting information,” the model reinforced a 
technological understanding of the phenomenon contrary to the philosophical and 
testimonial approach we are taking here.1 This had its consequences. Communication 
scholar Stanley Deetz illuminates the situation with this observation: 
By the 1960s the functionalists’ domination of communication studies in the 
United States was so complete that any critical analysis of the social 
consequences of existing communication conceptions and practices was nearly 
impossible. Conceptions of meaning based in reductionist psychology, concern 
with control and system integration, fragmented empirical observations, and 
preoccupation with transmission conspired together to make impossible a rich 
theoretical understanding of the social historical nature of modern communication 
practice…Attempts to reform this tradition with new concepts, in most cases, 
either provide technical solutions within the dominant conception (e.g., feedback 
loops and meditational processes), reaffirmed existing assumptions (e.g., focus on 
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receiver interpretive processes), or generated no systematic development or 
research (e.g., process conceptions).2   
To be sure, few within the field still espouse this functionalist view with much 
commitment. Nevertheless, we find it frequently in textbooks for introductory level 
undergraduate courses without the criticism necessary to demonstrate communication 
extends far beyond the narrow tendencies of information exchange. Why teach what we 
ourselves seem not to believe? Moreover, non-scholars continue to implicitly connect 
communication with information. In this project, simply put, we shall not understand 
communication this way. Instead, we shall turn our attention to a fuller conceptualization 
of communication that is granted to us by the linguistic turn in the history of philosophy. 
To clarify, communication can certainly be an exchange of information; however, this act 
is derivative of a deeper understanding of communication as testimony.  
To give shape to this claim, in this chapter I shall explore the work of three 
philosophers for whom being and communication are so closely intertwined that at times 
the concepts appear synonymous: Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer. Furthermore, each of these thinkers challenges information theory in their own 
way and open communication to a far more pervasive role in both philosophical 
scholarship and everyday life. In this sense, they offer an alternative aperture through 
which we are able to examine the phenomenon of communication. Said differently, each 
provides a different texture to communication, drawing some elements to the fore while 
allowing others to recede into the background. I turn here to these twentieth century 
                                                
2 Stanley Deetz, Democracy in an Age of Corporate Colonization: Developments in 
Communication and the Politics of Everyday Life (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1992), 6.  
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continental philosophers before I turn to my direct contemporaries with whom I’m in 
conversation—in particular Gianni Vattimo and Jean-Luc Nancy—so as to set a historical 
backdrop for my approach to understanding communication philosophically in chapter 
three. I wish to sketch out here a constellation of terms and interpretations that are more 
or less presupposed by those doing ontological investigations of communicative praxis 
today and that will remain in use throughout this project. To be sure, every explication is 
itself an interpretation—such is the great lesson of hermeneutics—and I shall read these 
three thinkers with an eye toward tempering our understanding of communication with 
the textures of testimony.  




in my heart.  
Rainer Maria Rilke, Duino Elegies 
 
The expectation of perfect consistency between moments within a writer’s corpus 
is an expectation rarely fulfilled. More so, it is an expectation we would do well to 
abandon. As Hannah Arendt writes in The Human Condition, “Fundamental and flagrant 
contradictions rarely occur in second-rate authors; in the work of the great authors they 
lead into the very center of their work.”3 Exact correspondence between a thinker’s ideas 
over time is far too static and demonstrative of a mind that has failed to expand with the 
times and its ever-changing circumstances. We need expansive thinkers, even if such 
expanse leaves pressing questions to be approached only obliquely. In the same spirit, let 
                                                




us recall Deleuze and Guattari’s insight at the beginning of Thousand Plateaus: “The two 
of us wrote Anti-Oedipus together. Since each of us was several, there was already quite a 
crowd.”4 In the all too crowded practice of thinking and writing, perhaps there is 
something to be had in being content with hints and glimpses of the philosophic issues of 
ultimate concern.   
 Among those thinkers of the expanse who push up against the limits of our so-
called common sense and who force us to stretch our understandings so as to account 
truthfully for our experiences—for how they are and not how we might wish them to 
be—we find Martin Heidegger. The question of how many Heideggers one might find 
over the course of his life’s work has no doubt been both a popular and disputed one. For 
William Richardson there were two Heideggers—marked by the Kehre occurring around 
1930 wherein Heidegger abandons the phenomenologically oriented existential-analytic 
of Dasein.5 For Calvin Schrag there were three: a movement from the quest for the 
meaning of being, to the truth of being, to the erasure of being—all indicated by a shift 
away from the analytic of Dasein toward the poetic unfolding of language.6 Yet Schrag 
makes room for more, stating, “There could indeed be four Heideggers, five Heideggers, 
or possibly more. Might there not be multiple Heideggers, at times conjugated, in league 
                                                
4 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). 
5 William Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff Press, 1963).  
6 Calvin O. Schrag, “The Three Heideggers,” Philosophical Papers: Betwixt and Between 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).  
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with each other, and at other times differentiated and disparate?”7 Said differently, 
perhaps there are as many Heideggers as there are questions we might pose to his thought.  
 I raise the question of the multiplicity of Heideggers not to add my voice to the 
chorus—I will remain silent on how many Heideggers I think there are—but simply to 
clear a way to track down one Heidegger in particular, namely the Heidegger who 
emerges when he is trying to think through the question of communication. Consequently, 
in dealing with this Heidegger, I will focus my attention in two parts. First, I will focus 
on his early work where the issue of communication is raised, primarily Being and Time 
(1927) and his earlier lectures at Marburg published as Basic Concepts of Aristotelian 
Philosophy (1924). Following this, I will pause and turn to Jaspers and Gadamer, both of 
whom were directly influenced by this early work. Doing so will offer some nuance to 
Heidegger’s early position on communication. I will then return to Heidegger once more 
to examine his shift in understanding communication within his later writings. This 
approach, although seemingly disjointed as Heidegger will undergo an interruption, 
allows for a clearer visualization of the increasingly poetic and poeticized understanding 
of communication and being that develops in the continental philosophical tradition, the 
one of concern to me in this work and to which I shall make a contribution by theorizing 
the phenomenon of testimony.  
Allow me to work in an untimely manner, beginning with Heidegger’s 
popularized conception of communication in his early work. As we recall from the 
previous chapter, Heidegger sets out in the fundamental ontology of Being and Time to 
raise the question of the meaning of being. He does so by maintaining the ontological 
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difference between being and beings, and situates Dasein as that privileged being for 
whom being itself is an issue. Wrenching being away from its understanding through 
substance ontology, Heidegger takes a hermeneutical and phenomenological approach. 
Within the pages of Being and Time, communication finds its most explicit and sustained 
treatment in §33: “Assertion as a Derivative Mode of Interpretation.” There Heidegger 
argues assertions—which are at root a judgment—are grounded upon understanding. In 
other words, an interpretive understanding has always taken place already and it is from 
out of this preliminary understanding that an interpretation can be laid out concretely. 
Said differently, any given assertion is dependent upon the hermeneutical “as” (i.e., 
taking something as something) which necessarily occurs before the assertion. 
Traditionally, assertion has three primary significations: (1) pointing-out or sharing-forth 
[Aufzeigen]; (2) predication; and (3) communication. Aufzeigen refers to the way in 
which an entity is seen from itself. Heidegger offers once an example of a hammer. When 
we assert that “The hammer is too heavy” we are not merely attributing a meaning to an 
object, but more primordially we are discovering the entity as it is as ready-to-hand (i.e., 
as it is in a project). The showing is not a representation but an uncovering of the entity. 
Predication, the second signification of assertion is perhaps our most common 
understanding. Here a subject is given a definite character by the attachment of a 
predicate. Returning to the hammer, which stands here as the subject, it takes on the 
character of being “too heavy.” The attribution of a predicate restricts and limits our 
seeing or interpretation of the entity—if it is “too heavy” we are, for example, limited in 
seeing it as light. The situation is, as Heidegger notes, “dimmed,” moving from the 
hermeneutic as to the apophantical as—i.e., the structure of propositional speaking—thus 
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allowing the character of the entity to be lit up against the darkness of what has fallen out 
of the boundaries of the predication. The character of the hammer is lit up against the 
boundaries of what the hammer is not.  
On the heels of these two primary significations of assertion comes 
communication [Mitteilung]. Communication is “letting someone see with us what we 
have pointed out by way of giving it a definite character…that which is ‘shared’ is our 
Being towards what has been pointed out—a Being in which we see it in common.”8 This 
is not the granting of a predicate, but the seeing-together in common of what stands forth 
to be seen. In its having been communicated, that which is asserted is open to being 
retold and expanded further. Communication is thus the third derivation of an already 
derivative moment of interpretation. Schrag, and I find him quite persuasive here, 
accounts for this subordination of communication by arguing Heidegger was still tied to 
the project of Husserlian phenomenology and “seeking to deconstruct it from within.”9 
Although communication no doubt in the main receives short shrift in Being and Time if 
we limit our focus to §33, I do not believe we need to wait for Heidegger II in order to 
acquire a thicker description of communication; we find further glimpses of it within 
Being and Time and perhaps more strangely, we can find it in an earlier work, his Basic 
Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy wherein he works through a significant swath of 
Aristotle’s corpus and lays the groundwork for Being and Time. Most remarkable about 
this text, as least from my perspective, is that Heidegger gives an unprecedentedly large 
share of attention to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, utilizing the concepts found therein to develop 
                                                
8 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San 
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1962), 197.  
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his soon to be famous concepts of concern, care, and being-in-the-world by focusing on 
speaking-with-one-another. Before we turn there, however, a few more words about 
words in Being and Time.  
 This limited discussion of communication as a primary signification of assertion 
leads Heidegger to address concepts of “saying” and “speaking” and to take up language 
explicitly as a theme in the existential analytic of Dasein and the constitution of Dasein’s 
disclosedness. Underlying both interpretation and thus assertion is discourse. Heidegger 
writes of the three primary constituents of being-in-the-world, “State-of-mind and 
understanding are characterized equiprimordially by discourse.”10 This puts Heidegger 
and us along with him in the curious position of stating that discourse underlies 
communication as communication is a derivative moment within interpretation. What 
could this possibly mean? In what way is communication, that most basic of all practices, 
underpinned by discourse or talk? It is here where we find an interesting moment of 
paradox, if not contradiction. It appears that discourse is constitutive of both state-of-
mind and understanding even though Heidegger will go on later in the text to claim “the 
existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk,” which is 
“existentially equiprimordial with state-of-mind and understanding,” if one was 
attempting to give a hierarchy.11 On the surface at least, the position of communication is 
unclear. We must take care to note however that Heidegger is working with multiple 
terms that we would do well to avoid conflating, at least at first: language and discourse 
(Rede) on the one hand, and communication (Mitteilung) on the other. We must avoid 
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becoming caught in this terminological thicket, or at the very least make an attempt to 
clear ourselves a space even if we find in the end that the thicket is unavoidable. This 
becomes all the more thorny, of course, when throughout Being and Time the terms 
appear synonymous, as for example in the following passage: 
Communication is never anything like a conveying of experiences, such as 
opinions or wishes, from the interior of one subject into the interior of another. 
Dasein-with is already essentially manifest in a co-state-of-mind and a co-
understanding. In discourse, Being-with becomes ‘explicitly’ shared; that is to say, 
it is already, but it is unshared as something that has not been taken hold of and 
appropriated.12  
In this critique of the functionalist perspective, Heidegger clearly offers a richer 
articulation of communication than most of the philosophical tradition up to that point 
could. Communication is expressly not the transference of information between 
encapsulated subjects as the transmission model of communication so fervently declaims. 
Indeed, such communication would be impossible as it fails to account for the world that 
makes possible the communicative event; moreover, Heidegger leaves behind Husserlian 
phenomenology as this is in many respects a critique of the Fifth Meditation of Husserl’s 
Cartesian Meditations. Communication understood in this respect makes manifest our 
being-with; it does not need to be accounted for theoretically nor does it need to be put 
into practice—it is there from the start.  
                                                
12 Heidegger, Being and Time, 205. [Emphasis in original]. 
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To address this complicated question of the relationship between discourse, 
language, and communication I suggest we turn our attention to the overarching 
phenomenon Heidegger is trying to capture with these terms: λόγος (logos).13 
Approaching communication from this avenue might bring into relief the way in which 
these terms are working with and at odds with each other. Since the second introduction 
of Being and Time, Heidegger has set his sights on clarifying λόγος in the process of 
raising the question of the meaning of being. This makes good sense as Dasein—the 
being for whom being itself is an issue—is as it is and who it is in relation to λόγος. 
Recalling Aristotle, whose influence on Heidegger is immeasurable and itself worthy of 
sustained exploration, human beings are ζῶον λόγον ἔχον (zoon logon echon), often 
translated as the living beings who have reason. Yet we know “reason” is but one of 
countless translations for λόγος (indeed, I’ve heard there are upwards of eighty different 
terms that would be a suitable replacement given the proper context). For Heidegger this 
rendition of Aristotle’s claim is not false per se, “but it covers up the phenomenal basis 
for this definition of ‘Dasein.’ Man shows himself as the entity which talks.”14 To make 
sense of this we can now turn to his 1924 summer session lectures in Marburg, published 
as Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, where he offers the following definition to 
describe the fundamental significance of zoon logon echon: 
                                                
13 Given the linguistic and historical complexity of the term, I have decided to preserve 
λόγος in the original Greek rather than transliterate into “logos” or, even more 
problematic, assign it an English equivalent.  
14 Heidegger, Being and Time, 208-209.  
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At best, an approximately corresponding definition would be: the human being is 
a living thing that reads the newspaper. At first, that may sound strange to you, 
but it is what corresponds to the Greek definition. When the Greeks say that the 
human being is the living thing that speaks, they do not mean, in a physiological 
sense, that he utters definite sounds. Rather, the human being is the living thing 
that has its genuine being-there in conversation and in discourse.15  
This delightful insight of Heidegger’s, demonstrates that despite being the essential 
characteristic of human being-in-the-world, there is nothing extraordinary about this 
definition. Speaking, for Heidegger, is not an issue of physiology. It matters little that we 
are capable of uttering sounds, or at least it is not this uttering which gives human being 
its fundamental significance.16 On the contrary, prior to any linguistic capability is the 
facticity of being-there in discourse. In other words, the being-there of Dasein is opened 
up within and through conversation. “Language is possessed, is spoken, in such a way 
that speaking belongs to the genuine drive of being of the human being,” Heidegger 
claims, and “Living, for the human being, means speaking.”17 We are who we are when 
we are communicating. That is to say, communication is not something within which we 
are sometimes and out of which we might be later, but it is our fundamental grasp of 
being-in-the-world as Dasein. Furthermore, “Where there is no longer speaking, where 
speaking stops, where the living being no longer speaks, we speak of ‘death’”18 The 
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silence that comes along with death is not merely the inability to once again utter words, 
but it is the complete eradication of future possibilities of dwelling in the world 
communicatively. It is through speaking, being amidst and awash in words, that human 
beings live out their essence.  
 Moreover, Heidegger’s description of human beings understood as those who 
read the newspaper makes explicit how discourse makes possible the sharing of a world 
in common. As Heidegger states, “Λόγος as ‘discourse’ means rather the same as δηλσύν: 
to make manifest what one is ‘talking about’ in one’s discourse.”19 That is to say, 
discourse brings into relief, in a manner able to be understood and shared, the worlding of 
the world taking place in common. In this way, discourse brings the world near and from 
out of this nearness we can talk about it. Or, said otherwise, discourse makes explicit 
Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Relating clearly discourse to communication once more, 
Heidegger writes,  
The λόγος, which has this functioning of exhibiting [the world], has the character 
of a definite communicating. I communicate with others; I have the world there 
with the other and the other has the world there with me, in so far as we talk 
something through—κοινωνία. Speaking is, in itself, communicating; and as 
communication, it is nothing other than κοινωνία.20  
Now a fourth term is added to the mix: communication, discourse, λόγος, and κοινωνία 
(koinonia). Koinonia is the Greek word for communion. A term shared by ancient 
philosophy and early Christian thought alike, koinonia implies a partnership or fellowship, 
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a joint participation in a shared project. Communication, then, is the joint participation in 
the shared project of dwelling in the world together.  
 At this point, keeping an analytic separation between the various terms at play in 
trying to name this phenomenon of sharing a world is teetering on futility. Perhaps the 
difficulty with words here points not merely to an inconsistency within Heidegger’s 
writing, but an inconsistency born of trying to express expression and its conditions of 
possibility. In other words, no single word will do in trying to pin down the larger 
phenomenon at work that we call language, discourse, communication, or shared 
participation. In this regard, I will use, from here on out, these terms more or less 
interchangeably. Throughout this project, to say communication is to say simultaneously 
language, understood as I understand Heidegger to describing it.  
It is communication that makes possible keeping the there of being-there open and 
shared in common. In this way, the understanding of communication we are getting at 
here most closely aligns with Heidegger’s conception of aletheia or uncovering.21 It is 
communication that makes possible the sharing manifest in co-attunement and co-
understanding. This is why for Heidegger, and we along with him, everything is at stake 
in how we understand communication. Indeed, as he will later go on to say in What is 
Called Thinking?, “With a worn out language everybody can talk about everything.”22 
This is not a facile critique of the democratization of language but rather a profound 
concern that with the wearing down of language—i.e., with the reduction of 
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communication to idle chatter—the essence of communication is covered over. No longer 
does communication keep open our being-there in its fundamental vulnerability and 
exposure, but communication is reduced to nothing more than information exchange 
between subjects, and thus smuggles back in the view of communication in which so 
many say they do not believe. Indeed, it makes all too easy the slip into fundamentalism 
or cynicism. Communication is not information exchange but the explicit making 
manifest our possibilities for action. In other words, communication as the joint 
participation of being-in-the-world is the disclosure of possibility itself.  
Moreover, Dasein has its possibilities disclosed to it through a history of 
communicative events. Or said differently, the historicity of Dasein is made meaningful 
through communicative practices. Heidegger gets at this near the conclusion of Being and 
Time when he states, “Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of 
destiny become free.”23 Destiny, the communal project of our dwelling in the world 
understandingly together, becomes free—that is, it becomes what it itself essentially is—
through communication and its struggles. Destiny is not some preordained trajectory 
within which human beings are placed, but destiny is the force of history as it continues 
to disclose world. Destiny is communicative and communication is shaped by destiny.  
With my thematizing of Heidegger’s contribution to thinking the relationship 
between being and communication at hand, let us now turn to two inheritors of Heidegger 
who take up this relationship and mobilize it toward their own projects. In doing so, I 
shall offer a historical and conceptual backdrop to the understanding of communication I 
will propose in the next chapter. The number of inheritors of Heidegger, and the 
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phenomenological project more generally, are great. One could certainly choose an 
alternate set of thinkers to work with. The following early inheritors readily come to 
mind: Georges Gusdorf, Paul Ricoeur, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jacques Derrida 
among others. However, I have chosen to focus on Jaspers and Gadamer as their projects 
most closely align with my own and grant me a vocabulary that makes way for 
understanding communication as testimony.  
3.3 Communication as Loving Struggle: Karl Jaspers 
If in communicating a thought, one fluctuates between absolute comprehension 
and absolute incomprehension, then this process might already be termed a 
philosophical friendship. For it’s no different with ourselves.  
Friedrich Schlegel, Philosophical Fragments 
 
The relationship between Martin Heidegger and his contemporary Karl Jaspers 
was a tenuous friendship at best, and one that degenerated into a terminal standoff as a 
result of deep political disagreement when Heidegger declared his sympathies for the 
National Socialists in 1933. Beyond this pressing political impasse, Heidegger and 
Jaspers had few positive commentaries for each other with respect to their philosophical 
projects as their friendship began to wane. Nevertheless, their work is often put into 
conversation with one another, as they were both early shapers of existentialism (even if 
Heidegger refused the label and Jaspers refused association with Heidegger). More 
importantly for our purposes here, both were concerned with the question of being and 
Jaspers, too, found being and communication to be of a pair in philosophical thinking.  
Drawing from his earlier studies in psychology, Jaspers was preeminently 
interested in issues of self-knowledge. In his most substantial body of literature, a three-
volume work titled Philosophy, Jaspers attempts to show the progression of knowledge 
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and modes of life towards higher levels of self-being, in a style not wholly unlike Kant’s 
systematic critical philosophy. In general, Jaspers’s philosophy is characterized as 
Existenz-philosophy, elucidating themes within the larger philosophical movement of 
existentialism. Existenz is a notoriously difficult term to define; indeed, most of Jaspers’s 
philosophy eludes definition and purposely so as it seeks to reconnect us with the 
unobjectifiable.  As William Earle writes helpfully in the introduction to Jaspers’s 
Reason and Existenz, “Existenz is an index; it names without characterizing.”24 Like 
smoke indicates but is not itself a fire, so Existenz names without being that which is 
named. Before we can clarify the meaning of Existenz, which will lead us in the end to 
communication, we must first turn to a few key ideas in Jaspers’s philosophical project, 
foremost among them his conception of the Encompassing. Jaspers writes,  
The Encompassing is not a horizon within which every determinate mode of 
Being and truth emerges for us, but rather that within which every particular 
horizon is enclosed as in something absolutely comprehensive which is no longer 
visible as a horizon at all.25  
We shall return to the notion of horizon in our discussion of Gadamer, however, for 
Jaspers, the Encompassing grounds our understanding of being but cannot be 
conceptually grasped. It exceeds our understanding. Moreover, for Jaspers, it is beyond 
both subject and object and encircles them both. It is prior to all knowledge—the 
Encompassing is the way through which being becomes present. With this understanding 
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of the inexhaustible ground of being, the concept of Existenz grants us further insight into 
Jaspers transcendentally inclined project. Jaspers writes, Existenz  
is the Encompassing, not in the sense of the vastness of a horizon of all horizons, 
but rather in the sense of a fundamental origin, the condition of selfhood without 
which all the vastness of Being becomes a desert. Existenz, although never itself 
becoming an object or form, carries the meaning of every mode of the 
Encompassing.26  
Existenz cannot be objectified but is the condition necessary for objectification itself. 
Moreover, Existenz is oriented toward the self as “the will to be authentic.”27 Existenz is 
a distinctly human endeavor. Importantly for Jaspers’ philosophy, despite being a human 
endeavor, Existenz is not a mere subjectivism and is in relation to two forms of 
transcendence that prevent subjectivism: being as the other that we are not (i.e., the world) 
and consciousness as such, which is not reducible to the empirical world. Earle offers 
greater clarification, stating that what Existenz names  
is not the individual in his organic vitality, his abstract understanding, or his spirit; 
it is the individual himself, as he comprehends himself, in his freedom and 
authenticity standing before Transcendence. It is the ultimate ground, basis, or 
root of each historical self; it is not the content of any concept.28 
Transcendence tempers the entirety of the human experience. The purpose of Jaspers’ 
philosophical project, then, is to illuminate Existenz and its historical manifestations so as 
to disclose the forms of the Encompassing within which human beings find themselves. 
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In the second volume of Philosophy, “The Illumination of Existence,” Jaspers 
directly takes up the phenomenon of communication and gives it an existentially 
significant role for human being in the world. Communication and Existenz go hand in 
hand—communication makes manifest Existenz. For both Heidegger and Jaspers, then, 
communication and manifestation are intrinsically related to one another. Jaspers is not 
concerned with communication in all of its forms but with communication as it is 
understood with respect to self-being. To this end, Jaspers draws a distinction between 
everyday communication (which we might understand here as the transmission of 
information or Heidegger’s communication as assertion) with “true” or existential 
communication “in which I begin to know my being as I bring it about jointly with 
another” and upon which everyday communication rests.29 Communication of this 
existential sort does not exist empirically for Jaspers except at the bounds of observation. 
True communication is a form of self-awareness requiring a leap of faith and a 
commitment of one’s whole being. Because true communication occurs at the boundaries 
of observable experience, it is, consequently, exceedingly difficult to describe. At best, 
Jaspers can point to its limitations and gives us glimpses and hints at the workings of 
Existenz. In everyday or unexistential communication we witness the shortcomings of 
communication: too easily we mistake our sociality for an encounter with Existenz. 
Jasper’s tells us of the profundity of encountering another, 
in the encounters of one possible Existenz with another, in the way they touch and 
pass each other by, lies an essential significance transcending all 
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comprehensibility in the world. An omission that is like a loss, because a hand 
was held out to us and we shook it only socially, but not existentially.30  
That is to say, in our encounters with others we fail to see them as the radically other 
being that they are. The other is unique and absolutely singular and thus existential 
communication is unique and singular, unable to be reiterated across contexts. 
Consequently, communication “occurs between two selves which are nothing else, are 
not representative, and are therefore not interchangeable. In this communication, which is 
absolutely historic and unrecognizable from outside, lies the assurance of selfhood.”31 As 
a result, the decision to avoid opportunities for true communication is tantamount to 
surrendering one’s possibilities for self-being. Moreover, because existential 
communication is each time singular our opportunities for communication are limited—
we cannot communicate with a large number—we will inevitably fail to do justice to the 
situation. In other words, our opportunities are limited and the stakes are great. Each 
communicative encounter is to be taken seriously as it is radically finite.  
In communication, through an intertwining of loneliness and desire for 
communion, we are revealed and made manifest to ourselves and likewise the other is too 
brought forth as she is. For Jaspers, the realization of oneself in the manifestation of the 
other is “a unique struggle, combative and loving at once.”32 The loving struggle of 
communication is allowing oneself to be thrown into question, to open oneself to risk 
without reservation. Consequently, communication—grounded in a profound 
loneliness—brings forth an equally unsurpassed solidarity. Critically for Jaspers the 
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struggle in this loving struggle is not the combat of Existenz versus Existenz, but the 
struggle to attain truth together. Existential communication requires equality, trust, and 
free response. Moreover, although the goal of communication is truth, the content of this 
truth is unable to be calculated in advance. That is to say, existential communication is 
always a surprise of sorts. This incalculability leads to the impossibility of absolute 
communication; Jaspers states of the communicative struggle,  
I want to find the right word, but I have to keep searching. The word will not have 
been said by the time we die; the crucial thing will not have been done—in truth 
there has been no absolute communication.33  
Communication is a perpetual task without end. Always in relation with one another, we 
continually respond always knowing that our responses will never be entirely fitting and 
that we will be called upon to respond once more. Existential communication requires the 
ability to dwell within silence—one who cannot be peaceably silent is not ready for 
communication. Often this silence is that of wanting to say more, but knowing more 
cannot be said. Or perhaps it is the silence of not knowing what to say. Or more 
pressingly, the silence of what cannot be said; the unsayable says as much as words 
themselves.  
With this understanding at hand, the power of communication for Jaspers is that 
“communication liquefies all things, to let new solidities emerge.”34 To this end, 
communication demands a flexibility and willingness to be open. Existential 
communication, unable to be calculated in advance, is not fixed and thus requires the 
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flexibility necessary to give oneself over to the communicative event. Equally, 
communication requires the readiness to squander oneself, to give oneself without 
reserve.35 Of course, this highlights the risk of potentially losing oneself in the 
communicative event, of giving without the expectation of return. Here lies what Jaspers 
terms “the turning point of all communication.” He writes,  
It is here that I either take the risk of vanishing from the other as a reality so as to 
reemerge out of my true potential, or that I hide because I do not want to be naked, 
not before the other and not before myself. I will either realize my potential with 
the other or relapse, alone, into mere existence.36  
The risk of existential communication faces a series of barriers. Foremost among them is 
the fear to communicate mentioned above, but equally we risk avoiding self-existence 
and fall prey to the comfortable isolation brought about by the pleasure of material goods 
and prestige. In other words, we fail to put ourselves at risk before the presence of the 
other. Moreover, as discussed above, existential communication carries with it no rules of 
conduct; no handbook of existential communication will be found at university 
bookstores. Rather, communication demands the phronesis or practical wisdom that 
springs from the situation itself.  
In Jaspers we find the early groundwork for the impossibility of communication. 
Although it is Jacques Derrida who gives this understanding its flesh, we see in Jaspers 
the way in which existential communication is up against a series of barriers nearly 
impenetrable. Absolute communication is itself impossible. In liquefying all things, 
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communication makes room for new actualities. From Jaspers we receive the language of 
excess and inexhaustibility, of boundaries and limits, and the general risk we take when 
we explore the world together with words. In the main, we have a tempering force, an 
understanding of communication that lessens the strength of communication as mere 
information exchange and opens communication toward other interpretive possibilities. 
As we shall see in the following chapter, we will call this force testimony.  
Jaspers concern for communication goes beyond his desire to clarify to the 
existential conditions for dwelling in the world. On its own, this is already without doubt 
a great contribution to the philosophizing of communicative practice. Beyond this, 
however, Jaspers believes the readiness for communication to be the premise of doing 
philosophy. Indeed, communicability becomes a criterion for the value of philosophic 
truth. He writes, “A philosophizing born of self-becoming requires a specific truth 
criterion, nonobjective in kind: a thought is philosophically true to the extent to which its 
thinking promotes communication.”37 Doing philosophy in conversation with others, 
“symphilosophizing,” means taking to heart the concerns of another Existenz. Here 
communication becomes an explicitly ethical task. To study communication is 
consequently and simultaneously to study ethics. The original impulse of philosophy, its 
function as a way of life, is lost in the mere back and forth of argumentation over 
conceptual machinations. Jaspers as no patience for this compulsion, writing “this 
unexistential, unessential, intellectually indoctrinated barbarism is made possible by the 
transformation of philosophy into a matter of purely rationalistic, timelessly existing 
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objectivity.”38 Not unlike Heidegger, for Jaspers it is through existential communication 
that the truth of being can be made manifest. He states with eloquence the closing words 
of his investigation of communication “the unobjectifiable measure of the truth of all 
philosophizing is always the communication which it effects and elucidates. The basic 
question comes to be this: what thoughts are needed to make the most profound 
communication possible?”39 For Jaspers then, philosophy takes communication to be the 
phenomenon toward which we must turn our attention most pressingly. Communication 
conditions and makes possible self-being and undergirds our relations with others.  
3.4 Communication as Being that Can Be Understood: Hans-Georg Gadamer 
Education is the point at which we decide whether we love the world enough to 
assume responsibility for it and by the same token save it from that ruin which, 
except for renewal, except for the coming of the new and young, would be 
inevitable. 
Hannah Arendt, The Crisis in Education 
 
 Perhaps no philosopher of communication is more directly influenced by 
Heidegger’s thinking than Hans-Georg Gadamer. Gadamer, who was among Heidegger’s 
students along with Hannah Arendt, Hans Jonas, Karl Löwith, and Helene Weiss, and 
present at the 1924 lectures in Marburg, considered himself primarily a scholar on Plato. 
Although his Plato scholarship is rewarding, his magnum opus, Truth and Method, 
irreversibly changed the study and practice of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics began as an 
intellectual practice concerning the nature and interpretation of texts. The hermeneutic 
tradition has its roots in classical Greece, named after the messenger god Hermes, where 
it was the practical art involved “in such things as preaching, interpreting other languages, 
                                                
38 Jaspers, Philosophy, 99.  
39 Jaspers, Philosophy, 103.  
  
89 
explaining and explicating texts.” The hermeneus (interpreter) translated “something 
foreign or unintelligible into the language everybody speaks and understands.”40 It was 
also closely connected to the mantic art of transmitting the will of the gods and the 
reading of signs. However, with the Reformation and the rise of modernity, the impetus 
of hermeneutics shifted from translation to finding the original meaning of a sacred text, 
or, in non-sacred texts such as legal codes, finding the authentic, correct interpretation 
(e.g., in juridical hermeneutics). By the time we reach Friedrich Schleiermacher in the 
early nineteenth century, hermeneutics becomes conceived as a universal doctrine of 
understanding and interpretation wherein the task is to reproduce the original intellectual 
act of the author’s production of the meaning in a text. Understanding a text requires 
understanding the author’s intent and state of mind.   
A profound reorientation of hermeneutics was precipitated first by Wilhelm 
Dilthy and then Heidegger, who developed his “hermeneutics of facticity” in claiming 
Existenz is the self-projecting by the self of its possibilities. Heidegger locates 
hermeneutics within his project of fundamental ontology in his explication of the fore-
structure of understanding. Understanding for Heidegger is, as we recall in Being and 
Time, constitutive of Dasein’s being-in-the-world in conjunction with state-of-mind and 
discourse (cf. Part V “Being-in as Such”). In his description of understanding, Heidegger 
turns to the now well-known concept of the hermeneutic circle stating,  
[The hermeneutic circle] is not to be reduced to the level of a vicious circle, or 
even a circle which is merely tolerated. In the circle is hidden a positive 
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possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing, and we genuinely grasp this 
possibility only when we have understood that our first, last, and constant task in 
interpreting is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception to 
be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the 
scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things 
themselves.41  
With this passage as a point of departure, Gadamer takes hermeneutics even further. In 
Truth and Method he moves from Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and the meaning of 
being to the project of historicizing understanding itself. Imperatively, Gadamer is not 
trying to elaborate a set of rules for the practice of hermeneutics, but is attempting to 
elaborate understanding, the very ground of hermeneutics. In other words, and reframing 
it within Kantian language, Gadamer attempts to set forth a theory of hermeneutic 
experience so as to uncover the conditions for the possibility of understanding. As he 
writes in the foreword to the second edition of Truth and Method, “My investigation is 
not to offer a general theory of interpretation and a differential account of its 
methods…but to discover what is common to all modes of understanding.”42 Indeed, it as 
we shall see, it is understanding which brings together being and communication.  
Understanding is always understanding within a historical context and made 
possible through an interaction with history and tradition within, through, and by way of 
language. For Gadamer, coming to an understanding of a text parallels our coming to an 
understanding and making meaning of the world, that is, the ontological structure of 
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understanding our being-in-the-world is fundamentally a process of always already 
interpreting the world through a conversation with the tradition. This work is a work of 
love, in the sense articulated by Jaspers above, as hermeneutics attends to the text in the 
project of coming to terms with its meanings in relation to our own historical 
circumstances. The hermeneutical task is an interplay between questioning and response, 
undergirded by a radical openness to the alterity of the text, and for the sake of achieving 
a fusion of horizons. Said within the vocabulary of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, 
we are always already projecting meaning into our experiences of understanding—we are 
projecting our fore-conceptions upon what is before us to be understood. However, as 
Gadamer insists, “understanding realizes its full potential only when the fore-meanings 
that it begins with are not arbitrary.”43 Fore-meanings must always be questioned, 
examined, and criticized—struggled with—for the sake of understanding. Gadamer 
continues, exposing the critical moment in hermeneutics, 
Thus it is quite right for the interpreter not to approach the text directly, relying 
solely on the fore-meaning already available to him, but rather explicitly to 
examine the legitimacy—that is, the origin and validity—of the fore-meanings 
dwelling within him.44  
The issue of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of fore-meanings moves Gadamer toward a 
rehabilitation of prejudice, a concept imperative for understanding our historical 
situatedness within tradition. Additionally, it makes way for an understanding of 
language more broadly thought.  
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For Gadamer, prejudice is not merely the inability to embrace a quasi-neoliberal 
notion of tolerance nor a series of mistaken assumptions, but rather the condition for the 
possibility of understanding oneself in relation to history and tradition, which is to say a 
necessary condition for understanding anything at all. The Enlightenment aligned 
prejudice with superstition and thus as something to be overcome at all costs, rather than 
something to be examined in its complexity—accordingly, Gadamer notes, 
“Enlightenment’s fundamental prejudice is against the concept of prejudice itself.”45 
Striving for the objective certainties upon which understanding can be based, the 
Enlightenment overlooked the role of prejudice in coming to an understanding and 
aligned prejudice with illegitimate authority or overhastiness in our knowledge and 
decisions. Furthermore, for the Enlightenment, specifically the Cartesian protocols for 
advancing in both knowledge and freedom through clear and distinct ideas, judgments are 
only legitimate by adhering to a methodology—precisely the scientific methodology 
Gadamer wishes to critique throughout the entirety of Truth and Method and which we 
examined in our discussion of scientism in chapter one. This Enlightenment view distorts 
the more originary understanding of prejudice as the pre-judgments one has in going 
about dwelling in the world, replacing it instead with an understanding of prejudice as 
error.  
Contrary to the Enlightenment view Gadamer asserts prejudice as the way in 
which, with no other alternative, we relate to the tradition and come to understanding. 
Prejudice is a necessity for thinking itself. Our understanding of and participating in 
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history is embedded with prejudices. Gadamer states, highlighting the historicity at work 
in all communicative events,  
In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we understand 
ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a 
self-evident way in the family, society, and state in which we live. The focus of 
subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only a 
flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. That is why the prejudices of the 
individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his 
being.46  
This passage from Gadamer is imperative, both for the history of philosophy and the 
project set forth here because he shifts the Enlightenment focus on subjectivity and self-
awareness to that which conditions the possibility of self-awareness from the start. In this 
way, Gadamer’s critique of the Enlightenment is more radical than the Enlightenment 
attempted to be as he continues its motivation rather than its method.47 Prejudice becomes 
the ground upon which judgments—and consequently the self-examination the 
Enlightenment claims to privilege—rest. Moreover, these preliminary fore-conceptions or 
pre-judgments serve as a horizon for the interpreter and stand as the ground upon which 
the horizons of interpreter and text can fuse. For Gadamer, this fusion of horizons is the 
accomplishment of understanding.  
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Although the Enlightenment rightly critiques the abdication of reason, Gadamer 
finds the equating of tradition and illegitimate authority questionable at best, adding a 
critical edge to what could be misread as conservative,   
In tradition there is always an element of freedom and of history itself. Even the 
most genuine and pure tradition does not persist because of the inertia of what 
once existed. It needs to be affirmed, embraced, cultivated. It is, essentially, 
preservation…but preservation is an act of reason…preservation is as much a 
freely chosen action as are revolution and renewal.48  
Preservation on Gadamer’s account is an act of freedom, an act of cultivating the 
inheritance that one is. It is this idea I shall exploit in my return, recovery, and 
rehabilitation of the concept of hyperbole in the following chapter. Furthermore, the 
interrogation of one’s prejudices or fore-meanings is, like the hermeneutic task itself, a 
questioning. Gadamer clarifies what is at stake in this understanding when he writes: 
“Reflection on a given pre-understanding brings before me something that otherwise 
happens behind my back.”49 The investigation of one’s prejudices, this force from behind 
one’s back, brings into relief the ideological structures and the historical conditions that 
made possible one’s pre-understanding. Thus, this force from behind one’s own back is 
not always or only an ambush; it is, rather, a type of gift—a buoyancy that holds one 
within the world understandingly. Gadamer pushes this conceptualization of prejudice 
further in response to a question posed by Habermas on what it is that hermeneutics 
teaches us. Gadamer responds, “The thing hermeneutics teaches us is to see through the 
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dogmatism of asserting an opposition and separation between the ongoing natural 
‘tradition’ and the reflective appropriation of it.”50 Gadamer brings to the fore that there 
is no tradition over and against which we stand and appropriate as we choose in some 
final form. Rather, the tradition as understood through and within language, is always in 
the process of being appropriated. The tradition is not a natural phenomenon that can 
come to be distorted or purified, but rather that the tradition is as it is appropriated in 
various ways to be judged by the context and situation. 
Language is the medium within which this hermeneutic experience of coming to 
terms with the tradition takes place. To be sure, Gadamer’s conception of language or 
communication here is not a narrow one.51 Language is not reducible to linguistic marks 
on a page, but rather linguisticality encompasses all our attempts at making meaning 
within the world; for Gadamer, like Heidegger, language extends beyond symbol-use. 
Gadamer explains the understanding of language we shall work with throughout this 
project,  
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There is the language of the eyes, the language of the hands, pointing and naming, 
all this is language and confirms that language is constantly present in our 
transactions with one another. Words are always answers, even when they are 
questions…There is no doubt that language is not only a language of words but 
must also be seen as a form of communication.  That means that there is a broader 
concept of language as well as the narrower one.  In the broader sense, language 
includes all communication, not only speaking but also all gestures that come into 
play in the linguistic relations among humans.52 
Understanding a gesture is as much an issue of language as understanding Shakespeare. 
“Language is what is constantly building up and bearing within itself [the] commonality 
of world-orientation,” as Gadamer writes.53 Language is, as we saw with Heidegger too, 
our shared being-together-in-the-world.  
It is against this backdrop of the linguisticality of the hermeneutic experience that 
we receive Gadamer’s most famous lines in Truth and Method: “Being that can be 
understood is language.”54 These lines have puzzled scholars since they were written, 
inciting various debates about the profundity of the statement. In German it reads: “Sein, 
das verstanden warden kann, ist Sprache.” Gianni Vattimo has made much of the 
perplexity the statement by focusing on the inclusion of the commas. These two commas, 
which are retained in German to preserve a grammatical structure, are omitted in the 
English and Italian translations. Vattimo argues that without the commas it easily slips 
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into an equivalence between being and language. Gadamer himself does not advocate this 
position and outright denies this as the intention of his claim stating,  
I once formulated this idea [the all-encompassing nature of the hermeneutic 
experience] by saying that being that can be understood is language. This is 
certainly not a metaphysical assertion. Instead, it describes, from the medium of 
understanding, the unrestricted scope possessed by the hermeneutical 
perspective.55  
What Gadamer seems to be saying is that insofar as being is able to be understood, it is 
understood through the medium of language. This appears to be confirmed in his later 
claim,  
When I wrote the sentence “Being which can be understood is language,” I 
implied that what is can never be completely understood. And this follows insofar 
as everything that goes under the name of language always refers beyond that 
which achieves the status of a proposition. What is to be understood is what 
comes into language, but of course it is always what is taken as something, taken 
as true. This is the hermeneutical dimension in which Being “manifests itself.”56  
When something comes into language this does not mean, for Gadamer, that it acquires 
some sort of secondary being (a being-linguistic, if you will), but rather that “what 
something presents itself as belongs to its own being.”57 Nevertheless, in Gadamer the 
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relationship between being and communication is much more highly entwined than it was 
for both the early Heidegger and Jaspers. Because of this I shall follow Gadamer on this 
score and retain this understanding as a knowing prejudice in the philosophy of 
communication I articulate throughout.  
3.5 A Circle Has Many Turns 
Months and days are the wayfarers of a hundred generations, the years too, going 
and coming, are wanderers. For those who drift life away on a boat, for those who 
meet age leading a horse by the mouth, each day is a journey, the journey itself 
home.  
Matsuo Basho, The Narrow Road to the Deep North 
 
 Let us return now to Heidegger as promised. Following Being and Time and the 
works published shortly thereafter, Heidegger shifts his understanding of language as a 
constitutive structure of Dasein to language as the space wherein being is able to make an 
appearance. This Kehre or turn in Heidegger’s thought, according to Schrag, moves from 
the meaning of being to the truth of being. Despite taking a different approach, the central 
issue remains an understanding of being with regard to language. Rather than examine 
the entirety of Heidegger’s later work, for this project there are three salient aspects we 
must explore: (1) Heidegger’s claim that “language is the house of Being”; (2) the 
relationship between language and technology and; (3) his turn to poetry as the milieu for 
philosophic thought.  
 This turn in Heidegger’s thought is generally marked by his publication of the 
“Letter on Humanism” in 1947. Written in response to inquiries regarding his 
relationship with humanism and existentialism, Heidegger’s letter can be read as an 
indirect response to Jean-Paul Sartre’s essay “Existentialism as a Humanism” wherein 
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Sartre sets forth the fundamental tenant of existentialism that existence precedes essence. 
Sartre was unhappy this piece drew so much attention as it likely caused more confusion 
than clarification; nevertheless, the essay made way for Heidegger’s new 
conceptualization of language. We can understand Sartre’s claim roughly as the assertion 
that there is no fundamental human nature (whether biologically or theologically 
determined) that undergirds our existence, but rather human beings are an open and 
ongoing project wherein we must determine ourselves. We must act because we are free 
and we are free because we can act. Furthermore, for Sartre this reversal of the dominant 
metaphysical presupposition that there is an underlying human nature, forms a kind of 
humanism because it finally, from his perspective, exalts the dignity of human beings as 
ones who are fundamentally free.  
Heidegger confounds this position and begins his letter by raising the question of 
the meaning of action. Action has predominantly been philosophically understood 
through the lens of causality. That is, human beings are acting agents when they have the 
power to cause an effect. Furthermore, we evaluate action in terms of utility—namely, 
how an action can achieve a particular end or purpose. The problem with this 
understanding for Heidegger is that it is too quick and cursory and quite caught up in the 
instrumentalization of thought (about which more shortly). Heidegger seeks to deepen the 
understanding of action so as to deepen the understanding of human being and thus move 
beyond humanism toward something deeper still and moves me closer to the type of 
understanding requisite for this project.  
He does so by turning to what is often thought to be the counterpart or opposite of 
action: thinking. For Heidegger, thinking is not subservient to acting—it is not something 
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we do so that we might then act—but thinking is action in its most illustrious form as it 
has the most intimate connection with truth. Heidegger illustrates this in claiming, 
“Thinking accomplishes the relation of Being to the essence of man.”58 In other words, it 
is through thinking that being itself is brought into a relationship with human beings. 
Thinking, for Heidegger, is always the thinking of being as it both belongs to being and 
listens to it. Following this explication of action, Heidegger offers what is arguably the 
most important passage of the essay: “Language is the house of Being.”59 How are we to 
understand such a sentence, one that rivals Gadamer’s “Being that can be understood is 
language” not only in difficulty but in importance as well? Heidegger offers us this 
interpretation of this ambiguous and poetic phrase,  
Language is not the utterance of an organism; nor is it the expression of a living 
thing. Never can it ever be thought in an essentially correct way in terms of its 
symbolic character, perhaps not even in terms of the character of signification. 
Language is the clearing-concealing advent of Being itself.60   
By language Heidegger does not (and never has) mean only those who work with words, 
whether written or spoken, though this is certainly part of language. Language, and for 
this we ought to be grateful, is greater than this. Language is the space wherein meaning 
makes its entry into the world; it is the disclosure (i.e., truth) of being itself. We can see 
clear parallels here to Gadamer’s claim that “Being that can be understood is language.” 
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This is why the scope of language must be broadened to not only include words but 
equally gesture, movement, and artistic marks. Each of these open up sites of disclosure.  
A more difficult problem, perhaps, is determining what a house might mean in 
this instance. For this we need to do a bit of interpretive work. Robert Pogue Harrison in 
his book The Dominion of the Dead devotes an entire chapter to this question. I share his 
thoughts here to demonstrate what is at stake and what is made possible for thinking if we 
have the courage to think communication otherwise than its everyday sense. Harrison 
turns not to architects or city planners to address this issue, but poets and philosophers, in 
particular Henry David Thoreau and Rainer Maria Rilke. Although the architect and the 
planner know how to build a home, it is the poet and the philosopher who ask what it 
means to dwell in one. What do houses do? What does a house provide? A house 
foremost provides an enclosure or shelter. As Harrison notes, the first houses were, 
anthropologically, houses for the dead—a tomb or grave. We made a lasting place for 
others before we turned to permanence for ourselves. Furthermore, within ancient Greek 
and Roman houses, there was often an altar upon which the sacred fires of ancestors 
burned, which later became the ground for our understanding of the hearth. We might 
recall Heraclitus warming himself at his stove, telling visitors that “even here too the 
gods are present.” Indeed, both Heidegger and Harrison make much of this Heraclitean 
insight. A house, then, bridges the living with the dead. Within the walls of a house or 
home we are protected from the elements and are able to retain our vital heat. We are 
sheltered, at least momentarily, from the weather, from that which lies beyond our control. 
Furthermore, houses form a border, where inside and outside meet at its walls and where 
one stands before a frontier.  
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Within houses we put things in their place, but houses too are a place of their own, 
a place for ourselves. They provide us with an orientation. Houses are an enclosure with 
an opening. The opening, of course, is key, as it prevents the house from becoming a 
prison. Deeper, though, a house places us at the opening extending beyond ourselves and 
orients us to the outside and to a world always in excess of ourselves. Let us not forget, 
too, that houses can be haunted. That is to say, that which is present in a house need not 
correspond to the number of living inhabitants—houses are filled with the memories of 
those no longer there as well as the expectation of others yet to arrive.  
Let us hear again Heidegger’s claim: Language is the house of being. Language 
gives us a lasting place wherein we can dwell, wherein we can make meaning of this 
human situation caught between life and death, the mundane and the cosmic. Language 
bridges time and culture and grants us the ability to oscillate between these poles. 
Harrison writes eloquently on this matter:  
Works of literature, then, are more than enduring tablets where an author’s words 
survive his or her demise. They are the gifts of human worlds, cosmic in nature, 
that hold their place in time so that the living and the unborn may inhabit them at 
will, make themselves at home in their articulate humanity—all thanks to the 
ultimate gift of the earth, which renders their testaments possible.61 
Language, as the sedimentation of voices past is haunted most of all. All speaking is a 
communing with ghosts (the communication of those no longer with us) as it is their 
words we must say anew and make our own. But most importantly, however, language is 
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what brings us to an opening, a precipice before ourselves wherein we cultivate our world 
with others.  
 For Heidegger, and I agree with him here, everything is jeopardized when we 
misunderstand the essence of language. This misunderstanding is made all the easier by 
the development of modern technology, the technology made possible by an objectivistic 
metaphysics. Heidegger’s critique of technology can be found in moments throughout his 
work, but it is most pronounced in “The Question Concerning Technology,” “The Age of 
the World-Picture,” and the Bremen lectures. Throughout these texts, Heidegger offers a 
rather biting critique of modern science and machine technology. In “The Question 
Concerning Technology” Heidegger seeks, on his account, to prepare a free relationship 
to technology via a thorough understanding of technology and its essence. Technology 
and the essence of technology are not reducible to each other and this tendency to 
reduction is itself constitutive of our poor relation to technology. For Heidegger the 
essence of technology is a “way of revealing the world.”62 Said otherwise, the essence of 
technology is a way through which being is disclosed.  
To arrive at this claim he reinterprets Aristotelian metaphysics, in particular the 
doctrine of the four causes—as causality is linked to instrumentality, which is a pervasive 
and correct, though not sufficient, understanding of technology. The sheet anchor of the 
essay is the distinction between two modes of revealing: bringing-forth and challenging-
forth. Heidegger focuses on the latter as it most clearly exposes the essence of technology. 
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Heidegger’s finest example of this distinction is his exposition on the Rhine River. 
Heidegger’s insights disclose so much essential to my project they must be cited at length,  
In the context of the interlocking processes pertaining to the orderly disposition of 
electrical energy, even the Rhine itself appears as something at our command. The 
hydroelectric plant is not built into the Rhine River as was the old wooden bridge 
that joined bank with bank for hundreds of years. Rather the river is dammed up 
into the power plant. What the river is now, namely a water power supplier, 
derives from out of the essence of the power station. In order that we may even 
remotely consider the monstrousness that reigns here, let us ponder for a moment 
the contrast that speaks out of the two titles, “The Rhine” as dammed up into the 
power works, and “The Rhine” as uttered out of the art work, in Hölderlin’s hymn 
by that name. But, it will be replied, the Rhine is still a river in the landscape, is it 
not? Perhaps. But how? In no other way than as an object on call for inspection by 
a tour group ordered there by the vacation industry.63  
Here challenging-forth reveals something as standing-reserve and as something 
stockpiled for use. Importantly, for Heidegger humans do not challenge-forth the world 
out of an act of will. Rather, the challenging “gathers man into ordering […] concentrates 
man upon ordering the real as standing-reserve.”64 This challenging of human beings is 
Gestell (enframing). Recalling the language of Being and Time, Dasein is the there where 
the challenging-forth occurs, but Dasein is not the cause of the challenging. The essence 
of technology lies within this enframing. Further, Gestell and thus the essence of 
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technology, covers itself over and as a result appears as the only way of revealing/being. 
Enframing sends humans on the way, or destines them, to reveal everything as standing-
reserve. We encountered this earlier in our discussion of aperture. Gestell provides an 
aperture of being as it is expressed in a technologically contoured modernity. The way in 
which being is disclosed, because of the essence of technology and its enframing, is pre-
figured in advance and appears as natural. In other words, the aperture itself is not 
brought into relief and that image of being which shines forth through it is shaped 
without our acknowledgement. The task then, as we have been saying, is to twist-a-way 
from within this aperture.  
Language, too, is caught up in Gestell. In an often overlooked lecture “Traditional 
Language and Technological Language” Heidegger understands language to be under 
attack by precisely the information theories of language which held sway in the early to 
mid-twentieth century. He writes,  
If in the spirit of the reign of all-determining technology one holds information to 
be the highest form of language because of its clarity, and the security and speed 
in the exchange of reports and assignments, then the result of this is also the 
corresponding conception of the human’s being and of human life.65  
Technological understandings of language, as the transmission of signals within feedback 
loops reduce human beings, on Heidegger’s account, back into the Cartesian cogito of 
objectivist metaphysics. Language brings the world into appearance; at issue is whether 
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we can allow things into presence without marking them merely as standing-reserve or 
objects of utility. Heidegger puts it this way in “Building Dwelling Thinking,”  
It is language that tells us the essential nature of a thing, provided that we respect 
language’s own nature. In the meantime, to be sure, there rages around the earth 
an unbridled yet clever talking, writing, and broadcasting of spoken words. Man 
acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language 
remains the master of man. Perhaps it is before all else man’s subversion of this 
relation of dominance that drives his nature into alienation.66  
Language says as showing; it discloses phenomena as meaningfully within the world. Yet 
when we misunderstand this relationship we find ourselves in peril; indeed, Heidegger 
sees our misunderstanding of language to be more threatening than the development of 
atomic weapons.  
Against the ever-growing challenge of technological language, Heidegger turns in 
the end to poetry and poetical thinking as the saving power of language and of thought. 
For Heidegger, following Hölderlin, poetry is the highest form of language and the 
greatest expression of thinking. Poetry is the language that illuminates the essence of 
human being. For Heidegger the ground upon which we dwell, upon which we are, is 
poetic. He states, “Poetry does not fly above and surmount the earth in order to escape it 
and hover over it. Poetry is what first brings man onto the earth, making him belong to it, 
and thus brings him into dwelling.”67 Poetry, in bringing mortals to their dwelling, brings 
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them to the possibilities of themselves. It brings them to the realization that they are as 
dwelling, as being-in-the-world. This turn to poetry and dwelling problematizes the 
grammar of being and moves Heidegger toward, on Schrag’s account, the erasure of 
being. Here Heidegger is seemingly concerned with language itself and the way in which 
human beings are caught up in the play of language. It makes good sense, then, when 
Schrag articulates the relation of saying to language this way,  
Saying is not a linguistic phenomenon; neither is it restricted to the articulation of 
Dasein’s existential constitution (Heidegger I); nor does it achieve its fulfillment 
as the ‘house of Being’ (Heidegger II). Saying is a poetic comportment in the 
sojourn of mortals.68  
We can see this in the inversion Heidegger gives between human beings and language. 
Human beings do not speak language. On the contrary,  
Man first speaks when, and only when, he responds to language by listening to its 
appeal. Among all the appeals that we human beings, on our part, may help to be 
voiced, language is the highest and everywhere the first…The responding in 
which man authentically listens to the appeal of language is that which speaks in 
the element of poetry.69 
This of course runs contrary to our everyday understanding of communication which 
holds that we are the ones who speak words, words which we have selected and shaped. 
Indeed, some might think such a claim is a bit spooky. He offers some clarification in 
What is Called Thinking?: 
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It is not we who play with words, but the nature of language plays with us, not 
only in this case, not only now, but long since and always. For language plays 
with our speech—it likes to let our speech drift away into the more obvious 
meanings of words. It is as though man had to make an effort to live properly with 
language. It is as though such a dwelling were especially prone to succumb to the 
danger of commonness.70  
Poetic language brings us to this understanding of language and allows us to dwell there. 
Moreover, poetic language exposes human being to the difficulty of living properly 
within language, that is, the difficulty of genuinely saying something and not merely 
perpetuating the repetition of the same. It is this, and not his participation in National 
Socialism, that we might properly call the political moment in Heidegger’s work. Our 
dwelling within language is itself political because it is through this dwelling that we 
encounter others in their ethical relationship to us.  
 It is in poetry, too, that Heidegger makes room for a relationship with divinity. To 
be sure, Heidegger’s divine looks little like the divine of any historical religion. The 
divine is not a supreme being. Rather, divinity is simply that which is beyond, in an 
ontological rather than ontic sense. We might say, to borrow from Levinas, that the 
divine is otherwise than being. Nevertheless, it is poetry that brings us into relation with 
divinity. In “…Poetically Man Dwells…” poetry is a measuring; “to write poetry is 
measure-taking, in the strict sense of the word, by which man first receives the measure 
                                                
70 Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, 118-119.  
  
109 
for the breadth of his being.”71 This measure is not a doing, at least not in the sense of a 
challenging of the world, but a letting-be.   
 In returning to Heidegger once more, we find an altered relationship to being, one 
that is concerned less with the constitutive features of Dasein and more with the letting-
be of being through poetical thinking and a free relationship with technology, although it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine him getting here without the genius of Being and 
Time. For our concerns in this project, we find a less systematic understanding of 
language and the call of poetry to aid our understanding of being. This turn makes further 
room for rhetorically oriented approaches to the issue of being, as we shall see in the 
following chapter. 
Throughout this chapter we have examined various challenges to understanding 
communication functionally as information exchange. Such an understanding, although 
undoubtedly useful and efficient at times, eclipses other possibilities for our 
communicative praxis. What the linguistic turn in phenomenology and philosophical 
hermeneutics demonstrated was that communication itself was much more fundamental 
we had previously thought. With the early work of Heidegger we see language as a 
constitutive feature of human being-in-the-world; with Jaspers we find communication at 
the heart of self-being and communion with others; with Gadamer language illuminates 
being and grounds our relationships with others; and finally with Heidegger’s late works 
communication takes on a strange role of its own in the disclosure of being. What each 
thinker highlights in his own way is that in order to continue the philosophic project of 
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ontology we will not only encounter communication, but we must hold it to be central to 
the question of being.  
Moreover, it is our task here to turn these insights into the phenomenon of 
communication toward questions of ethics and politics. Neither Jaspers nor Gadamer 
were particularly politically active, although they were both adamantly against despotism. 
Heidegger’s politics, as we well know, were the biggest failure of his life’s work. 
Nevertheless, it is my position here that any approach to ethics and politics requires that 
we work through the insights of philosophical hermeneutics as it is here where we are 
able to approach the other as both singular and representative, as part of a larger 
community and at the same time irreducibly unique. Moreover, philosophical 
hermeneutics, through its twisting-a-way through the tradition, grants us the possibility of 
shifting grounds of judgment even if the metaphysical certainty we desire is no longer 
available. In other words, hermeneutics offers us the practical attitude, the necessary 
phronesis, through which we are able to respond to shifting global circumstances.  
With this at hand, the work we have done in this chapter exploring the ground of 
philosophical hermeneutics and alternative approaches to communication beyond 
information exchange has provided us with a nexus of terms to which we will have 
recourse in thinking about testimony: disclosure, opening, excess, inexhaustible, vastness, 
unbounded, irreducible. In the following chapter we shall focus on the hyperbolic at at 
work in communication. It is this hyperbolic condition, I will argue, that most clearly 
gives shape to testimony. 
 CHAPTER 4. SPEAKING OF SERIOUS THINGS: THINKING COMMUNICATION 
HYPERBOLICALLY 
Even the slightest testimony concerning the most plausible, ordinary or everyday 
thing cannot do otherwise: it still must appeal to faith as would a miracle. 
Jacques Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge” 
 
4.1 Reading Between the Lines  
To hyperbolize is to tell and not to tell enormous truths in one eloquent breath. 
Christopher Johnson, Hyperboles 
 
 In Hermeneutic Communism Gianni Vattimo and Santiago Zabala draw a direct 
link between hermeneutics and metaphysics: “Hermeneutics did not begin because of a 
theoretical discovery; it is an interpretive response to the end of metaphysics.”1 Their 
claim echoes Gadamer’s concern that hermeneutics must move beyond the attempt to 
find the original meaning of a text to a sophisticated understanding of the very way in 
which our dwelling together in the world is interpretive. For Vattimo and Zabala, this is a 
necessary response to the end of metaphysics; that is, in the wake of the death of God we 
find a plentitude of perspectives and interpretations. With Nietzsche we discover that 
there are no facts, only interpretations; the words we use have no privileged access to the 
reality we face. There is no correspondence between language and a true nature simply in
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Marx (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2011), 96.  
 need of uncovering. Instead, we are ensconced within the contingencies of history and 
culture. This is the lesson of postmodernity, “that each experience of truth is an  
experience of interpretation is almost a truism in today’s culture.”1 This is the case, of 
course, only to a point, as we witness simultaneously the unbridled fanaticism of 
contemporary fundamentalism that resists this hermeneutic lesson. Nevertheless, the 
outcome of the end of metaphysics is the ubiquity of hermeneutics and the rise of various 
conflicts of interpretation this end entails. However, Vattimo in Beyond Interpretation 
believes this understanding needs to be pushed further, beyond the understanding that 
hermeneutics is merely “the metatheory of the play of interpretations.” Hermeneutics 
itself must undergo a comprehension of its own historicity so as to avoid being merely “a 
purely relativistic philosophy of cultural multiplicity.”2 This means that hermeneutics 
must recognize itself as a nihilistic vocation. Nihilism is the provenance or origin of 
hermeneutics. Said differently, hermeneutics is the necessary outcome of nihilism. Here 
Vattimo advances Heidegger’s later position on language and offers to our understanding 
of communication a revolutionary impulse,  
If one can speak of Being (and one must, in order not to fall unwittingly back into 
objectivistic metaphysics), it must be sought at the level of those inherited 
openings (Heidegger also says: in language, which is the house of Being), within 
which Dasein, man, is always already thrown as into its provenance.3  
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The meaning of hermeneutics recognizes that the dissolution of objectivistic metaphysics 
is not an error or a mistake, not something that results from some sort of ineptitude, but is 
itself the event of Being. If this is the case, then Vattimo sees a tendency to weakening 
“which is, to be sure, only such on the basis of the metaphysical category of presence, of 
fullness” within Being itself. With this, Vattimo makes the radical claim: “until now 
philosophers have seen fit to describe the world, now the moment has arrived to interpret 
it.”4 Obviously playing on Marx’s Eleventh Thesis of the Theses on Feuerbach (to wit: 
“philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to 
change it”), Vattimo brings into relief the transformative force of interpretation. 
Interpretation and social change are not separate endeavors, but are instead mutual 
projects each of which is intertwined with the other. Such is the task of what we have 
been calling twisting-a-way.  
 This leaves the task of philosophy in a curious position, but one that we should be 
prepared to take up. Philosophy is no longer a quest for certainties and absolute 
foundations, rather it is the place for historical narrative and the unmasking of absolute, 
ultimate truths—the weakening of thought with which Vattimo and his colleagues are 
concerned. In this regard, Vattimo allows us to see an alliance between philosophy and 
more socio-politically oriented projects. He notes in particular the way in which twentieth 
century philosophy took the form of “sociological impressionism” (think, for example, of 
the work of Adorno, Benjamin, and Bloch).5 In the refusal of objectivist metaphysics, and 
the turn to analyzing the rationalization of society through technological and scientific 
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means, philosophy took up a generalized critique of industrialization and the 
consequences this has for social life. To borrow from Adorno, philosophy became 
concerned with the total administration of everything that is. With this understanding of 
how one practices philosophy, it is of little surprise then that Vattimo was elected to the 
European Parliament in 1999, is a prominent social democratic politician, writes 
newspaper columns, and generally participates in the political concerns of his age. 
Equally, it should not be surprising to find philosophers more generally to hold deeply 
committed political concerns. What Vattimo discloses for this project is that the task of 
philosophy is to interpret Being as it can be understood for our times; that is, to witness 
the event of Being. For Vattimo, this means coming to terms with technology. Following 
Heidegger, metaphysics is the basis of the modern techno-scientific understanding of 
being, but it is also the space within which the very fragmentation of the significance of 
existence takes place. In other words, the basis for our understanding is simultaneously 
the conditions for its undoing. Moving beyond Heidegger’s critique of mechanical 
technologies in works such as “The Question Concerning Technology” and “The Age of 
the World-Picture,” Vattimo turns his attention information and communication 
technologies. Although I find this project necessary, it is not one I wish to take up here. 
Rather, I believe it is of importance to examine not only our technological heritage, but 
equally the literary and rhetorical tradition to which we have access and which constantly 
shapes our understanding of dwelling in the world. In other words, we must add to 
Vattimo’s sociological impressionism a rhetorical nuance at which he hints throughout 
his work, particularly in his writings about being a professor of philosophy, but does not 
take up directly. Here we can take with us a watchword: “Hermeneutics is a way of 
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looking at Being as an inheritance that is never considered as ultimate data.”6 In other 
words, our inheritance—the event of being to which we are a witness—is irreducible and 
expansive. It provides not the final word on any matter but the conditions necessary to 
say the first. Furthermore, it is this inheritance, this repertoire of responses to being in the 
world, that offers some safeguarding against relativism in its unbridled form. Our 
inheritance is something to which we have recourse, which has the solidity not of 
something absolute, but of something historical, and provides buoyancy in the sea of 
meanings wherein we find ourselves. Hermeneutics offers us the lesson that our 
inheritance is inexhaustible to the degree we are willing to approach it questioningly. We 
might ask in a manner parallel and complimentary to Vattimo’s concern with technology, 
what resources in our rhetorical history, the inheritance that we ourselves are, do we have 
to assist us in understanding being in a manner fitting to our times? And, of equal 
importance, how might this understanding address issues of political and social concern? 
4.2 Figuring Speech  
We can always escape toward an “elsewhere,” but this elsewhere is still 
somewhere, in the heart of our human condition. We never escape from that 
human condition, and we have no way to envision it from the outside in order to 
judge it. It alone makes language possible. 
Simone de Beauvoir, Pyrrhus and Cineas 
 
 In his deftly written handbook of rhetorical tropes and figures of speech, the late 
Arthur Quinn introduces his readers to the myriad possibilities of turning a phrase with 
the following admonition: “Writing is not like chemical engineering. We shouldn’t learn 
the figures of speech the way we learn the periodic table of elements. We shouldn’t 
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because we are learning not about hypothetical structures in things, but about real 
potentialities within our language, within ourselves.”7 In other words, figures of speech 
are not concepts to be collected and stored, ready to be inserted into writing and speech 
when needed, as one might select a spice from the spice rack now and then to add greater 
flavor to a dish when the recipe calls for it. Figures of speech at their core are neither 
accouterments nor extravagances, despite the fact that they are all too often approached 
with such purpose in mind. On the contrary, when we do work with words we 
simultaneously do work upon ourselves. Figures of speech are as much an issue of 
existence as they are of language.  
As I have argued throughout, linguistic and communicative practices are 
inextricably linked to shaping both individual and shared human experience. Indeed, if 
we are to take Aristotle at his word with his summation of human beings as zoon logon 
echon, often merely translated as “the animal who has reason (language),” as the defining 
characteristic of human beings then we must make sense of the relationship between 
language and human being in the world. 8 To understand Aristotle’s claim in a more 
fundamental manner is to understand that living for human beings is to be caught up in 
the whirlwind of language—of speaking and listening—in the drive toward 
communication, which is to say, toward the disclosure of a shared world within which we 
have a multiplicity of intentions and purposes that must be negotiated in common. The 
life of human beings is a life suffused with speech and the presence of others. 
Consequently, I believe it is paramount to turn our attention to particular figures of 
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speech so as to see what they might uncover about experience generally. That is to say, 
following the philosophical and hermeneutical work of Chapter Three, can a rhetorical 
figure itself be an aperture of being?  
Although I believe any rhetorical figure would give insights into the workings of 
language, and thus consequently of being, not just any figure here will do. Given this 
contemporary age of extremes, extremes of both abundance and lack on a global scale, I 
suggest we turn our eye toward that rhetorical figure of excess: hyperbole. In the main, 
within everyday use, hyperbole appears to function with ill repute. Often the term 
conjures up claims such as “I’m so hungry I could eat a horse,” over mere discomfort or 
“It’s freezing in here!” when the temperature is merely chilly. Or perhaps one thinks of 
the mainstream media’s incessant hyperbolizing and sensationalism for the sake of profit. 
Certainly these exaggerations are illustrative of hyperbole, but can we allow hyperbole to 
do more noble work? That is, might hyperbole have a positive function in our discourse, 
a function that is disclosive rather than ideologically suspect. Furthermore, the 
approaches to communication we explored by way of Heidegger, Jaspers, and Gadamer 
all made overtures to the hyperbolic, but they do not explicitly theorize the hyperbolic. 
Such then is our task here, to make visible the hyperbolic at work in these approaches to 
communication and link it to testimony which I will argue is the ontological condition of 
communication that embraces this hyperbolic force. 
From the Greek ΰπερβολή, hyperballein (“to throw beyond”), or its Latin cognate 
superiectio, hyperbole reaches beyond the ordinary into the extraordinary, that which lies 
outside our everyday experience. Hyperbole exists at the limit, both the limits of 
discourse and the limits of understanding. Hyperbole exploits the extraordinary so as to 
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illuminate the everyday and vice versa. Hyperbole helps to mark the limits of objective 
knowledge and subjective experience. More than mere exaggeration or amplification 
(although often reduced to this understanding) hyperbole causes problems for those who 
attempt to understand the figurative literally. For now, though, we are getting ahead of 
ourselves, beginning in a space beyond the proper beginning—beginning already within a 
hyperbolic spirit so to speak.  
Let us work not yet forward and beyond as the hyperbolic urges us to do, but 
backward into a brief history of hyperbole. I will not offer here a comprehensive history, 
but only a modest account of hyperbole’s early days in classical antiquity before turning 
our sights to more contemporary issues.9 As a figure of speech hyperbole has received 
rich and varied treatment in the rhetorical tradition ranging from admiration to disgust. 
For some, hyperbole is no more than mere exaggeration and often of a grotesque form at 
best. Aristotle, with his emphasis on moderation and propriety—worked out most 
masterfully in his Nicomachean Ethics but equally evident in his analysis of rhetoric—is 
hesitant to praise hyperbole. Indeed, on his account hyperbole is a rhetorical trope fueled 
by primarily by emotion rather than reason; he states “Hyperboles are adolescent, for they 
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exhibit vehemence. Therefore those in anger, mostly speak them…”10 As it is the young 
who tend to over-do things, to act excessively, hyperbole is best reserved to that specific 
class of individuals and to be avoided by mature adults.  
Nevertheless, hyperbole finds its most sustained moment in Aristotle’s project 
within his discussion of metaphor in Book 3 of the Rhetoric. He writes of metaphor, 
“metaphors should be transferred from things that are related but not obviously so, as in 
philosophy, too, it is characteristic of a well-directed mind to observe the likeness even in 
things very different.”11 In this respect, metaphor has a knowledge producing function as 
it brings together the familiar with the unfamiliar so as to make something 
understandable. One must take care in doing so, however, as Aristotle claims the speaker 
must continually maintain a believable ethos, which hyperbole risks shattering. Thus 
hyperbole, itself a figure which eschews propriety, must be used in moderation. It is 
against this backdrop that his claim of hyperbole’s adolescence makes sense—its 
exaggerated form is fitting only when the mood calls for it. The intensity of the rhetorical 
situation is the only justification for employing hyperbolic means. Beyond this, for 
Aristotle at least, hyperbole is indecorous.  
Longinus in his discussion of the sublime makes further space for hyperbole than 
does Aristotle. The hyperbolic and the sublime are not coincident, but hyperbole plays a 
role in making the sublime manifest. Indeed, it is only in this reaching and pointing 
toward the sublime that hyperbole finds its legitimate place, otherwise as with Aristotle, 
hyperbole falls prey to excess. Longinus writes of the hyperbolist who, in his shooting-
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beyond the everyday misses the sublime, and may fall “into unaccountable puerility 
through his desire to amplify everything.”12  Although granting further power to 
hyperbole with respect to the sublime, Longinus likewise holds that excess is to be 
avoided.  
Within classical theories of rhetoric, hyperbole finds its greatest and most 
balanced expression in Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria. A veritable textbook on rhetorical 
style and practice—both written and spoken—the Institutio had profound consequence 
for the rebirth of classical rhetoric in the late Renaissance. Quintilian defends rhetoric as 
the practical art of persuasion, a practice concerned more with everyday ethics than 
metaphysics, citizenship over ideal situations of justice. Following the traditional five-
part division of rhetoric into invention, arrangement, style, delivery, and memory 
Quintilian takes up the issue of hyperbole in his discussion of style, what Quintilian 
himself declares “the most difficult part of the whole work.”13 Style marks the difference 
between the sufficient orator and the great. Although still hesitant, Quintilian makes 
greater room for transgressing the rules of decorum when the subject matter or rhetorical 
situation demands it. Christopher D. Johnson in his discussion of Quintilian’s account of 
hyperbole speaks of how hyperbole is “bolder” than other tropes (among which metaphor 
is the most common) and often “functions as a catachrestic vehicle for the most desperate, 
unspeakable emotions and thoughts.”14 Catachresis is the figure of providing a name for 
something that lacks one (e.g., “the leg of a chair” instead of “the part of the chair that 
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allows it to sustain weight”). In other words, catachresis borrows from one semantic field 
to describe something in an altogether category that otherwise lacks a term. Hyperbole 
takes on this form and as such is to be distinguished from mimetic truth, taking on what 
Johnson argues is a looser form of truth.15 The Bible offers a rich array of loose truths. 
For example, in Mark 10:25 we read, “It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a 
needle than for someone who is rich to enter the kingdom of God.” Obviously we are not 
discussing camels and needles, but the hyperbolic image points toward the existential 
reality of the kingdom of God being reserved only for those who are worthy and who 
uphold charity beyond riches. Hyperbole, understood in terms of catachresis, provides a 
way to say something about that which cannot be said. It is an attempt, when no standard 
is available, to raise everyday language toward the extraordinary.  
Quintilian distinguishes five types of hyperbole: hyperbole by simile, comparison, 
and metaphor which are tropological forms of hyperbole, and hyperbole through the 
exaggeration of facts and by “certain signs” which serve more as figures of thought.16 
Moreover, often hyperbole takes on a chain-reaction effect wherein hyperboles build 
upon each other, each out-doing the other so as to move the audience to a more 
transcendent or grotesque position. With respect to Quintilian, Johnson summarizes, 
“There are two principle justifications for hyperbole. First, the speaker is moved in some 
extraordinary manner. Second, some incredible subject calls for expression. Both 
                                                
15 Johnson, Hyperboles, 39.  
16 Johnson, Hyperboles, 42.  
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psychological (interior) and phenomenological (exterior) motives depend on the 
existence of an outrageous or extraordinary res.”17  Indeed, as Quintilian claims,  
Hyperbole only has positive value when the thing about which we have to speak 
transcends the ordinary limits of nature. We are then allowed to amplify, because 
the real size of the thing cannot be expressed, and it is better to go too far than not 
to go far enough.18 
That is to say, hyperbole functions at the limit of everyday understanding in an effort to 
make sensible that which is unintelligible. Hyperbole functions as a figure of 
transcendence but, as we shall show, not merely an extra-worldly transcendence, but 
equally a transcendence within immanence, that is, the transcendence at the core of being 
in the world and of language.  
Hyperbole continues to receive both accolade and criticism throughout the history 
of rhetorical criticism, but here we must change terrain to the domain of philosophy. This 
change need not be abrupt; indeed, as Calvin O. Schrag makes clear in “Rhetoric 
Resituated at the End of Philosophy,” philosophy and rhetoric were born of the same 
ground and are today making a remarkable homecoming to their shared roots.19 In that 
sense, we are not leaving rhetorical theory behind so much as carrying its lesson with us 
forward. I will argue throughout the remainder of this chapter that hyperbole ceases to be 
a figure of speech performing a specific function and transforms into a description of our 
ontological condition.  
                                                
17 Johnson, Hyperboles, 44. 
18 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, 8.7.75-76. 
19 Calvin O. Schrag, “Rhetoric Resituated at the End of Philosophy,” Quarterly Journal 
of Speech 85(1985), 164-174. 
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In Dis-Enclosures, Jean-Luc Nancy investigates the relationship between 
Christianity or the religious spirit and rationality. In particular, he attempts to dis-enclose 
or raise the barrier of the closing of metaphysics we found earlier in Nietzsche and 
Heidegger. For Nancy, Christianity “designates nothing other, essentially (that is to say 
simply, infinitely simply: through an inaccessible simplicity), than the demand to open in 
this world and alterity or an unconditional alienation.”20 That opening which Christianity 
calls into being is the other of the world rather than the world-beyond-worlds the 
Kingdom of Christ more often brings to mind. With Christianity the world becomes 
opened “to an inaccessible alterity.” This inaccessible alterity necessarily shapes the 
world within which we dwell.  
Nancy rephrases this claim by arguing that alongside logos (i.e., reason or 
language) the alogon is always present. He states, 
 The alogon can be understood as the extreme, excessive, and necessary 
dimension of the logos; from the moment we speak of serious things (death, the 
world, being-together, being-oneself, the truth), it has never seriously been a 
question of anything other than this dimension. It is the alogon that reason 
introduced with itself.21  
The force of hyperbole is this alogon which is always alongside reason. Hyperbole is the 
extreme that is always hand in hand with the mundane, the excessive that is embedded in 
the lack. Even more so, it is the extreme that makes the mundane visible and the 
                                                
20 Jean-Luc Nancy, Dis-Enclosure: The Deconstruction of Christianity, trans. Bettina 
Bergo, Gabriel Malenfant, and Michael B. Smith (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2008),, 10.  
21 Nancy, Dis-Enclosure, 8. 
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excessive that brings the lack into relief. It is only against the underlying hyperbolic 
conditions that something like the ordinary can come into being.  
The serious things of which we speak—and the list could be lengthened to include 
such pressing matters as beauty and love—are serious precisely because they bring into 
relief our finitude, the limits of our being. Standing before the sublime, whether beautiful 
or terrible, we are at the edge of experience, overwhelmed and without the capacity to say 
what we see exactly. Our words escape us and we are left often with a set of feelings or 
gestures with which we can only hint. Let us think for a moment about death. Death 
places us at the limit, whether the limit of our existence or the limit of our understanding. 
When someone close to us dies, the absolute fragility and contingency of existence is 
brought into relief. We are moved beyond ourselves to the acknowledgement of our 
finitude and of the inevitability of our end. Moreover, when another dies with them dies 
also a web of meaning and significance. Think too of how difficult it is to share words 
with someone who is grieving. We take shelter in the ready-made phrases: “My 
condolences,” “You’re in my thoughts and prayers,” because there is nothing else to be 
said. It is not that these phrases are disingenuous; on the contrary, they mark the limit of 
our words to convey the fullness of our response. Like the experience of the serious, so 
too does hyperbole bring us to the limits of our linguistic capacities.  
Hyperbole and finitude go hand in hand as a way in which being is disclosed. To 
acknowledge our finitude is to concede the hyperbolic. Setting aside beliefs of a more 
perfect world after this one, even a purely a-theistic examination of death must 
acknowledge the existence of a world beyond our death, this world to be sure, but 
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altogether different without our dwelling within it. Finitude necessitates a beyond that 
cannot be explained, the alogon. Our lives are a testimony to this fact.  
Although Nancy is trying to make an historical argument about the ontological 
significance of Christianity, I believe we can examine the relationship between the logos 
and the alogon beyond this religious context through expanding our understanding of 
testimony (which itself extends beyond the religious). Indeed, Nancy himself seems to be 
moving this claim toward an ontological principle.  
Let us turn then to the alogon, the excessive that exists alongside logos, and see what it 
might show us. To take up this task of examining hyperbole philosophically, I will offer 
three sketches of increasingly complexity, first of Plato, then Nietzsche, and finally 
Heidegger each of whom offer divergent understandings of hyperbole with respect to the 
human condition and consequently offer multiple perspectives on the relationship 
between language and life. With each pass at understanding hyperbole we will speak of 
something serious, for indeed, what else is worth our words? 
4.3 The Epistemic Function of Hyperbole—Plato’s Mythologies 
He took a book from a shelf, and as he brought it up to his chest it passed from 
shadow into one of the sun shafts. He held the book there, looking at that book, 
that light, that dust. It was as those there were two worlds. This world, and a 
hidden world that it took the momentary shafts of late-afternoon light to reveal as 
the real world—of flying particles wildly spinning, shimmering, randomly 
bouncing into each other and heading off into entirely new directions.  
Richard Flanagan, The Narrow Road to the Deep North 
 
 Philosophy was born to address serious things. The pre-Socratics were concerned 
with nothing short of the stuff of the universe and the laws by which it appeared to 
human beings. More so, early Greek philosophy tried to make sense of its mythical 
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inheritance—the aperture of being in that early epoch—in a way that suited the rise of 
rationality. We witness here a change in paradigms and an attempt to appropriate the 
tradition in a way fitting to the new circumstances. The gods become increasingly 
weakened, functioning more as exemplars and inspirations than omnipotent forces. With 
the gods no longer offering sufficient explanation for the workings of the universe, their 
epistemic value is brought into question. Although the pre-Socratics still turned to 
mythology for questions of ethics and being-together, questions of knowledge began to 
shift toward a rising rationality.  
 With this in mind, philosophy’s relationship to rhetoric has no doubt been a 
complicated one and no less so within Plato’s Dialogues. Certainly the very structure of 
the texts as dialogues already moves philosophy into the realm of rhetoric and literature 
wherein figures of speech are readily at play. Through a dialogic form, Plato takes up the 
rhetorical tradition in various ways so as to make his philosophic position understandable; 
one might go so far as to say it is the addition of literary and rhetorical nuance that gives 
the insights of Socratic reasoning its full force and without which we would merely have 
the cold feel of dialectical rationality. Indeed, what words of Socrates would stay with us 
without his customary weirdness to bolster our spirits. Gadamer lends insight into this 
need for literature when he writes, “Philosophy continually finds itself in a state of 
linguistic need. This is constitutive of philosophy, and this calamity, this distress, 
becomes all the more felt, the more boldly the philosopher breaks new paths.”22 We 
witness this linguistic need within the works of Plato. To be sure, Plato, through his 
                                                
22 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Autobiographical Reflections,” in The Gadamer Reader: A 
Bouquet of Later Writings, ed. Richard E. Palmer (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 2007), 36. 
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Socrates, breaks away from the tradition of mystics and sages and lays the groundwork 
for philosophy, i.e., for loving (rather than already having) wisdom. Furthermore, as we 
well know, part of Plato’s great genius is that he demonstrated in the time of supreme 
rhetorical flourishing produced by the Sophists that he could outdo them all without 
forsaking truth for linguistic beauty. He knew well that the truth was fine enough to 
surpass any rhetorical accoutrements.  
 Beyond their dialogic form, we can view this distinction between philosophy on 
the one hand and rhetoric or literature on the other through the opposition between logos 
and mythos. By doing so, we can approach the hyperbolic force at work in Plato’s 
Dialogues. These two terms in pre-Socratic Greek philosophy were often found hand in 
hand—indeed, as Heidegger later reads the Greek situation, “The mythos is that appeal of 
foremost and radical concern to all human beings which makes man think of what 
appears, what is in being. Logos says the same; mythos and logos are not, as our current 
historians of philosophy claim, placed into opposition by philosophy as such.”23 Both 
mythos and logos then are attempts to give voice to our most serious concerns. Although 
such a distinction between terms is not necessary, it nevertheless begins to emerge in 
Plato’s Dialogues.  
Plato’s use of myth is two-fold. First, we have his appropriation of traditional 
myths. Here Plato draws significantly from Homer and these are often the myths to which 
his interlocutors make reference for sources of evidence in defending themselves against 
the superior strength of Socrates’ reasoning. For example, early in the Phaedrus the myth 
                                                
23 Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 1968), 10. 
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of Boreas is recounted as Socrates and Phaedrus have decided to discuss the ways of love 
and language at the alleged site where Boreas seized Orithyia. Phaedrus asks Socrates if 
he believes the story to be true and Socrates responds, “I myself certainly have no time 
for the business, and I tell you why, my friend. I can’t as yet ‘know myself’ as the 
inscription at Delphi enjoins, and so long as that ignorance remains it seems to me 
ridiculous to inquire into extraneous matters.”24 Here, Socrates proclaims myth to be 
superfluous with regard to the most important of all matters, knowing oneself. In this 
respect, mythological narratives turn one’s attention away from oneself and toward the 
external world and its trivialities. The hyperbolic act of going beyond oneself, that is, 
going beyond one’s capacity for self-reflection on the issues most central to living well, 
and into the trivial world is a form of hyperbole for which Socrates, and Plato with him, 
has no patience.  
This is not the final word on myth however, as we also have the myths and 
allegories that Plato himself invents. To name a few: the Gorgias myth (523a–527a), the 
myth of the androgyne (Symposium 189d–193d), the Phaedo myth (107c–115a), the myth 
of Er (Republic 614a–621d), the myth of the winged soul (Phaedrus 246a–249d), the 
myth of Theuth (Phaedrus 274c–275e). Here Socrates is not drawing explicitly from a 
commonly held heritage that covers over the truth of existence—these are the myths that 
he believes we would do well to get over—but draws rather from the power of the 
imagination to give form to and crystalize what at times appear to be seemingly abstract 
ideas. In other words, he reaches out to the imagination to give an image of the truth that 
                                                
24 Plato, “Phaedrus,” in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, eds. Edith Hamilton and 




he is trying to describe. Socrates does not have a problem with myths per se, as his 
comments in Phaedrus might lead us to believe, but instead eschews myths that promote 
a way of life that is not self-reflexive. Among these mythic inventions, Ludwig Edelstein 
offers a further distinction between kinds of myths, “those dealing with an account of the 
creation of the world and with an account of the early history of mankind, and those that 
deal with the fate of the soul before and after this life and have a bearing not on 
metaphysics or science but rather on ethics.”25 In both modes of myth Socrates reaches 
beyond that which can be delivered to one by purely logical reason (dialectic) and toward 
the creative impetus that can give flesh and blood to that which dialectic leaves rather 
lifeless. What I wish to show here is that myth understood generally as a form of 
narrativity takes on a hyperbolic force within the Platonic Dialogues and mediates the 
relationship between knowing oneself and having knowledge of the truth of being. In 
going beyond dialectic to myth, what I am calling here a hyperbolic movement, the 
Platonic Dialogues take on a livelier existential characterization. This occurs through the 
development of paradox within the text, a narratival confusion between myth and reality. 
Joshua Ritter in his essay “Recovering Hyperbole” illuminates this writing,  
Hyperbolic paradox stretches the imagination through its extravagance and in 
one’s ambiguous apprehension of it, because it is only in the obscure space of 
“para” [i.e., of paradox] that one is disoriented enough to surrender to 
                                                
25 Ludwig Edelstein, “The Function of Myth in Plato’s Philosophy,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 10(1949), 467. 
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presuppositions about thought and reality, thereby preparing the way for a newly 
reimagined perspective.26  
Through shifting between dialectic and myth, the reader of the Dialogues is 
hermeneutically disoriented and from within this disorientation opened up to new 
perspectives that were previously inaccessible through dialectical routes. It is not an issue 
of whether or not any of Plato’s myths are true, nor whether they accord with our 
experience of the world. Instead, what is of significance is the way in which this tension 
between dialectic and myth turns our attention to something new. In other words, this 
paradox generates the space for new thinking. 
In addition to this hyperbolic force on the scale of narrativity, hyperbole is also at 
work as a rhetorical trope with an epistemological function. Let us take as our primary 
example Plato’s Symposium in conjunction with his famous description of the “divided 
line” in the Republic. Here Plato raises the question “What is love (Eros)?” by setting the 
stage for a gathering of some of the greatest minds in Greece at the time. He offers series 
of accounts of love such that we might know love when we see it.27 After hearing 
genealogies of Eros, of common and heavenly love, of the origins of the human form 
from the likes of Pausanias, Aristophanes, and Agathon, Socrates first utilizes dialectic to 
question previous accounts of Eros. Upon doing so, he moves beyond this strategy 
toward a recollection of what he learned of love from the priestess Diotima. Here the very 
trajectory of the story moves ever beyond itself in wider circles and Socrates himself 
                                                
26 Ritter, “Recovering Hyperbole: Rethinking the Limits of Rhetoric for an Age of 
Excess,” 411. 
27 For an account of the Symposium with regard to philosophy as a way of life and 
communicative praxis, see Ramsey Eric Ramsey and Jessica N. Sturgess, “The strange 
leisure of the snake-bitten: Listening to the wonder of Socrates,” Listening, 46, 5-20.  
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throws his understanding of love beyond himself to the words of a wiser woman. 
Through what he learned from Diotima, Socrates grounds love as the desire for “the 
conception and generation that the beautiful effects.”28 Socrates then offers an image of 
what this looks like, bringing the hyperbolic force of the text into relief. The process of 
love is an ascension, Socrates claims, from the love of one individual body, to the form of 
all bodies, to the beauty of the soul wherein “he will find it beautiful enough to quicken 
in his heart a longing for such discourse as tends toward the building of a noble nature.” 
From there he will contemplate the beauty of this discourse on a wider scale, laws and 
institutions, and then finally to the beauty of all kinds of knowledge. Socrates tells us, 
“And turning his eyes toward the open sea of beauty, he will find in such contemplation 
the seed of the most fruitful discourse and the loftiest thought, and reap a golden harvest 
of philosophy, until, confirmed and strengthened, he will come upon one single form of 
knowledge.”29  
As with so many of the Dialogues we find here the ascension from the everyday 
to the realm of the pure forms, another take on the story of the divided line in the 
Republic. This upward process of continually moving beyond mere becoming (the 
holding of opinions and beliefs about things in the world which pass away) to knowledge 
(not of worldly phenomena, but of the intelligible order of the world) makes an ever-
expanding pathway from the everyday to the pure forms of the true, the just, and in the 
                                                
28 Plato, “Symposium,” The Collected Dialogues of Plato, eds. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairnes, trans. Michael Joyce (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1999), 206e. 
29 Plato, “Symposium,” 210a-210d. 
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case of Symposium, the beautiful. All of these themselves point to that which is supra-
essential, that which is beyond being, the good. As Socrates tells Glaucon in the Republic,  
In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive 
from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and 
essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still 
transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power. 
To which Glaucon replies: “Heaven save us, hyperbole can no further go.”30 Glaucon 
addresses the rhetorical figure critically; the words of Socrates and the ideas therein have 
exceeded the limits of rationality—they cannot go on any further. But this transcendence 
is itself hyperbolic. Indeed, in On the Name Jacques Derrida defines hyperbole with 
respect to this moment of the Republic as “the movement of transcendence that carries or 
transports beyond being or beingness.”31 In other words, hyperbole as the progressive 
moving beyond from becoming to being and further to that which is beyond being, from 
opinion to knowledge of the forms to the good, serves an epistemological purpose in the 
Platonic Dialogues. Rather than simply (though not merely) serving a rhetorical function, 
hyperbole is the device through which we can gain an understanding of how knowledge 
works. It has, so to speak, an epistemological function about epistemology itself by 
delimiting the knowledge to which we have access and that which is beyond our 
intellectual capacities. In other words, hyperbole helps to make manifest and 
understandable the Delphic injunction to “Know Thyself” by clarifying what is possible 
                                                
30 Plato, “Republic,” The Collected Dialogues of Plato, eds. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairnes, trans. Paul Shorey (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 
509c. 
31 Jacques Derrida, On the Name, trans. David Wood (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1995), 64. 
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for a self to know and what lies beyond the realm of self-knowledge. For Plato to 
articulate that about which he was convinced, he turned to the alogon, the willful lies 
through which he could disclose the truth. Furthermore, in this turn to hyperbole Plato 
discloses, perhaps against his will, the way in which the epistemic rests upon the 
communicative. It is only through the myths and stories, through the dialogue itself, that 
the insights about knowledge and being can come to light. More so, these rhetorical 
constructions do not merely represent Plato’s epistemology, but fundamentally shape it—
indeed, there is no separation between the so-called “content” of Plato’s philosophy and 
the communicative means by which he tried to voice it. The hyperbolic is implicitly tied 
to knowledge.  
4.4 The Ethical and Communicative Function of Hyperbole–Nietzsche’s Excesses 
Unceasing human work gave birth to this 
Infinity of books. If of them all 
Not even one remained, man would again 
Beget each page and every line,  
Each work and every love of Hercules,  
And every teaching of every manuscript.  
Jorge Luis Borges, “Alexandria, A.D. 641” 
 
 Whereas the hyperbole at work in the Platonic Dialogues is an outward movement 
from personal opinion to knowledge of the forms—a movement that passes from the 
subjective through the external world and then beyond to the conditions for the 
possibility of knowledge within the external world, Friedrich Nietzsche offers hyperbole 
of an altogether other sort. Nietzsche, as we well know, wants nothing to do with this 
divided understanding of knowledge or a focus on that which is extra-worldly but prefers 
to bring us back down to earth wherein we might be sufficiently and honestly grounded; 
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nevertheless, in avoiding the extra-worldly Nietzsche does not escape hyperbole but runs 
headlong into it. Recalling Quintilian, Nietzsche’s use of hyperbole is of no surprise 
given his philosophical style. His use of parables and aphorisms draw the reader outside 
of the text and turn her to her own understanding. The reader is forced to extend beyond 
herself and take into account the hermeneutic conditions that lead her to any particular 
judgment. Indeed, we might call Nietzsche the hyperbolic philosopher par excellence. 
However, following Paul Ricoeur in his discussion of hyperbole in Oneself as Another 
we must avoid understanding hyperbole in only stylistic terms. Indeed, it is the purpose 
of this project to elevate hyperbole from a figure to a concept. There Ricoeur writes, “By 
hyperbole it must be strongly underscored, we are not to understand a figure of style, a 
literary trope, but the systematic practice of excess in philosophical argumentation.”32 
Although within this section Ricoeur is discussing the hyperbole at work in Emmanuel 
Levinas’s writings, I believe the same can be said of Nietzsche. Throughout his corpus, 
Nietzsche’s writing tends toward the excessive—not only in the tone it takes up but 
equally in the development of his fundamental concepts.  
 It would be a mistake to understand Nietzsche’s tone as a kind of impropriety in 
the way in which Aristotle characterized hyperbole. Although Nietzsche’s works resonate 
with the young (who has not encountered a young man with Nietzsche in his back pocket, 
or who has not played that role herself?) it is not itself an immature body of thought. On 
the contrary, Nietzsche’s hyperbolic form speaks to the coldness of Enlightenment 
rationality, to its at times painful lack of beauty and style. Although it is easy to find a 
                                                
32 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 337. 
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thoughtful passage in Kant’s Critiques or Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, for example, 
it is quite difficult to find a beautiful one or one that excites and quickens the spirit. This 
of course was what philosophy, in its focus on systematicity, was lacking during this time: 
the force of beauty that allowed philosophy to speak to life.33 It is to this necessity that 
Nietzsche’s work speaks.  
For Nietzsche, our experience of truth is shaped by rhetorical practices. In “On 
Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense” he writes, in a now famous passage,  
What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, and 
anthropomorphisms, in short, a sum of human relations which have been 
subjected to poetic and rhetorical intensification, translation, and decoration and 
which, after they have been in use for a long time, strike a people as firmly 
established, canonical, and binding.34  
This passage, and the essay more generally, often draws debates regarding the social 
construction of reality and not surprisingly so. Truth is rhetorically constituted and this 
constitution is frequently covered over and its derivations are presented as some kind of 
absolute truth. To the contrary however, these metaphors, metonymies, and 
anthropomorphisms are simply the way in which we attempt to grasp the experiences of 
which we believe ourselves convinced. We have, on Nietzsche’s account, no recourse to 
alternative options. Nothing we could say would lie outside the reach of poetic and 
                                                
33 The question then is whether it is possible to do systematic philosophy in our time 
without abandoning the promise of philosophy as a way of life.  
34 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense,” in The Birth of Tragedy and 
Other Writings, edited by Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 146.  
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rhetorical translation as there is no understanding of language that does not have 
testimony at its center.  
Here, however, I am less concerned with the hyperbole at work in Nietzsche’s 
argumentative strategy, as fascinating as such an inquiry would be.35 Instead, I wish to 
examine the way in which a form of hyperbole, for Nietzsche, functions as a description 
of our communicative capacities. Said differently, Nietzsche begins to mark human 
beings as themselves hyperbolic (rather than simply users of hyperbole), a line of 
reasoning I will further develop in my discussion of Martin Heidegger and our hyperbolic 
ontological constitution. In section 354 of The Gay Science, in an aphorism titled “On the 
‘Genius of the Species’” Nietzsche takes up the question of the development of human 
consciousness. He gives an etiology of consciousness, writing at length:   
Now, if you are willing to listen to my answer [to the question of the origin of 
consciousness] and the perhaps extravagant surmise that it involves, it seems to 
me as if the subtlety and strength of consciousness always were proportionate to a 
man’s (or animal’s) capacity for communication, and as if this capacity in turn 
were proportionate to the need for communication […] Where need and distress 
have forced men for a long time to communicate and to understand each other 
quickly and subtly, the ultimate result is an excess of this strength and art of 
communication—as it were, a capacity that has gradually been accumulated and 
now waits for an heir who might squander it. (Those who are called artists are 
                                                
35 This project has already been taken up with great skill and precision and I suggest one 
turn to Allan Megill’s Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) or Alexander Nehamas’ Nietzsche: Life 
as Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) for greater insight.  
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these heirs; so are orators, preachers, writers—all of them people who always 
come at the end of a long chain, “late born” every one of them in the best sense of 
the word and, as I have said, by their nature squanderers.)36  
Nietzsche admits his hypothesis is extravagant; that is, it exceeds or goes beyond our 
ordinary understanding. Nevertheless, it is with the same breath that lies and truths are 
told. What then is Nietzsche trying to get at through a hyperbolic route? To this end, 
Ritter’s insight on the relationship between hyperbole and lie might be of use, “The lie of 
hyperbole presents one with an opportunity to explore the hermeneutical possibilities for 
expanding one’s conception of truth(s) beyond its conventional bounds.”37 Recalling 
Nancy, it is this lie, the alogon, that makes logos possible. As we discussed with Plato, by 
setting forth the lie we are reoriented toward the truth. In Nietzsche’s case, the truth is in 
distinction to our inherited understandings of consciousness as prior to our 
communicative capacities. He upends this understanding and pairs consciousness and 
communication as equiprimordial phenomena. It is not at issue here whether Nietzsche 
genuinely believes consciousness was a development of herd life, or even more so, as we 
shall soon see, that consciousness is lamentable. What matters for our understanding of 
hyperbole is what this stretching of the understanding through exaggeration discloses; 
that is, the truths that underlie the seeming lies at work in the text. In this way, hyperboles 
are a form of hermeneutic gymnastics; that is, of keeping the understanding fit such that it 
is adequately prepared to shoulder the burden of large truths.  
                                                
36 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1974), 298. Italics my own.  
37 Ritter, “Recovering Hyperbole,” 421.  
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In this aphorism I understand Nietzsche to be saying a human being’s capacity for 
response is proportionate to his or her need for relationships; that is, the intensity of the 
need for relationships determines the communicative finesse one has—the more we must 
communicate the better we are able to do so. Originally, our need for communication was 
derived from our desire to survive. Consequently, on Nietzsche’s account consciousness 
is superfluous; it is an addition or developmental supplement of human beings for the 
sake of survival. This survival is made more feasible with the assistance of others, as is 
generally evident in the necessity of communication and communication technologies in 
the development of civilizations. We might understand communication at this level as the 
exchange of information that aids in the survival of the species or herd. Indeed, Nietzsche 
continues in the aphorism, “Consciousness does not really belong to man’s individual 
existence, but rather to his social or herd nature; that, as follows from this, has developed 
subtlety only insofar as this is required by social or herd utility.”38 The strength of our 
consciousness and its facility and grace is proportionate to the requirement of social 
utility. We must remember however that Nietzsche had little appreciation for utility as it 
is the most calculative and least aesthetically pleasing, least life-affirming, of values. This 
requirement of herd utility for the development of consciousness is key to the ongoing 
laying waste of our life-affirming capacities to which Nietzsche draws our attention time 
and again throughout his work. “Utility,” Nietzsche writes, “is ultimately also a mere 
belief, something imaginary, and perhaps precisely the most calamitous stupidity of 
which we shall perish some day.”39 What becomes conscious, within this line of thinking 
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and this specific need of communication as information exchange, is in the process going 
to become shallow since it is made conscious only because it is necessary for the herd. 
The current language of the herd, what we might call the language of utility—concepts 
such as “facts” and “correctness”—given Nietzsche’s larger project, is only so because it 
is believed to make living easier, more efficient. With facts dwelling in the world is far 
less burdensome as we have stable grounds upon which we can rest. Facts are useful and 
can be employed to facilitate even more useful endeavors. Yet perhaps wedged in 
Nietzsche’s critique of communication is a small but viable hope: upon widening our 
consciousness by recognizing new communicative needs, perhaps we might generate 
communicative dwelling places that do not fall within the constricting boundaries of herd 
utility. Perhaps our communicative capacities can be set loose without bounds. Perhaps 
we might find not just the ability to communicate, but the power to testify.  
Whatever hopes we have for twisting-a-way from the crass utilitarianism of the 
herd rests with those who are willing to be wasteful and extravagant, those who are 
willing to act against the common injunction of efficiency and utility—i.e., those who are 
willing to be hyperbolic. Those who are able to be excessive in proportion to the already 
excessive phenomenon of consciousness will move beyond the yoke of utility.  In the 
development of the art of communication due to the need to quickly distribute 
information, there resulted the “excess of this strength and art of communication—as it 
were, a capacity that has gradually accumulated and now waits for an heir who might 
squander it.”40 In my interpretation of Nietzsche, this squandering is not a misguided and 
reckless wastefulness, but rather the extravagant spending of what language gives us, as 
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opposed to miserly consciousness of only that which is useful to the herd. These 
squanderers—the ethically profligate, plentiful, profuse, generous, open-handed and 
exuberant—are the artists, poets, rhetors, writers, and thinkers who discern that language 
has been worn out by the base wastefulness of herd utility. One recalls Heidegger’s apt 
and concise admonishment, “With a worn out language everybody can talk about 
everything.”41 This is not a facile critique of the democratization of language but rather a 
profound concern that with the wearing down of language—i.e., with the reduction of 
communication to the transference of what is useful—the essence of communication is 
covered over. In all this talk about everything nothing is said, or at least nothing that 
speaks of serious things.  
Squandering does not mean that language is employed without care and anything 
can be said to anyone willing to listen. Instead, the squanderers squander by using the 
accrued strength of communication to bring us back to what is near; squandering attempts 
to give voice to the being in the world that we are. The exemplar squanderer is not the 
politician, who today seem to be saying things so carelessly that one wonders if words 
any longer have value, but the poet. It is these squanderers, in their extravagant 
participation with language, who revive it and allow language to speak our disclosive 
nature. The squanderer writes for everyone and for no one; she writes with something to 
say but without the purposiveness of direct communication. Nothing is exchanged, but 
something is communicated. Squandering, in its excessive spending, allows a glimpse at 
the immense power of language. The poem is always about its subject, yes, but 
simultaneously every poem is likewise a poem about language itself.  
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Experiencing the world outside the constraints of utility is among the most 
difficult challenges we can undertake. To be sure, our everyday habits of interpretation 
and actions are embedded in the useful—perhaps nothing causes so much anguish as not 
‘feeling of any use’ to society. However, as Heidegger notes, “the most useful is the 
useless…yet one must look upon the useful as ‘that which makes someone whole,’ that is, 
what makes the human being at home with himself.”42 That is to say, that which gives us 
the greatest satisfaction, a sense of genuine flourishing, are those undertakings which 
escape the grasps of utility—what for Nietzsche would be the practice of the arts.43 The 
squandering work of the artist and the thinker is such that they turn us away from utility 
and toward other possibilities for dwelling together. The poem twists-a-way from the 
narrow confines of a worn out language and, through the arrangement of words, opens 
out upon a vista of new insights and possibilities. Perhaps this is why we feel so buoyed 
and safe in the world when we stumble upon a passage of literature that seems to speak 
directly to us, that seems to open new worlds we did not even know were possible.  
 It is this excess that gives content to our articulation of testimony. Testimony is 
that understanding of communication which sees all speaking as excessive and as a 
practice of squandering. Language, in its inability to match in equal measure the 
resources of speech to the experience of being in the world, is always a lavish attempt to 
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say something knowing all the while a final word can never be said – the spending must 
occur without reserve and without reservation. Stephen Webb, approaching the question 
from a theological perspective, offers keen insight into the characteristic of such 
squandering. He writes, “We squander when we do not care what the systems that be will 
do to our gifts, when we defy all of the efforts to make our giving reasonable and prudent. 
But we also squander from an inner strength, a spiritual richness that suggests that we 
give because we already have been given too much.”44 Substituting a will to affirm life 
for Webb’s conception of a spiritual richness, squandering becomes an act of freedom, an 
act of giving without the expectation of return. By living within language hyperbolically 
we affirm life against the constraints of a utility that is beginning to wear out its welcome. 
If we are not to perish from this calamitous stupidity, as Nietzsche notes, then our only 
hope is to turn to the lavishness that the useless affords us and squander it in a manner 
that is ethically generous. In reading Nietzsche I always imagine the great-souled one as 
she or he who ‘sloshes’ goodness, whose fine character overflows into and onto the 
others around her, whose good acts are done and good words given not for any 
recognition or praise, but because that is the truest expression of her nature. So too is it 
with each of us, the hyperbolic character of language grants the opportunity for the 
sharing of good news in defiance of all that is practical or of use. It is art, Nietzsche 
shows us, that lays bare and makes visible our communicative capacities, the art of word 
and image and all that lies between.  
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4.5 The Ontological Function of Hyperbole—Heidegger’s Dasein 
In the day I would be reminded of those men and women,  
Brave, setting up signals across vast distances,  
Considering a nameless way of living, of almost unimagined values.  
As the lights darkened, as the lights of night brightened,  
We would try to imagine them, try to find each other,  
To construct peace, to make love, to reconcile  
Waking with sleeping, ourselves with each other,  
Ourselves with ourselves. We would try by any means  
To reach the limits of ourselves, to reach beyond ourselves,  
To let go the means, to wake.  
Muriel Rukeyser, The Speed of Darkness 
 
Whereas Nietzsche calls on us to become hyperbolic through embracing 
aestheticism, or embrace our hyperbolicity through a turn to aesthetics, Heidegger shows 
us that we already are hyperbolic from an ontological perspective. More so, where Plato 
shows us the necessity of turning to myth and Nietzsche discloses the lack of absolute 
foundation to knowledge, Heidegger draws these two insights together through showing 
that our poetic dwelling offers a ground for our being in the world. Having examined the 
epistemological and ethico-communicative functions of hyperbole, I wish now to turn to 
what I consider to be the most substantial contribution to the larger conversation 
surrounding hyperbole. Here hyperbole no longer has a function within a particular 
philosophic discourse, as we saw with both Plato and Nietzsche, but the hyperbolic 
becomes an ontological condition of being human. We move from hyperbole as a 
rhetorical tool to hyperbole as a description of existence. In other words, we can read 
Heidegger’s attempt to speak of serious things (finitude, being-in-the-world, being with 
other), the disclosure of our hyperbolic constitution.  
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We see this most clearly in his analytic of Dasein in Being and Time. In 
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, being-in is an existentiale and not a category; being-
in signifies an ontological condition rather than an ontic property. The being-in of Dasein 
is not “the kind of Being which an entity has when it is ‘in’ another one, as the water is 
‘in’ the glass, or the garment is ‘in’ the cupboard.”45 Being-in otherwise than water or a 
garment highlights the way in which Dasein is fundamentally (i.e., ontologically) not a 
corporeal thing. Human beings are radically unlike everything else, not by degree, but 
fundamentally so. There is, for Heidegger, and absolute abyss between Dasein and all 
other entities. Moreover, as he argues later in the same section, “Being-in is not a 
‘property’ which Dasein sometimes has and sometimes does not have, and without which 
it could be just as well as it could with it.”46 Instead, Dasein “resides alongside” or is 
“absorbed in the world.” To be sure, such residing alongside is not like that of two 
objects in proximity to one another, but the ability for an entity to encounter the world. 
This encountering the world as world, a communicative phenomenon, is what 
distinguishes Dasein from everything else. For this to be the case, Heidegger offers an 
analysis of Dasein such that Dasein is not reducible to an object present-to-hand or best 
explicated by turning to the being of things. Certainly Dasein can be reduced to or treated 
as if it were a mere thing, we have much historical evidence of such an approach—it is 
the scientism that we brought into question in the first chapter—but this is possible only 
on the condition of Dasein existing primordially as being-in-the-world. It is this 
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ontological fact that then opens up the possibility of Dasein dwelling in the world 
authentically or inauthentically.  
With this in mind, we must ask who is this Dasein, this being-in-the-world? Of 
course, the entirety of Being and Time attempts to address this question so as to prepare 
to ask the question of the meaning of being. What I wish to show here is that at least one 
possible way to respond to the question of who is Dasein is to say Dasein is the being 
who dwells in the world hyperbolically. We can see this by addressing Heidegger’s 
conception of thrownness, transcendence, and ek-stasis and the theoretical implications 
that fall out from such claims.  
Beginning with thrownness, Heidegger writes in a discussion of Dasein’s 
faciticity,  
‘whence’ and ‘whither,’ yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it 
the ‘thrownness’ of this entity into its ‘there’; indeed, it is thrown in such a way 
that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the ‘there.’ The expression ‘thrownness’ is meant 
to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over.47  
Into what is Dasein thrown? Into a state-of-mind, an understanding, and discourse—to 
wit, the three constitutive elements of the existential analytic of Dasein. Dasein always 
finds itself in a particular state-of-mind or attunement through which the world shows 
itself in a specific manifestation, and in an interpretive understanding that allows the 
world and Dasein’s relationship to it to be meaningfully projected, as well as discourse, 
the totality of references that give the world and Dasein communicable meaning. Said 
differently, Dasein is thrown into the world already underway and from within this 
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having already begun, is ensconced within a state-of-mind, understanding, and discursive 
practices. Furthermore, this thrownness is saturated in finitude; that is, Dasein is thrown 
into its possibilities as the ground of decision and from out of these possibilities must 
make choices to take up some possibilities while leaving other possibilities unactualized. 
Indeed, finitude is the hyperbolic existentialized. Finitude, the acknowledgement that one 
day we shall die and this shall be over, all of it, launches us into the future. Dasein has 
but one direction: forward. Onward. To be thrown is to move on. One cannot ask from 
whence she is thrown, but must from this having-been thrown resolutely take up living 
together with others.  
Dasein, as we recall from our discussion of cynicism in the first chapter, in its 
everyday being fails to acknowledge this thrownness but instead takes up this thrownness 
by attempting to ignore it and flee into comfort of the everyday with the tranquilization 
that it offers. It is thrownness that makes possible Dasein coming to understand itself and 
it is the lack of acknowledgment towards this thrownness that mires Dasein in a restricted 
understanding of its worldiness. Dasein is itself because it is outside of, beyond itself, 
thrown into the world and thrown into everydayness. Dasein is, as we shall explore 
shortly, ek-static. Heidegger calls the everyday “who” of Dasein the They-self or Anyone 
(das Man), a who who is both everyone and no one, a constitutive structure of our 
existence. One’s They-self is the public ego is what we have in common with everyone 
else. There is nothing special nor unique about the They. Our primary mode of existence 
is as the They—we strive to keep everything easy, to abide by convention. The force of 
the They, a force which we have internalized and made our own, limits the range of 
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possibilities that any given Dasein can take up if the They remains unexamined. 
Heidegger clarifies the role of averageness, lending a sense of urgency to our own project:  
In this averageness with which it prescribes what can and may be ventured, it [the 
They] keeps watch over everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore. 
Every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed. Overnight, everything that is 
primordial gets glossed over as something that has long been well known. 
Everything gained by a struggle becomes just something to be manipulated. Every 
secret loses its force. The care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency 
of Dasein which we call the ‘leveling down’ of all possibilities of Being.48  
This leveling down of possibilities of Being occurs through publicness. Publicness 
determines the way in which things are interpreted, as through it “everything gets 
obscured, and what has thus been covered up gets passed off as something familiar and 
accessible to everyone.”49 This is not to say that in the They all is lost; on the contrary, 
everything merely remains as it is without any reflection or celebration. It is glossed over, 
another moment in the passage of time that occurs without incident. With respect to the 
question of the meaning of being, such questions lose their priority and fail to be asked 
with any degree of care. Moreover, that which seems to concern us most (e.g., petty 
affairs, prestige, wealth, etc.) fails to be of ultimate concern (e.g., learning to live well 
with one another). Said differently, in the publicness of the They we fail to speak of 
serious things. Let us remember the Socrates of the Apology here as an illustration. 
Socrates found himself mired in the status quo, out of place, weird, and thus struggled 
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throughout his life to search for wisdom, to love wisdom and thus to practice philosophy. 
He freed himself with visions of fame or wealth and focused on the only practice that 
mattered: attempting to live in accordance with philosophy as a way of life.   
The fundamental problem of the They is that it allows Dasein disburden itself of 
itself; Dasein no longer acknowledges responsibility and complicity. Let us be clearer for 
a moment: there are not some who fall prey to the They and some who do not—the They 
is a constitutive feature of each individual. I prefer to think of it in terms of moments; at 
moments we rely upon the status quo, on our habits and pre-made interpretations. At 
other times, however brief, we resolve upon our actions and interpretations and put them 
to work freely and with a sense of responsibility. In the manifestation of its They-self, 
Dasein surrenders itself to the indistinguishable mass of publicness. Heidegger states with 
an eloquence worth quoting at length as it gives further illumination of the ideological 
saturation, whether fundamentalism or cynicism, we wish to critique.   
In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information services 
such as the newspaper, every Other is like the next. This Being-with-one-another 
dissolves one's own Dasein completely into a kind of Being of ‘the Others’, in 
such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more 
and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship 
of the ‘they’ is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take 
pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; 
likewise we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we find 
‘shocking’ what they find shocking. The ‘they’, which is nothing definite, and 
  
149 
which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of 
everydayness.50  
In the They “everyone is the other, and no one is himself.”51 The interpretation of the 
world to which we are constantly given over in our average understanding, state-of-mind, 
and discourse allows for the possibility of experiencing the world without ever making it 
one’s own, that is, without grounding it in authentic possibility. Whether we believe him 
to be genuine or not, it is important to note that for Heidegger this is not a moral issue. 
The They is an ontological necessity that precedes any issues of wrongdoing. Indeed, we 
rely on our They-selves as a repertoire of responses in our existing. In a sense, the They 
has much in common with Gadamer’s articulation of prejudice, our pre-made habits of 
interpretation and action. We can reflect upon those prejudices—such is the project of 
hermeneutics. Being resolute, then, means being hermeneutical. Acknowledging this is 
the task we constantly face, a task more pressing than any other, is the practice of 
freedom.  
This understanding of thrownness turns us to the central issue in Heidegger’s 
work that speaks directly to the philosophical account of hyperbole we are developing 
here: transcendence. Transcendence, he notes, is a kind of surpassing—the going-beyond 
that I want to argue the concept of hyperbole marks. Dasein has transcendence as the 
fundamental constitution of its being, “one that occurs prior to all comportment.”52 This 
does not merely mean Dasein is capable of surpassing boundaries in space, but more 
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primordially, it is because Dasein is always already transcendence, always already 
surpassing, that it is able to encounter boundaries as such. This also means that 
transcendence is not an action of any individual Dasein that we can point to and analyze, 
but is the condition for the possibility of all action. Furthermore, surpassing is not 
something Dasein sometimes does once and a while, but Dasein is always, by virtue of 
being Dasein, surpassing. That towards which Dasein transcends is the world. 
Consequently, Dasein is transcendent as being-in-the-world. Dasein exceeds the subject-
object distinction, and exists within the ontological difference between being and beings.  
As transcendence, Dasein projects world and projects the possibilities of itself. 
The fact the world appears to us as meaningful—that the entities and equipment in the 
world present themselves as things that we can make sense of—demonstrates our 
constitution as projection. Imagine, for example, that we find ourselves at the airport. The 
entities and equipment of the airport—security guards, ticket counters, baggage claims, 
conveyer walkways, luggage—each of these appears as meaningful (i.e., we can take 
them as something, which as we recall is a hermeneutic and communicative task) and 
appears meaningful in relation to the project within which they are. In this case, the 
project might be traveling afar on vacation. Entities in the world show themselves as 
hindrances or affordances within the intending toward the world in the manner of leisure 
travel. Dasein’s transcendence makes this intentionality possible. The projection of 
possibilities is always in excess of what we intend. That is to say, within any given 
project, our interpretation of the entities and equipment could always be otherwise than it 
appears; for example, we could take the conveyer walkway as something other than an 
efficient means of transportation and see it instead, perhaps, as a potential danger. 
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Heidegger returns this idea to hyperbole claiming “in this process [Dasein as transcendent] 
Dasein in each case exceeds itself.”53 Dasein is hyperbolic in its being-thrown and in its 
always being-in-excess.  
At its core, however, Dasein is a nullity; it dwells within a foundationless space. 
With regard to the They, when we stop judging as they do, stop thinking and acting as 
they do, we discover that there is no foundational basis for our decisions on how to think 
or act. Dasein is thrown into this position, thrown from nothingness, as transcendence. In 
grounding Dasein as care—as concern for pragmata and solicitude toward others—
Heidegger, like Nietzsche before him, bars access to a foundational basis. There is no 
immutable substance that secures subjectivity. Heidegger writes,   
To this entity it has been delivered over, and as such it can exist solely as the 
entity which it is; and as this entity to which it has been thus delivered over, it is, 
in its existing, the basis of its potentiality-for Being. Although it has not laid that 
basis itself, it reposes in the weight of it, which is made manifest to it as a burden 
by Dasein’s mood. And how is Dasein this thrown basis? Only in that it projects 
itself upon possibilities into which it has been thrown. The Self, which as such has 
to lay a basis for itself, can never get that basis into its power; and yet, as existing, 
it must take over Being-a-basis. To be its own thrown basis is that potentiality-
for-Being which is the issue for care.54  
Dasein is delivered over to itself in its thrownness—in this time and place not of its own 
choosing—and from out of this thrownness must make a world. The basis upon which 
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Dasein stands was not chosen; indeed, history has long ago started before any individual 
Dasein arrives on the scene. This is the anxiety of being in the world; we remain 
responsible for our existence without having inaugurated it. From out of this nullity we 
are creative—we make relations and lives and worlds for which we together shoulder the 
responsibility. Heidegger argues, “Care itself, in its very essence, is permeated with 
nullity through and through. Thus ‘care’—Dasein’s Being—means, as thrown projection, 
Being-the-basis of a nullity…”55 In this way, one might imagine Dasein living along a 
trajectory—a line extending futurally but carrying with it both past and present— a line 
without a beginning and without a clear end. An impossible image that nevertheless 
speaks a truth.  
 This is not the final word on Heidegger’s hyperbolic constitution of Dasein, as he 
has still yet to disclose the meaning of being—the overarching question of Being and 
Time. Division Two of the text takes up this question once more and locates the meaning 
of being for Dasein in temporality. Dasein is as temporality. To claim the meaning of 
being for Dasein is temporality is simultaneously to say the meaning of being for Dasein 
is being-hyperbolic. Heidegger radically reconceptualizes the history of philosophy’s 
conception of time, particularly those offered by Aristotle and Kant. Temporality is 
neither the measurement of movement nor something within which we are embedded and 
that conditions the possibility of experience. On the contrary, Dasein is temporality. For 
Heidegger, temporality (and thus Dasein) is ek-static; that is, Dasein is always outside of 
itself already as temporality. We are not dealing here with clock-time, or time as a 
sequence of nows, but with time as the very ground of Dasein. Heidegger writes, 
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“Temporality is the primordial ‘outside-of-itself’ in and for itself.”56 As temporality, 
Dasein is caught up in all three moments of time (past, present, and future) 
simultaneously. Dasein is always thrown-beyond itself into and as the past, present, and 
future—as historicality, presence, and futurality. We can see this by looking at 
Heidegger’s articulation of projective understanding. He states, “The future makes 
ontologically possible an entity which is in such a way that it exists understandingly in its 
potentiality-for-Being. Projection is basically futural; it does not primarily grasp the 
projected possibility thematically just by having it in view, but it throws itself into it as a 
possibility.”57 Said otherwise, the future calls us forward and into ourselves, into a 
position for understanding the past. Furthermore, this temporality can either be taken up 
authentically or inauthentically: 
Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially futural so that it is death and can 
let itself be thrown back upon its factical ‘there’ by shattering itself against 
death—that is to say, only an entity which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the 
process of having-been, can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has 
inherited, take over its thrownness and be in the moment of vision for ‘its time.’ 
Only authentic temporality which is at the same time finite, makes possible 
something like fate—that is to say, authentic historicality.58 
To this end, Dasein is thrown into history and in that hyperbolic space must make such an 
inheritance meaningful.  
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 What Heidegger offers in his hermeneutic and existential analytic of Dasein is a 
way of conceiving the very essence of human being as hyperbolic. Heidegger gives us the 
hyperbole anterior to hyperbole; that is, the hyperbolic conditions necessary for the 
manifestation of hyperbole as a figure of speech or rhetorical trope. It is only because of 
our originary hyperbolic existence that we can then craft something like a figure of 
speech utilized in turn to express our condition. Yet, with regard to language and 
communicative praxis, what does this hyperbolic condition look like, how might we see 
its shape and understand its contours? 
4.6 We Are as Openness 
 Our reading of Plato, Nietzsche, and Heidegger have brought us to an 
understanding of our limits and excesses whether of an epistemological, communicative, 
and most importantly ontological manner. We have been calling the ontological 
constitution of language, which hyperbole brings into relief, testimony. This concept 
brings with it multiple valences of constituent meanings: opening, excess, squandering, 
inexhaustible, vastness, and the likes which we have been exploring in the last two 
chapters. With these hyperbolic elements of testimony in place, let us turn now to what 
this means for communicative ethics and, as a result, for what we have been so patient: 
democracy.  
 In “Originary Ethics” Jean-Luc Nancy draws together the relationship between 
ontology and ethics through the concept or fact of sense. The being of Dasein is to make 
sense; that is, Dasein as being-in-the-world is as making sense. This making sense is 
neither theoretical or practical, as if these could actually be pitted against one another. 
Although Nancy does not put it this way, we might think of it as a kind of poiesis or 
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bringing-forth. Nor is making sense a production of sense. Rather, making sense is a form 
of conduct—the conduct of human beings. Importantly for Nancy, and imperative for this 
project, this making sense is not the fixing of sense, i.e., declaring that one thing means 
something in particular, though of course this is something that human beings do. He is 
not dealing here with the arbitrariness of any given linguistic system but with what comes 
prior to any historical language (and yet such a phenomenon is only visible through any 
ontic existence of a language). Moreover, this is also not the fixing of the sense of the 
meaning of human being. Dasein as making sense resists this fixing and stasis—it resists 
being bounded. Fixing the sense of being would be a kind of enclosure that acts against 
the openness that we are.  
This is because sense and finitude go hand in hand. Nancy writes,  
The finitude of Dasein is the finitude of being as the desiring-action of sense. 
“Finitude,” then does not mean a limitation that would relate man—negatively, 
positively, dialectically—to some other authority from which he could derive his 
sense, or his lack of it. Instead, it means precisely the non-fixing of such a 
signification; not, however, as the powerlessness to fix it, but as the power to 
leave it open.59  
Finitude is not what prevents us from making sense, but is rather that which makes 
making sense possible. We make sense because we are finite and we are finite because 
we stand out in the openness of world disclosure (ek-stasis). In our being-hyperbolic we 
make sense. We are as the site where being is disclosed and where being can come to 
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make sense as sense. All that is given to us in our finitude, that is to say, all that we are 
responsible for is the call to make sense. It is this call to which we must respond. This is 
of course the lesson of fundamental ontology. Nancy’s great insight, however, is that 
“ethics is what is fundamental about fundamental ontology.”60 In a single sentence ethics 
and ontology are reunited without one taking priority over the other.  
 On this reading, ethics is not some signification or value we fix and stabilize, 
around which we then orient our actions. On the contrary, ethics, or originary ethics as 
Nancy calls it, underlies all possible ethical signification and is a “total and joint 
responsibility” toward making sense or making meaning from within the space of our 
finitude, from within our ek-sistence. It is through ek-stasis or our being open in the most 
fundamental way—our being as openness, our being as the there of the disclosure of 
being—that brings us in relation to each other. Originary ethics has hyperbole at its heart. 
This openness is of course not a solitary one. Being open is, as Heidegger’s fundamental 
ontology failed to make clear enough but what we must say as many times as can be 
suffered, always already a being-with. Heidegger showed us a version of this in his 
description of the They, though this gives being-with a too negative tinge. At the level of 
ontology we are always already with others and this being-together predicates the 
possibility of communication or, understood differently, it is the primordial form of 
communication that makes possible any specific utterance.  
 Let us remember our earlier epigraph from Nancy wherein he claimed being is 
communication. Language or communication is not some privileged form of conduct 
wherein we use language at some moment and not at another. Nothing here is being put 
                                                
60 Nancy, “Originary Ethics,” 189.  
  
157 
to use. Rather, language is “the element in which conduct confirms itself as conduct of 
sense.”61 Language, as the “house of Being” for Heidegger is the dwelling within the 
conduct of making sense of being. Nancy writes, “In truth, ‘language’ designates much 
less the order of the verbal than that on the basis of which this order can take place, and 
which is, precisely, the experience of transcendence (or, more exactly, experience as 
transcendence, and as its responsibility).”62 To be sure once more, this transcendence is 
not some extra-worldly calling but the transcendence of being-in-the-world, the 
transcendence of ek-stasis, of standing-out in the world meaningfully. Language, 
communication, is hyperbolic. Communication is not “the communication of a message 
(of a signification), but that of making-sense-in-common, something that is quite 
different from common sense. It is finitude as sharing.”63 It is this finitude as sharing, this 
keeping open against enclosure, for which we are responsible. We must bear it and it is 
that to which we must constantly respond.  
This is a bearing of and in language, a responsibility to “respect and care for the 
job of making-sense; the refusal, consequently, to reduce it to facile moralizations or 
aestheticizing reductions.”64 Let us call democracy that ethical and political configuration 
of being-together that takes this responsibility seriously. The two threats to democracy 
with which we have been concerned throughout this project fail to shoulder this 
responsibility in different ways. Fundamentalism tries ceaselessly to fix meaning that is 
at its core unfixable. It tries, desperately at times, to ignore the finitude of human beings 
                                                
61 Nancy, “Originary Ethics,” 187.  
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and consequently the finitude of meaning. It tries, often successfully, to enclose that 
which would make clear the primacy of dis-enclosure. Cynicism, on the other hand, has 
little concern for the fixing of meaning but fails to acknowledge the way in which this 
task is shared. By focusing on one’s own self-interest and failing to account for one’s 
responsibilities to others, the cynic overlooks being-with beyond the yoke of utility. This 
is, admittedly, not the understanding of democracy with which we are most familiar. 
Indeed, this is a sense of democracy that has not yet arrived but it is, I am hopeful, on its 
way.  
I have argued throughout that whatever democracy we might develop requires 
foremost an understanding of the conditions of communication, what I am calling 
testimony. In his essay “What Two Looks Can Teach or Hermeneutic Lessons of the 
Double Feature,” Ramsey Eric Ramsey offers this project the faith it requires, writing, 
“Hermeneutics…teaches us every spring will have something of winters past within it.”65 
This meditation on hermeneutic inheritance poetically illuminates the role of tradition on 
the development of future understandings, whether those moments from the tradition are 
oppressive or liberatory. With this at hand I wish in the following chapter to examine a 
few flashes among most insightful moments of our winters past, namely the works of 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, and Walt Whitman. These three writers, 
simultaneously champions and skeptics of democracy, wrote during some of the most 
trying times in United States history yet nevertheless found solidarity amid relentless 
strife. What I aim to do is recover these democratic impulses while simultaneously 
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(Münster: LIT Verlag, 2015), 350. 
  
159 
drawing from them the resources to develop a philosophical account of testimony as the 
conditions for the possibility of communication, to develop a philosophical account of 
finitude as sharing. 
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CHAPTER 5. UTOPIAN THINKING IN A NARROWED WORLD: A QUASI-
TRANSCENDENTAL APPROACH TO COMMUNICATION 
The act of faith demanded in bearing witness exceeds, through its structure, all 
intuition and all proof, all knowledge.  
Jacques Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge” 
5.1 Setting Sail 
And I add my own voice to the history of people who have loved beautiful things, 
and looked out for them, and pulled them from the fire, and sought them when 
they were lost, and tried to preserve them and save them while passing them along 
literally from hand to hand, singing out brilliantly from the wreck of time to the 
next generation of lovers, and the next.  
Donna Tartt, The Goldfinch 
 
Throughout this project there has been an ethical and political impulse, a utopian desire 
we might say, for things to be otherwise than they are—a world with greater justice, well-
being, and solidarity. What prevents this change, this revolution in both thought and 
action, could be described in lists too long to measure. This is, after all, what grants the 
virtues of ideological critique: the ceaseless desire, with steadfast commitment to match, 
to describe the mechanisms of power and its sites of resistance, or, as Adorno and 
Horkheimer have so concisely put it, “to be clearer about the terrible state in which 
everything is.”213 The only benefit to the state of the world, if we might crassly call it a 
benefit, is that it is so troubled one has a multiplicity of theoretical options of where to 
start in one’s critique. From psychoanalysis to critical theory, feminisms to race, 
                                                
213 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. Edmund 
Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 198.  
 Marxism to queer theory, and beyond there are endless beginnings. Each serves as a way 
to map the world and its workings, a way to trace out topologies of disenchantment, 
alienation, and despair. For our purposes we have traced the dual problems of 
contemporary neoliberal globalization, fundamentalism and cynicism, and the consequent 
necessity of understanding the communicative underpinnings of our being in the world. 
In this chapter, we will build upon this task, turning to a rich inheritance in the American 
literary tradition, and expose the possibilities of response through an appropriation of 
sources typically overlooked in the history of philosophy.  
 Before we are underway, however, let us turn to two metaphors, both maritime in 
nature, to help us get our bearings, first from Oscar Wilde and then from his 
contemporary, who is always nearby in this project, Friedrich Nietzsche. These passages 
send us on our way, the first as a jubilant exhortation and the second as a cautious 
watchword. In his 1891 “The Soul of Man Under Socialism,” a treatise on the 
relationship between aesthetics and living well together, Wilde writes in defense of 
utopia: 
A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for 
it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always landing. And when 
Humanity lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a better country, sets sail.1 
To our ears, this could ring a bit of an outdated modernist emphasis on progress, as if 
history were a linear trajectory that, would we finally find our guiding star, we might 
actually get on course and find ourselves heading in a favorable direction. Nevertheless, 
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if we put our postmodern proclivities aside, we see that the utopian desire to improve our 
lot, what Wilde describes as as impulse to “set sail,” is what makes the map worth 
reading (and, we might add, worth sketching out in the first place). In other words, it is 
the care for where we might go that confirms the value in detailing where we are. Critical 
theorizing absent a utopian desire, then, is not worth our while for it leaves out the future 
for which we are all responsible. Despite the slurs against utopianism which assail us 
from left and right, we will not abandon this hope.  
 That said, our hopes ought not be blind. Our second orienting passage, written 
only a few years earlier, resounds in a different key. Nietzsche writes not of utopia but 
the infinite in aphorism 124 of The Gay Science (the passage directly preceding the 
Madman who we encountered earlier): 
We have left the land and have embarked. We have burned our bridges behind 
us—indeed, we have gone farther and destroyed the land behind us. Now, little 
ship, look out! Beside you is the ocean: to be sure, it does not always roar, and at 
times it lies spread out like silk and gold and reveries of graciousness. But hours 
will come when you will realize that it is infinite and that there is nothing more 
awesome than infinity. Oh, the poor bird that felt free and now strikes the walls of 
this cage! Woe, when you feel homesick for the land as if it had offered more 
freedom—and there is no longer any “land.”2 
Nietzsche reminds us here of the force that is born out of what we do not have. Without 
recourse to any land—that is, without recourse to any fixed certainties, the destroyed land 
behind us—we sail on upon a sea that oscillates between gift and danger. Nostalgia is not 
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an option as the past that once was (if it ever was) cannot be re-lived and we must forge 
ahead anew. From one moment to the next what lies ahead remains a mystery for we 
know not how the world will show itself. We feel as if we are too free, as it was the 
numerous constraints on our freedom that made being free bearable. Homesick though 
we might be, we have only ourselves, which is to say each other and the words and 
actions between us. Utopia and the infinite are not unalike. Each stretches before us in 
incalculable dimensions. So we must set forth, jubilant about our possibilities but sober in 
our lack of recourse to any stable ground upon which we can rest easy.  
 Although we are absent the recourse to solid land of which Nietzsche speaks, the 
sea itself is still something, still a place where we can begin. Recalling from the previous 
chapter the hermeneutic lesson that every spring has something of winters past within 
it—i.e., the emancipatory thinking called for today does not necessitate ignoring the 
strategies of resistance or utopian potentials of the past—I wish to suggest here that we 
turn, without any hint of nostalgia, to three thinkers who, though often overlooked in the 
philosophic tradition, nevertheless speak to our contemporary circumstances. I suggest 
we allow Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, and Walt Whitman to be guiding 
constellations, aids in our navigation that do not themselves assure a safe journey but 
guarantee that without them we would be worse off. Although we will take note of 
historical and biographical insights where fitting, my contribution here is not to place 
these three in their historical context and work out where their thinking converges and 
diverges. What follows is not an attempt at intellectual history, nor will I examine closely 
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their internal motivations for writing with regard to their biographical circumstances.3 
Instead, I wish to offer an interpretation of each so as to uncover resources for 
understanding our current communicative situatedness within the world. In other words, 
let us learn a little something from those past winters for the sake of future springs by 
reading them against the grain of their usual reception in the American intellectual 
tradition.  
Although none belonged strictly within the same circles (Emerson and Thoreau 
had various interactions and founding moments within Transcendentalism, whereas 
Whitman was relatively outside that milieu), each was writing with a similar purpose: the 
call for a new America. All three were witness to the rise of industrialism and its 
concomitant problems, of slavery and the destruction of freedom, of the Civil War, of a 
burgeoning scientific field of inquiry—in short, they were witness to the beginning of 
modernity that laid the groundwork for our current philosophical circumstances. Each 
was doing his best to make room or point us on our way toward fulfilling the early 
promise of America as a space of free interaction and inquiry. In examining their words 
in search of their utopian potential I am, in a way, attempting to contribute a verse to this 
unending project to realize a community grounded in freedom and care.  
                                                
3 For a more generalized approach to the intellectual movement, I recommend Philip F. 
Gura’s American Transcendentalism: A History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008) and 
Barbara Packer’s The Transcendentalists (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2007). 
Robert D. Richardson has written two very thorough biographies: Emerson: The Mind on 
Fire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995) and Henry David Thoreau: A Life 
of the Mind (Berkeley: University of California, 1988), both of which are well worth 
one’s time. Lastly, David S. Reynolds, Walt Whitman’s America: A Cultural Biography 
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 It must be acknowledged early on that it is not straight away apparent why we 
would consider these three from a philosophic perspective. Indeed, each of them had a 
strained relationship with philosophy at best. Emerson, with the incompressibility of his 
paragraphs, the irreducibility of the whole of his thought, is situated in a curious position 
within American intellectual culture. His status more than a century later still remains 
enigmatic; is he to be understood as an essayist? A public intellectual? A poet? Emerson 
saw himself as the latter: “I am in all my theory, politics, and ethics, a poet.”4 And yet, 
we do not remember Emerson for his poetic verse, but for his poetic thoughts, which is to 
say, for his philosophy. So to, Thoreau’s relationship to philosophy was unclear. He 
writes in the early pages of Walden, “There are nowadays professors of philosophy, but 
not philosophers. Yet it is admirable to profess because it was once admirable to live.”5 
At first blush, this slight against philosophy (or at least philosophy in its professionalized 
form) makes it appear as if Thoreau would prefer not to engage in this practice. 
Philosophy has been left to the systematizers and logicians; Thoreau, it seems, is after 
something altogether different in his stay at Walden Pond. And Whitman is no less 
skeptical of received traditions. As he writes in the preface to Leaves of Grass, “re-
examine all you have been told at school or church or in any book, dismiss whatever 
insults your own soul.”6 Authority, whether intellectual or political, has no room in 
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5 Thoreau, Walden, 14.  
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Whitman’s reading of the world. These three are at best suspicious of the philosophical 
tradition and at worst hostile to it.  
 It is true that we might make our case by turning to an alternative set of thinkers, 
perhaps even staying with those we have already mentioned. However, our investigations 
of hermeneutics and ontology itself suggests these three thinkers. What I intend to show 
here is that Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman in some sense prefigured the hermeneutic 
turn in philosophy that is generally attributed to the twentieth century. Well before 
Derrida speaks of the impossibility of communication or Gadamer discloses the 
historicity of dwelling in the world, Emerson, Whitman, and Thoreau testify to the power 
of language and the need to think communication otherwise, though communication goes 
by other words. In their work we can see the germination of thinking communication as 
testimony, indeed at moments we nearly see it to fruition, as the standing out open to the 
responsibility of making sense in common. Furthermore, it is as a result of our readings 
of twentieth century philosophy that we are better situated to make much of the American 
thinkers that preceded them. Cornel West in The American Evasion of Philosophy echoes 
this concern for communication as well as a re-inheriting of this tradition, writing, “once 
one gives up on the search for foundations and the quest for certainty, human inquiry into 
truth and knowledge shifts to the social and communal circumstance under which persons 
can communicate and cooperate in the process of acquiring knowledge.”7 In West’s terms, 
prophetic pragmatism—the impulse against systematization and abstraction that marks 
this intellectual movement—not only highlights the communal and communicative 
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project of understanding-together, but politicizes this task. As we will see in our reading 
of these three, philosophy practiced in this way becomes an emancipatory 
experimentalism. Democracy becomes a creative act on the part of the entire citizenry 
and is not merely the prerogative of the elite.  
Consequently, and despite their challenged position with respect to the history of 
philosophy, we shall treat them here as some of the finest philosophers we can imagine. 
If, as Charles Bakewell writes,  
to be a philosopher means to have a closely reasoned system of metaphysics, then 
doubtless Emerson [and we would add Thoreau and Whitman] was not a 
philosopher. But there is a far more general, and equally valid, sense in which we 
use the term philosophy, where it simply implies an attitude, whether reasoned, 
intuitive, or instinctive, toward life as a whole.8  
Indeed, the very figures of Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman in their attitude toward life 
as a whole disclose a rift in our understanding of what constitutes philosophy. On the one 
hand, we have philosophy as a systematic discourse. Here, we do philosophy by 
comprehending and extending the history of philosophies, by examining philosophical 
discourse. We see whether the propositions cohere, the argument is sound, the system 
stable and generative of further theoretical insight. Contrary to this philosophy as system 
building, is this concern or attitude toward life as a whole as Bakewell describes, or what 
we have been calling with Hadot philosophy as a way of life.9 Within this understanding, 
philosophy is an existential attitude fundamentally concerned with everyday life. If we 
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draw our understanding of the philosopher not as one who builds systems of statements 
and propositions, but as one who promotes a way of life in accordance with loving 
wisdom, or, as Derrida claims, addresses the question philosophy came into existence to 
answer: “how to handle one’s life and live well together,” we are justified in considering 
Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman as philosophers. Although they offer no systematic 
worldview, they make manifest an attitude toward life as a whole.10  
Throughout his work, contemporary philosopher Stanley Cavell has continuously 
claimed American philosophy has made no rigorous attempt to investigate Emerson and 
Thoreau’s philosophic work. Although they are foundational figures in American history 
and intellectual culture, few are able to say much of their thought beyond the platitudes 
learned in secondary school: self-reliance, communion with nature, the values of 
sensuality. Cavell surmises,  
The moral to draw here may of course be … that Emerson and Thoreau are to be 
comprehended as philosophical amateurs, toward whom, it would be implied, 
there is no professional obligation. But suppose the better moral is that Emerson 
and Thoreau are as much threats, or say, embarrassments, to what we have 
learned to call philosophy.11  
Let us make more of Cavell’s insight. First, Emerson and Thoreau are belittled as 
amateurs and, consequently, unworthy of sustained professional obligation. It is as if they 
were not serious enough in being philosophers (though what, really, is more serious than 
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the question of how one ought to live one’s life?). On this all too common reading, their 
words though perhaps insightful for amateurs simply do not meet the criteria of 
philosophical work worthy of professional scholars. They lack the rigor of non-
contradiction and systematic thinking. Nevertheless, the amateur, precluded from the 
province of professionalism, is embraced elsewhere. Recalling the root of the word, the 
amateur is someone who has a taste for something; she is a lover (L. amatorem, nom. 
amator, “lover,”). The amateur is the friend of philosophy as a way of life, one who has a 
taste for living well. Secondly, in what way are these writers ever a threat, let alone an 
embarrassment? What do their words put at risk? Cavell offers us an indication in his 
final clause: they were a threat to “what we have learned to call philosophy.” Understood 
in this light, they were a threat to philosophy as it has come to be understood as a process 
of system-building and propositional analysis. It was not Emerson, Thoreau, and 
Whitman who were an embarrassment to philosophy, rather they brought into relief the 
embarrassment that philosophy itself had become when it abandoned the quest of loving 
wisdom and guiding one towards living well.  
Here again the word tells us more than we might suspect at first glance. To 
embarrass is to perplex or throw something into doubt. Indeed, in those moments when 
we are most embarrassed ourselves the locus of such suffering is that our understanding 
of our circumstance becomes perplexed or confounded. The everyday smoothness of our 
habitual affairs is disrupted and shown to be a matter more of chance and habit than 
genuine skill at living. In embarrassment, everything is out of place. From the root 
embarras, an obstacle, embarrassment impedes and calls into question the seeming ease 
with which our life carries on. It is in this sense that we might consider Emerson, Thoreau, 
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and Whitman’s work an embarrassment to philosophy; they obstruct the worn-out 
understanding of philosophy and in this obstruction upend our habits of what counts as 
doing philosophy.  
 In this light, let us see them as philosophers of a particular sort. In his book Senses 
of Walden, Cavell claims Emerson and Thoreau (and again, let us always add Whitman 
here) are “philosophers of direction, orienters, tirelessly prompting us to be on our way, 
endlessly asking us where we stand, what it is we face.”12 The idea of direction and 
directionality cuts to the core of this project, as my discussion of the hyperbolic 
conditions of communication and being-in-the-world have attempted to bring into view. 
In the midst of what I have been calling a crisis of directionality, Emerson, Thoreau, and 
Whitman offer us vistas upon which we might view new orientations, which is to say new 
habits of interpretation and action. We shall draw ourselves near to their most aphoristic 
statements so as to see what mysteries they bring to light. Indeed, their evasion of the 
systematic is itself an embracing of the aphoristic. We shall not make a series of dicta 
about their work, but try rather to allow ourselves to be open to what they have to say. 
Although Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman have been central to the development of 
American literary and intellectual culture, perhaps now their time has finally come to be 
heard as philosophers of testimony, which is to say, philosophers who give voice to the 
dwelling in the world that we are.  
 
 
                                                




5.2 Taking a Hint, or Emerson on Understanding 
For the return to the concrete and everlasting world 
what in fact I keep choosing 
 
are these words, these whispers, conversations 
from which time after time the truth breaks moist and green. 
Adrienne Rich, Cartographies of Silence 
 
Whether as poet, essayist, or philosopher, Emerson remains difficult to read. His 
essays are notoriously challenging to hang together through any analytical framework. 
Indeed, the spontaneity that his work promotes is enacted throughout his texts through the 
weaving together of countless ideas across essays and speeches. One rarely has the sense 
that Emerson means or says anything exactly, but is instead offering hints and glimpses 
of a larger meaning that can only be approached indirectly. Perhaps the audience able to 
hear and see his words in their fullness remains to be constituted, or perhaps words 
themselves will never do more than approach and point to what is being circled around in 
such discourse. Along these lines, Gilles Deleuze in his essay “Literature and Life,” takes 
up the relationship between writing and experience and offers us an approach to 
understanding Emerson, “To write is certainly not to impose a form (of expression) on 
the matter of lived experience…Writing is a question of becoming, always incomplete, 
always in the midst of being formed, and goes beyond the matter of any livable or lived 
experience.”13 In this respect, writing is not merely the transference of ideas or 
representations from one’s mind to the page, but a dynamic process, an ever moving 
towards completion that can never be reached and which exceeds the bounds of one’s 
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experience. Writing is, in its structure and practice, fragmentary. Writing is always on its 
way, never finished, even if we reach an end. Emerson knew this well, as did Thoreau 
and Whitman. Throughout his essays we find both an embracing of and frustration with 
this fragmentary force, one that Emerson seems to suggest is at the heart of being human 
and consequently at the center of understanding and thinking itself. For the sake of our 
interest in the philosophy of communication, we shall focus on three threads within 
Emerson’s work: his call for openness and receptivity, the necessity of creativity, and the 
perpetual outward movement of thought and action. We shall do so toward dual ends: (1) 
to better understand Emerson’s account of thinking/understanding in a manner that 
highlights its hyperbolic and hermeneutic character and (2) to provide textual resources 
for our description of communication as testimony.  
We can approach Emerson’s essays not only as works of cultural criticism, but as 
a reevaluation of the values of his time. The titles of his essays lend some credence to this 
reading strategy as among them we find: Prudence, Friendship, Heroism, Self-Reliance, 
Manners, Wealth, and others. Within these essays he often reads against the grain of the 
typical understanding of the idea under analysis and offers a reading of the virtue fitting 
to his time. Like Aristotle before him, Emerson writes to cultivate the characters of his 
audience and he attempts to speak to their better natures. There is one virtue, on my 
reading, that underlies them all: receptivity. Although no essay goes by that name, the 
idea of receptivity underwrites all of Emerson’s thinking; human beings are receptive and 
they can live this receptivity in more or less virtuous ways. We are, I suspect, most 
familiar with Emerson’s ideas regarding receptivity from his quite popular essay “The 
Over-Soul.” There Emerson writes of human beings’ relationship to mystery and 
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transcendence. He says of the process of thought, “I am a pensioner; not a cause but a 
surprised spectator of this ethereal water; that I desire and look up and put myself in the 
attitude of reception, but from some alien energy the visions come.”14 Thinking, although 
creative as we shall see, is not a form of production; rather, thinking means holding 
oneself open in an attitude receptive to thought. Thinking is an awaiting that has done the 
preparatory work such that a thought might arrive. Surely we have had some experience 
of this ourselves; for example, we feel stuck in our writing, trying too hard to come to the 
proper conclusion in a timely manner. Yet once we distance ourselves from our bad 
moods we find the idea we were looking for, but did not have in mind in advance, had 
arrived. We were inspired. For Emerson, the idea was breathed into us from afar and we 
are the organ through which thinking occurs. The Over-Soul, that “common heart” which 
all share, speaks to us in hints and indirection, modes of communication to which we 
must be attuned to receive their insights. In this sense, thinking is a kind of revelation. 
When we think we make manifest what has been revealed and announced to us from we 
know not exactly whence. Revelation is for Emerson “the disclosure of the soul.”15 We 
need not read this in a Christian spirit, though Emerson with his Unitarian predilections 
might have had that in mind. Instead, I suggest we instead approach it with the 
understanding of transcendence we developed in the previous chapter. What is revealed is 
not the soul per se, but language itself as the web of relations ranging across the ecstasies 
of time, which bears upon us and grants us the power of having something to say. Our 
common heart, then, is the language we have built together in common and within which 
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we dwell. Language is at the heart of understanding, granting both its possibility and its 
means. It is the way in which we bear the responsibility of responding to the call of 
making sense.  
 With respect to receptivity, Emerson makes much of one’s tone. That we are 
receptive is an ontological fact, but the manner in which we are receptive is malleable. 
Tone, which I read as the manifestation of a mood, shapes the way in which we are 
receptive; our tone brings into relief this rather than that, these insights rather than those. 
As Emerson puts it rather cryptically, “the tone of seeking is one, and the tone of having 
is another.”16 He does not explicitly state which he considers to be greater, yet we have 
reason to believe (as we shall see later) that it is better to seek than to have. Emerson is 
simply pointing out what we take to be an ontological fact: how we hold ourselves open 
to the world determines in many ways what we take the world to be. Enthusiasm then 
becomes paramount as a tone of living. He writes in “Circles,” “The way of life is 
wonderful; it is by abandonment.”17 To live one’s life with abandon, open to all that 
might come, is the mark of a hyperbolic magnanimity.  
 Emerson gives us a figure through which to understand receptivity: the poet. The 
poet, that lover of language, acquaints us not with her skill or her wealth of knowledge, 
but apprises us of the “common wealth.”18 That is to say, the poet speaks truly (though 
not always accurately) from out of our shared linguistic powers. The poet is balanced 
both in her reception of the world and her ability to put it into words. In his essay “The 
Poet” Emerson draws a distinction between three representatives of being, all equal with 
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one another: the Knower, the Doer, and the Sayer. Whereas the Knower loves truth and 
the Doer good, the Sayer loves beauty. The poet, as Sayer, gives voice to the world and 
discloses its beauty. The poet is representative and receptive, giving expression to that 
which would otherwise be mute. Importantly, however, the poet is not necessarily 
inventive, but from her talent and receptive nature, is open to the world and voices what 
stands forth to be said. “Poetry was all written before time was,” Emerson writes, “we 
hear those primal warblings and attempt to write them down, but we lose ever and anon a 
word or a verse and substitute something of our own, and thus miswrite the poem.”19 
Speaking poetically, testifying, is the attempt (and always ever an attempt) to capture the 
uncapturable. In hearing the warblings amiss, the poem becomes one’s own—it gains the 
mark of creativity. The poem that was the world was miswritten, yes, but as a result we 
gain a remarkable insight. It is the only world we have. The failure of perfect match 
between poem and poet gives us something beautiful. Thus “the world seems always 
waiting for its poet.”20 The poet receives and announces, unfolding a new beautiful 
thought and experience. The world always awaits its poet because it is poetry that brings 
forward the world.  
 We are all poets. A poem has nothing to do with a particular literary genre: “it is 
not metres, but a metre-making argument that makes a poem.”21 Poetry is passionate 
thought. Poetry gives voice to the receptivity that we are. Emerson tells us “We stand 
before the secret of the world, there where Being passes into Appearance and Unity into 
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Variety.”22 Any experience, regardless of how minimal it might appear, is sufficiently 
rich for poetry. All words illuminate this there where Being passes into Appearance, the 
there that we ourselves are. As poets we are intoxicated by words and by the 
responsibility of our shared being-together ecstatically. Our task then is to give ourselves 
over with abandon to this intoxication, to release ourselves to it, so as to make sense of 
our dwelling in the world. When Emerson declares that “Every word was once a poem. 
Every new relation is a new word” he is pointing to the continual movement of language 
with its flows and fluxes.23 The word, with its history, harkens to a prior poem, a prior 
insight into the world that has solidified and become shorthand. When we examine words 
we find the fossils of a language that although it came before us it is nevertheless 
something to we belong. In short, the poet, which is to say we, liberate the world by 
standing exposed, with abandon, and bearing witness to it.  
This understanding of radical openness and receptivity moves us to our second 
major theme or Emersonian virtue: movement and fragmentation. Emerson has no 
patience for the stale and the static as they preclude the vitality of human beings as 
receptive, creative creatures. His concern for movement is demonstrated predominantly 
in two essays, “Experience” and “Circles.” We shall begin here with “Experience” as it is 
the most well-known of the two. Although Emerson is typically described as an idealist 
due to his focus on genius and mind, as seen primarily through his conception of the 
Over-Soul, in “Experience” Emerson undertakes an experiment in empiricism. He 
attempts therein to say something about “Illusion, Temperament, Succession, Surface, 
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Surprise, Reality, Subjectiveness…I dare not assume to give their order, but I name them 
as I find them in my way.”24 He does not know from the start where his inquiries will 
lead, but he sets off on a line of thinking to see what may occur. He lets the movement of 
his ideas be his guide. Indeed, he begins the essay with the quintessential question of 
empiricism and phenomenology: “Where do we find ourselves?” He continues,  
In a series of which we do not know the extremes, and believe it has none. We 
wake and find ourselves on a stair; there are stairs below us, which we seem to 
have ascended; there are stairs above us, many a one, which go upward and out of 
sight. But the Genius which according to the old belief stands at the door by 
which we enter, and gives us lethe to drink, that we may tell no tales, mixed the 
cup to strongly, and we cannot shake off the lethargy now at noonday.25  
In other words, we find ourselves here and now, having sojourned in the world thus far 
and with untold, unforeseen, and incalculable possibilities before us. Shaped by both the 
past and the projection of the future, we find ourselves here, and lethargic. We know not 
whence we came nor where we are headed with any detail, as “all things swim and 
glitter.”26 Such is our lot in life on Emerson’s account, to be perpetually on our way 
tenuous in where we are going and just what it is we might be doing. Moreover, the 
confusion of what it is we are doing is further compounded because there are forces, 
impulses, and drives pushing us forward and pulling us back, sending us this way rather 
than that, despite what we may or may not will. For Emerson the will has little to do with 
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our experience. Indeed, we can see within his writing itself a contest of forces struggling 
to say something. Emerson himself has an ambivalence suffused into the core of his 
thinking in this essay; we find a sort of undecideability, a saying of one thing inextricably 
linked to a saying and desiring of something else. Said differently, although written by 
the singular figure of Emerson, “Experience” is composed of a multiplicity of voices all 
seeking to be heard. It is my contention here that not only is this the case for Emerson in 
this specific essay, but this multiplicity is at the core of speaking and writing itself. It is at 
the core of experience and understanding.  
In this respect, Emerson is a philosopher worthy study as he is a thinker caught in 
the in-between, always in the process of becoming. Emerson is always on his way. 
Returning to the image of the stairs, we can ask, between what is Emerson situated? Said 
differently, what is behind him in his thinking and what lies before him? Where is he 
going? I wish to argue here that Emerson is caught between two conceptions of thinking, 
and consequently understanding.   
On the one hand, there is the dominant image of thought grounding Emerson’s 
time; he cannot help but desire the universality and transparency of thinking. Throughout 
“Experience” he is deeply concerned with the forces that divert one from the truth: 
“Dream delivers us to dream, and there is no end to illusion. Life is a train of moods like 
a string of beads, and as we pass through them they prove to be many-colored lenses 
which paint the world their own hue, and each shows only what lies in its focus.”27 In our 
moving through life we attempt to find reality, “the sharp peaks and edges of truth,” but 
they remain elusive. Even the most certain of experiences—death—provides little by way 
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of accessing truth. Many have taken great offense by Emerson’s seeming dismissal of 
grief and death. In particular, the following passage:  
The only thing grief has taught me is to know how shallow it is…In the death of 
my son, now more than two years ago, I seem to have lost a beautiful estate—no 
more. I cannot get it nearer to me…it does not touch me; something which I 
fancied was a part of me, which could not be torn away without tearing me nor 
enlarged without enriching me, falls off from me and leaves no scare. It was 
caduceus. I grieve that grief can teach me nothing, nor carry me one step into real 
nature.28  
There are many ways we can read this insight. We might find this a callous denial of 
grieving for his deceased son Waldo. A charitable reading on this score would be to claim 
he is so overtaken with grief that he is unable to express it. These readings, in addition to 
psychologizing the text, fail to see what Emerson might be getting at philosophically. 
Emerson shows grief holds no special insights, death teaches us no more than living does. 
Death moves us not. In this sense, Emerson affirms a philosophy of life. As much as we 
might strive for a sense of solidity to our being here, none is offered, not even the 
certainty of when our death will arrive. He concludes, even with a touch of melancholy, 
“I take this evanescence and lubricity of all objects, which lets them slip through our 
fingers then when we clutch hardest, to be the most unhandsome part of our condition.”29 
He laments this unhandsome condition but nevertheless brings it into relief. He describes 
experience as he sees it, despite hinting at a wish it might be otherwise.  
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On the other hand, and despite his lament over the dissipation of any transparency 
or universality to thinking, we find gestures toward a new understanding. We see this 
most clearly within two movements in Emerson’s essay: (1) his focus on mood over 
rationality and (2) his critique of the “impudent knowingness” of his time.  Emerson’s 
“Experience” is foremost an experiment in traversing the spaces between ideas and 
seeing where they might lead, should we follow them. In other words, it traces out the 
movements of understanding. 
First, Emerson confronts and rebukes the idea that we have direct access to reality 
and the truth. For Emerson, experience is always already mediated through the having of 
a mood. As we made note of earlier, “Life is a train of moods like a string of beads,” and 
it is through these moods that the world discloses itself to us. The process of perception 
shapes reality. This string of moods is strung on the iron wire of temperament. But 
temperament, too, is not stable with any hard degree of certainty. As Emerson notes, 
“Temperament also enters fully into the system of illusions and shuts us in a prison of 
glass which we cannot see.”30 There seems to be a morose finality to all of this, as 
temperament “prevails over everything of time, place and condition.”31 Emerson takes on 
a tone of regret for always being in a mood, for having the world disclosed to us in a form 
mediated by our state of mind. In this respect, he seems to fall prey to the dominant 
image of thought that we are diverted from the truth by forces that are outside us, or at 
least outside our pure consciousness (i.e., our mood). And yet, things are never so simple 
with Emerson. Although he appears to regret this weakness in the human condition, he 
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marks the illusoriness of moods as a necessity. He continues, “Our love of the real draws 
us to permanence, but health of the body consists in circulation, and sanity of the mind in 
variety or facility of association…Dedication to one thought is quickly odious.”32 In other 
words, although we may desire permanence, we need variety of both body and spirit 
(here he demonstrates a very close affinity to Whitman’s poetry). Life requires an 
elasticity that wards off immobility and stasis. Human being for Emerson is profoundly 
dynamic: “Man lives by pulses; our organic movements are such; and the chemical and 
ethereal agents are undulatory and alternate; and the mind goes antagonizing on, and 
never prospers but by fits.”33 The stasis of permanence, although a wish, is a deadly one. 
This elasticity is the directionality and momentum that life requires.  
This focus on perception and experience as imbued and made possible through the 
having of a mood leads Emerson to critique all attempts at calculation and method as a 
way to understand reality or truth. The “mental proclivity of the physicians” and the 
“chuckle of the phrenologists,” who would have heard Emerson’s words with mere 
amusement as they believe themselves to have access to temperament and mood with 
methodological certainty are “theoretic kidnappers and slave-drivers” of his time. His 
distaste for those who attempt to reduce access to the miracle of human being to a 
methodological program is palpable:  
They esteem each man the victim of another, who winds him round his finger by 
knowing the law of his being; and, by such cheap signboards as the color of his 
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beard or the slope of his occiput, reads the inventory of his fortunes and character. 
The grossest ignorance does not disgust like this impudent knowingness.34  
Better to know nothing than to believe that such crass methodology is knowledge. No 
method, no calculation, will get at the heart of what it means to be human and experience 
being in the world. He notes, “Nature hates calculators; her methods are saltatory and 
impulsive.”35 Said otherwise, we are, as manifestations of Nature, moved by impulses 
and drives, hops and leaps. We are driven by a locomotion that proceeds in all directions; 
we are hyperbolic. The attempt to narrow these lines of movement, this excess of 
experience, to a singular, knowable path is not only profoundly arrogant, it goes against 
the very condition of human being. As with our moods, we need a variety of experience. 
Importantly, this variety of experience does not mean one must travel throughout the 
world or collect as many experiences as possible. On the contrary, such variety comes not 
from movement but from intensity. It is not a question of going anywhere, but of 
genuinely experiencing where one is in its fullest potential, following possibilities where 
they lead. The very value of life, on Emerson’s account, lies “in its inscrutable 
possibilities; in the fact that I never know, in addressing myself to a new individual, what 
may befall me.”36 We need not venture far, the everyday experience of life itself and of 
being surrounded by others who engage us is all the adventure we need. In every 
communicative encounter there is the unforeseeable possibility that we will be moved in 
a direction we know not whence.  
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The perpetual movement of experience is intensified and broadened in “Circles.” 
There Emerson points to the hyperbole at the center of being in the world. The circle, he 
believes, is the cipher of the world. We see it everywhere in nature, from the eye to globe. 
We move from circle to circle, from one understanding and context to the next—there is 
a “circular or compensatory character of every human action.”37 Furthermore, and more 
to the reading of testimony we are providing here, “Every action admits of being outdone. 
Our life is an apprenticeship to the truth that around every circle another can be drawn; 
that there is no end in nature, but every end is a beginning; that there is always another 
dawn risen on mid-noon, and under every deep a lower deep opens.”38 Said otherwise, 
acknowledging our testimonial comportment means acknowledging this fact: we are 
always beginning, always on our way. Every action can be outdone and encompassed 
within another series of actions. Emerson writes, “Permanence is but a word of degrees;” 
moreover, permanence only appears as such from within our finite perspective.39 
Everything is at risk as a result; nothing is permanent or ultimate, nothing is safe-guarded 
from being worked upon. Emerson, who still believed in progress, sees progress as this 
movement. “Every ultimate fact is only the first of a new series.”40 That is, everything 
admits of being a beginning.  
We are never outside of our circles in full, but we are able to twist-a-way from 
within them. Such is the task of art and creativity, our third major theme. Emerson returns 
to the Sayer or poet and writes, “Literature is a point outside of our hodiernal circle 
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through which a new one may be described.”41 Literature gives us the distance necessary 
to see our position in this endless movement anew. To the poet, to those who dwell with 
words and images, all is new as if voiced for the first time. The Sayer undertakes a 
continual experiment; she is an endless seeker who aims to give voice to the world and 
who knows always that her voice can be outdone.  
Creativity becomes the marker for Emerson of thinking about thought otherwise. 
He writes, “Did our birth fall in some fit of indigence and frugality in nature, that she 
[Nature] was so sparing of her fire and so liberal of her earth that it appears to us that we 
lack the affirmative principle, and though we have health and reason, yet we have no 
superfluity of spirit for new creation?”42 We have reason enough, indeed exploring 
reason further might well be a continuation of the dominant image of thought. What we 
need, Emerson believes, is the spirit for creation, the impulse necessary to bring anything 
new into the world. This, and not the process of mental representations, is what thinking 
is. Returning to our discussion of receptivity, thinking becomes an active receiving of a 
gift from the world that allows something new be witnessed and brought forth in the 
sharing out of words. In one of the most beautiful passages of his work, Emerson puts it 
this way, “But every insight from this realm of thought is felt as initial, and promises a 
sequel. I do not make it; I arrive there, and behold what was there already. I make! O no! 
I clap my hands in infantine joy and amazement before the first opening to me of this 
august magnificence.”43 The spirit of creativity is the making oneself ready, the 
preparation for, the presencing of something new. Emerson is advocating a holding-
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oneself-open or radical exposure to the world such that one might receive its insights and 
further share them with those who are ready to hear. We might take Emerson’s essay 
itself as a testimony to his receiving of insights, and his attempt to weave those 
experiences into words that can be let loose upon the world. This understanding of 
thinking and writing is profoundly different from the dominant image of thought for his 
time—he is on the verge of saying something new. Given the stronghold this dominant 
image of thought still holds on philosophy, it might well be that he is writing for an 
audience that has yet to come. Although Emerson’s lectures and essays were without 
doubt popular and garnered large audiences, one wonders if their ears were ready for his 
words. Is not the declaration of Emerson’s philosophy as unworthy of professional 
obligation an indication that our ears are still stopped?  
 Moreover, Emerson writes “Experience” as an essay and not as a poem. If we take 
seriously that the genre of a piece is essential to its meaning, then there is something to be 
made of this occurrence. An essay, from the French essai, is an attempt, a trial, an 
experiment. Emerson is not offering a systematic discourse of any sort, but an attempt, a 
reaching out into the world that tries to say something. Said otherwise, we can see him 
taking himself at his word (or persuading himself of his word) by enacting in his writing 
the very attitude and way of life he is promoting.44 The focus on mood, vitality, and 
creativity is enacted within the structure of the essay wherein we can witness his moods 
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change, his ideas transform, and his thinking become suffused with a gratitude for 
insights having being given and shared.  
 As an attempt or trial, Emerson makes clear time and again the tentativeness and 
hesitation behind every word. He points to the limitation of his thoughts, the way in 
which regardless of rigor or precision—though they certainly matter—his words will fall 
short of encompassing his experience. Try as he might, he cannot communicate the 
fullness of the world as experienced. All names and words are “quaint” and “narrow.” 
That which makes thinking and creativity possible, the flux of moods that point to “that 
in us which changes not,” is ineffable and refuses to be named. Emerson can report the 
hints, offer glimpses, or use profane words when sacred are not available, but the impulse 
of experience refuses to be named and pinned down. Although Emerson cannot 
communicate in full the experience of being in the world, he continually testifies, 
knowing all the while there will never be a final word on the matter.  
 We even witness the movements of intensity through the section breaks within his 
essay. Such breaks, unnamed and unmarked, demonstrate the spinning out of his ideas 
and the necessity of beginning again differently and following a new line of 
understanding. Each section of the essay appears a perspectival bead strung along the 
wire of experience. In an 1838 letter to his friend Thomas Carlyle, Emerson gets at this, 
writing, “Here I sit & read & write with very little system & as far as regards composition, 
with the most fragmentary result: paragraphs incompressible each sentence an infinitely 
repellent particle.”45 Emerson makes no promises and offers little if any clarity. Rather, 
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he explores the vicissitudes of experience, tracing out some and leaving behind others, in 
an attempt to say something meaningful. And yet, he is making an attempt at the 
impossible; he is on his own account saying something about which we can never speak 
clearly or with exactitude. Every paragraph, sentence, or word, is a fragment of 
experience itself and experience necessarily exceeds the bounds of what is sayable. In 
this respect, even the most complete thoughts of Emerson’s are fragmentary through and 
through. And it could not be otherwise. Thus he declares to his readers, “I am a fragment, 
and this is a fragment of me.”46 Experience is forces and flows in flux, unable to be 
stopped but for a moment when they will inevitably slip from our grasp.  
5.3 Living Without Bounds, or Thoreau on Hermeneutic Dwelling 
How long does it take to make the woods? 
As long as it takes to make the world. 
Wendell Berry, A Timbered Choir 
 
 Every few years, interest in Henry David Thoreau is renewed through popular 
magazines and academic debates about his significance to the American literary and 
political tradition. Most recently, Kathryn Schulz offered a scathing critique of Thoreau’s 
scholarly value in her New Yorker article “Pond Scum.”47 The title alone sets the tone, 
but Schulz’s general argument is that Thoreau is morally myopic: a narcissist who 
demands of others an unsustainable ethic, who thinks a solitary inward life is all that 
matters (in distinction to, for example, one’s relationships with other people). In a claim 
characteristic of the entire essay, she writes “Walden is less a cornerstone work of 
environmental literature than the original cabin porn: a fantasy about rustic life divorced 
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from the reality of living in the woods, and, especially, a fantasy about escaping the 
entanglements and responsibilities of living among other people.”48 Schulz even goes so 
far as to compare Thoreau to Ayn Rand claiming each are fanatics of individualism. 
Although we should always be wary of raising a single individual into a national literary 
hero, and we should admit Thoreau was at least something of a curmudgeon, Schulz’s 
reading is profoundly uncharitable and lacks the hermeneutic sophistication necessary to 
be a genuine source of scholarship. She fails to examine with any depth the meaning that 
underlies Thoreau’s words, focusing instead on only what is immediately apparent. At 
times I wonder if Schulz and I have read the same Walden, as it is a text as deep as the 
ponds Thoreau resided by. Read with a careful eye, which we shall have here, Walden is, 
first and foremost a treatise on learning to live with and among other people. Moreover, it 
is an essay on dwelling in the truth of world disclosure. To this end, it is a text that 
contributes to a philosophy of communication.  
 Walden begins with a familiar literary trope, the author’s justification for the 
words that follow. It is a writer who went to Walden Pond and a story that returned. 
Townspeople, upon hearing about his experiment in the woods, wanted to know how 
Thoreau was able to get on as he did (what did he eat? was he afraid? etc.); consequently, 
he penned a response so as to avoid repeating his answers to each curious passerby. In his 
telling, Thoreau came to Walden Pond so that he might learn how to live: “I went to the 
woods because I wished to live deliberately, to front only the essential facts of life, and 
see if I could not learn what it had to teach, and not, when I came to die, discover that I 
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had not lived.”49 And he left as easily as he had arrived, having learned from his 
experiment and wishing to undergo another before his finite time was ended. Although 
Walden, and Thoreau’s writing more generally, has cemented its place in the American 
literary tradition as a kind of proto-environmentalism (which Schulz notes but 
immediately dismisses), focusing only on Thoreau’s communion with nature overlooks 
the larger impetus of the work. Walden is a philosophic tract par excellence. It constructs 
no system to be sure, yet it raises questions most central to existence and being-with 
others; as so many of the thinkers we have examined in this project overall, Thoreau 
contributes to the practice of philosophy as a way of life. I wish to offer one reading of 
Walden in particular, one that gets at the significance of being-together with other people 
and the world. Although Thoreau poses a variety of quite pointed questions to his readers, 
I will argue here that the text has one central question at its core, one he raises near the 
mid-point of Walden: “What do we want to dwell most near to?”50  
 The question of one’s dwelling is at the crux of Thoreau’s insights and concerns. 
Furthermore, where and how one dwells is intertwined with how and with whom one 
communicates. On a cursory reading it is obvious that he his writing about building his 
home—the entirety of the first chapter, “Economy,” lists all that was necessary for him to 
undertake such a task, from boards to screws and nails. However, to focus only on the 
accounting and budgeting that frames Thoreau’s experiment is to fail to grasp just what is 
being taken into account. He is not merely balancing his expenses against his gains 
(though he does purposively demonstrate that it was not as burdensome to build his home 
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as his detractors proclaimed), but he is bringing into view how one must take an account 
for how one lives one’s life. Living is the spending of one’s time, a time finite through 
and though and thus for Thoreau it matters how time is spent and who it is spent with. As 
he puts it, “in any weather, and any hour of the day or night, I have been anxious to 
improve the nick of time, and notch it on my stick too.”51 Not only does he wish to 
improve his time, but also to “notch it on [his] stick,” to record it. The words offered 
about his time at Walden Pond are the notches marked in hopes that they might assist in 
improving the time of others. From the very start this text has a sense of community at its 
core; it is an experiment published (i.e., shared) with others in the hopes that they might 
find similar results through their own methods. As he goes on later in Walden to say, the 
greatest aesthetic achievement is not any of the fine arts, but the ability to sculpt the very 
atmosphere of one’s being with good deeds. Living well is the highest art and that toward 
which all can aspire and cultivate a talent. Thoreau’s words clarify an experiment, an 
aesthetic experiment, which is to say an experiment in ethics, with how he spent his 
time—it gives an account of whether such spending was worthwhile—it does not give a 
mandate for what others ought to do with theirs. For as judged as one might feel upon 
reading the text he offers no moral mandates. He asks only that others experiment with 
their own lives, put it under the weight of a trial, and ask whether it is worth living in the 
manner you have chosen (which demands, of course, you acknowledge the choices you 
have made). As an experiment, Thoreau’s time at Walden Pond risks the possibility of 
failure, but what will not fail are the insights gleaned from his time there. Moreover, as 
an aesthetic experiment Thoreau, like Emerson with the poet before him, believes we can 
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all be artists of some kind because we already are on a more elemental level. This task 
requires not a concrete artistic skill, but a sense of good taste—a taste for what is 
beautiful to life and what is not. In order to develop this practice one must make an 
account of the way in which one dwells.  
In raising the question “What do we want to dwell most near to?” Thoreau is 
asking, around what, or in the midst of what, do we wish to spend our lives. What 
Thoreau wants, above all, is not to dwell absent other people alone in the woods with 
only animals to converse with—a misreading so predominant that it is reckless—but to 
dwell with others who acknowledge the responsibility of having to make one’s own life. 
In other words, the writer at Walden Pond wants to live among those who face the world 
with wakefulness. The idea of wakefulness, morning, and somnolence weigh heavily 
throughout the text. “To be awake is to be alive,” Thoreau writes, “I have never yet met a 
man who was quite awake. How could I have looked him in the face?”52 Wakefulness 
marks the ability to better each moment in the notches of time, to live each moment to the 
fullest, to risk slipping into a kind of pop psychology banality. Along similar lines as 
Emerson, wakefulness is a radical openness to the world, an openness cultivated through 
the making oneself ready for what is to come. For our purposes, to be awake is to see 
beyond the ordinariness of our habituated responses to the world and see opportunities 
for twisting-a-way. Wakefulness is the acknowledgement of our hyperbolic condition. In 
this sense, Walden has a messianic tone to it, the tone of seeking about which Emerson 
speaks. The writer at Walden Pond seeks for another, one who is more awake than he, for 
a community of others with whom he can share his time. And in this seeking he greets 
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every other as one who might possibly be awake. Said in a more philosophically inflected 
vocabulary, he greets every other as the radically other that they are. Communicative 
ethics, whatever else it might be, must take the other as someone with whom we can 
make meaning and with whom we can with-stand the ek-stases of dwelling in the world.   
Just as Walden is not merely a proto-environmentalist manifesto, neither is it a 
treatise on self-reliance. It is a mistake to think Thoreau wished to escape the company of 
others or that he saw no value in relationships. To the contrary, we must read Thoreau’s 
description of dwelling in nature in at least two ways. First, we must take his words at 
face value as he presents them—Thoreau is indeed discussing ways in which one can live 
harmoniously with one’s natural surroundings. After all, Walden is a critique of the rise 
of modernity in Thoreau’s world and a call for the necessity of harmony with both natural 
and technological objects. Second, however, he makes it quite clear in his discussion of 
his solitude in nature that he is being allegorical. Every sentence, deliberate to be sure, 
means more than it seems. Said otherwise, every sentence testifies to multiple 
experiences. Like the ponds whose depth is more than it appears, so too with the words of 
Walden. For example, when he writes of his bean-field he spins tales about the inner 
workings of what surrounds him. On the one hand, yes, of course Thoreau is discussing 
how he cultivated his field and how he was able to grow enough for sustenance. On the 
other hand, however, the bean field is about more than this. “Perchance some must work 
in fields if only for the sake of tropes and expression, to serve a parable maker one day,” 
Thoreau writes hinting that he is indeed that parable maker, a sharer of both wit and 
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wisdom.53 We would do well to remember that Walden is as much about writing and 
reading as it is about living in the woods, if only we open ourselves up to the text.  
Thoreau claims that “The works of the great poets have never yet been read by mankind, 
for only great poets can read them,” we might say the same of Walden as well—the text 
sings forth to the degree that we allow it to say something to our ears.54 To be sure, this is 
a capacity we all have would we only put ourselves to the hard work of learning to listen. 
Listening means not only a hearing of words, but simultaneously an openness to the 
context within which they are said. Writing or understanding poems—which is to say, 
speaking and understanding language—requires a hermeneutic approach to 
communication.  
Let us take as an example of Thoreau’s hermeneutic complexity the passage 
wherein he describes building a chimney for his home. This passage speaks doubly: first 
as an example of the intricacy of Thoreau’s writing and secondly as another way of 
articulating the hermeneutic approach to communication we have been supporting 
throughout this project. He tells the reader, 
When I came to build my chimney I studied masonry. My bricks, being second-
hand ones, required to be cleaned with a trowel, so that I learned more than usual 
of the qualities of bricks and trowels. The mortar on them was fifty years old, and 
was said to be still growing harder […] Many of the villages of Mesopotamia are 
built of second-hand bricks of a very good quality, obtained from the ruins of 
Babylon, and the cement on them is older and probably harder still […] As my 
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bricks had been in a chimney before, though I did not read the names of 
Nebuchadnezzar on them, I picked out as many fireplace bricks as I could find, to 
save work and waste, I filled the spaces between the bricks about the fireplace 
with stones from the pond shore, and also made my mortar with the white sand 
from the same place […] I was pleased to see my work rising so square and solid 
by degrees, and reflected, that, if it proceeded slowly, it was calculated to endure 
a long time.55  
There are multiple readings we could develop from this short passage, layer upon layer of 
meaning rests atop each other. On the one hand, he is literally describing the process he 
took to build his chimney: the acquisition of materials, the skills of labor, and the 
pleasure brought forth by a completed work. Even with this rudimentary reading it is 
clear that Thoreau strongly relies on others, those who provided him the necessary bricks 
to get started and the knowledge to undertake the project in the first place. In this reading 
Thoreau does not make the mistake of fetishizing either labor nor material goods.  
Yet Thoreau is always saying more than one thing at a time, each sentence 
functions within a multiplicity of registers and resonates different meanings depending on 
how we are attuned to listen. So too, then, is this recounting a parable about dwelling and 
inheriting one’s tradition. The chimney we can read here as Thoreau’s own understanding 
and writing, and the bricks other texts (broadly thought) which he has encountered. His 
understanding of the texts with which he finds himself—the received tradition so to speak, 
which is able to be received only by interpretation—must be appropriated as his own, 
they must “be cleaned with a trowel.” That is to say, they must be examined and taken up 
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with care. The prior readings of such texts are old, they have become habitual and 
increasingly sedimented, but one must look at them anew. To these newly understood 
standard meanings, Thoreau acknowledges the inventiveness of one’s own interpretation: 
he gathers stones from the shore of Walden Pond and mixes his own mortar. That is to 
say, he takes something from his own experience and combines it with the tradition he 
has come to understand. What is more intersubjective—that is, what is a clearer 
indication of embracing one’s always dwelling together with others—than this 
acknowledgement of always having to be within a tradition and from within this space 
the cultivation of one’s appropriation?  
Here Thoreau echoes the insights we learned from Gadamer. The tradition is 
something within which we consistently are, indeed, it is who we are as the active 
appropriation of it through interpretation. The tradition, the force of history, propels us 
into the future and gives us the materials with which we make meaning of our world. 
Through a receptivity to the tradition we are able to generate creatively something new. 
Furthermore, taking up and preserving the tradition—as Thoreau does here by 
incorporating borrowed bricks—is an act of freedom. The critical lesson that 
hermeneutics teaches us is not that we must abandon tradition for the sake of progress. 
On the contrary, we must take up the tradition and re-fashion it (preserve these elements 
rather than those, rework this but not that) in a manner fitting to our own circumstances. 
Such is the communicative task we perpetually face: being receptive to the tradition and 
hermeneutic situation within which we are and creatively generating a response that 
attends to the circumstances of our time.  
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The creative generation of a response to our worldly circumstances, as our 
hermeneutic task, is caught up in the practice of reading. We must learn not only how to 
read a book, but how to read the world. With a little more practice and courageous 
determination, Thoreau writes, we might all become “essentially students and observers” 
who can properly read. Reading is more than the learning of one’s ABCs, indeed for 
Thoreau it is among the highest task; there are few who can read. The work that goes into 
reading parallels in difficulty the work of writing. Furthermore, we cannot underestimate 
the power of reading. Thoreau writes, “There are probably words addressed to our 
condition exactly, which, if we could really hear and understand, would be more salutary 
than the morning or the spring to our lives, and possibly put a new aspect on the face of 
things for us.”56 Reading, as reception, discloses the power words have to reveal the 
world anew.  
Perhaps the greatest lesson Thoreau offers is not a particular insight from his time 
at Walden Pond. Not the building of his home, his encounters with loons and 
woodchucks, his bean field, or the conversations with his neighbors. Instead, and before 
all of this, he offers a lesson in the telling of a tale as such. Thoreau recognizes that he 
has something to say and that he has to say something. He is compelled to share his 
experiences because they have given a force to his life. He writes, with questionable 
lament, “unfortunately, I am confined to this theme by the narrowness of my 
experience.”57 Thoreau knows that regardless of the content of his experiences he must 
share them. It is by a mixture of happenstance and choice, then, that these are the 
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experiences he has to share. This impulse to speak, and to speak truly (that is, in 
accordance with one’s experience of the world) is woven throughout Walden. However, 
this impulse to speak is tempered by the understanding that his words will never capture 
the entirety of his experiences. Consequently, he uses words which bring into view, like 
Emerson, the fragmentary nature of his language. Phrases such as “If I should attempt to 
tell…”58 “I will only hint at some of the enterprises which I have cherished,”59 “I would 
fain to say something,”60 all highlight the hesitation of his language. Nevertheless, he is 
“convinced, both by faith and experience” and consequently must put into words the 
experiences he knows cannot be explained fully enough.61 His hesitation is gives no 
indication of a lack of conviction, it points instead to the unerring strength of his 
commitments.  
This returns us to testimony. All communicative acts, from the most basic to the 
most complex risk fragmentation because they rest upon a kind of faith. To respond to 
another is to promise in return (re- ‘back,’ spondere- ‘promise’); it is an obligation. A 
promise begins every communicative event—I promise to tell the truth. Structurally, a 
communicative event begins with each asking the other “believe and trust me” rather than 
the declaration that one knows with certainty what they are going to share with the other. 
In testifying, the other comes upon us as if a surprise and we do not know immediately 
how this new relation must be negotiated. Dwelling in the world together is a matter of 
faith. We are always already with others and in this condition we are faithful regardless 
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of our habituated faithlessness. It is this faithlessness, I have argued, that Thoreau helps 
us recognize and overcome. To become wakeful, open and receptive, is to take up one’s 
faith.  
Part of this faithfulness is the acknowledgement of limitations, the boundaries 
which in our hyperbolic moments we attempt to move beyond. Moreover, testimony is 
the possible manifestation of communication which is itself an impossibility. When we 
testify we tell impossible words. That communication always entails a lack is not a 
deficiency but rather its saving power. Thoreau writes,  
The volatile truth of our words should continually betray the inadequacy of the 
residual statement. Their truth is instantly translated; its literal monument alone 
remains. The words which express our faith and piety are not definite; yet they are 
significant and fragrant like frankincense to superior natures.62  
Indeed, because there can be no final word and thus the task of communicating is never 
complete, certainty can never be reached once and for all. From this standpoint, 
possibility is never entirely closed from us; from within the structure of communication 
understood as testimony resides the space where new possibilities emerge and call to be 
actualized. Our words are fragrant and linger, they have weight in the world but remain 
indefinite. This is their virtue, for in their indefiniteness we will never have said enough. 
The truth of our words must continually be said anew.  
Thoreau fully embraces this hyperbolic character and I suggest we come to 
acknowledge it as well. Words are the atmosphere in which we breathe, but not all of us 
are attuned to this insight. Thoreau worries, not that he is unable to find words to say, but 
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rather that those words will fit together too tightly, be too precise in a way that is 
unfaithful to his experience. In what I consider among the most beautiful passages of 
Walden, he illuminates what I am attempting to conceptualize as testimony: 
I fear chiefly lest my expression may not be extra-vagant enough, may not 
wander far enough beyond the narrow limits of my daily experience, so as to be 
adequate to the truth of which I have been convinced. Extra vagance! It depends 
on how you are yarded. The migrating buffalo, which seeks new pastures in 
another latitude, is not extravagant like the cow which kicks over the pail, leaps 
the cowyard fence, and runs after her calf, in milking time. I desire to speak 
somewhere without bounds; like a man in a waking moment, to men in their 
waking moments; for I am convinced that I cannot exaggerate enough even to lay 
the foundation of a true expression.63  
It is extravagance then, an abundance of language, that comes closest to the truth. 
Precision here is the enemy for the more precise we are the more we limit the 
significance of the experience. This is not to say that more words are always preferable to 
fewer, but that the words themselves must continue to remain open and translatable, 
hermeneutically fluid. We must have the nature for this, as Thoreau notes in comparing 
the buffalo to the barnyard cow. Is not this nature the hyperbolic condition of being in the 
world? When we exaggerate, when we tell lies (or what would be lies if we take 
correctness as our measure), we are, for Thoreau, getting closer to the truth that we can 
never fully speak because we are never able to speak without bounds. The buffalo already 
has the ability to roam, but we, the barnyard cow sink further and further into utility and 
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efficiency, modes of interpretation which shape how we are yarded. In the narrowed 
horizons of understanding what is needed now more than ever is the ability to be 
extravagant. In such a world as ours we cannot possibly exaggerate enough to speak 
beyond the confines of functionality. In our extra-vagance we allow our words to wander, 
we stand open to our responsibility of making-sense and we squander our communicative 
abundance. We give our words freely in an attempt to make sense in common.  
5.4 Still to Come, or Whitman on Democracy 
In the intertwining of destinies, each comes to stand caringly, thoughtfully with 
others. This standing with others is a going-along-the-way together. It is a sharing 
of life. 
Les Amis, Commemorating Epimetheus 
 
 Where Emerson and Thoreau offer an account of the human condition, it is our 
thinking with Walt Whitman that makes the connection between a hyperbolic and 
testimonial understanding of communication to democracy and utopian practice explicit. 
Among this collection of thinkers, it is Whitman who is most often left out of 
philosophical discussion; indeed, not even Cavell moves to include him as an amateur 
who brings into question the way in which philosophy practiced. Nevertheless, there is 
precedent to consider Whitman an exemplary figure for philosophy. Oscar Wilde, ever 
the arbiter of good taste and a constant touchstone in this project, wrote of Whitman’s 
poetry: 
Certainly in Walt Whitman's views there is a largeness of vision, a healthy sanity, 
and a fine ethical purpose… He is the herald to a new era. As a man he is the 
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precursor of a fresh type. He is a factor in the heroic and spiritual evolution of the 
human being. If Poetry has passed him by, Philosophy will take note of him.64  
Thankfully, poetry has had the good sense not to pass him by, but it is worth our while to 
examine what Whitman can contribute to a philosophy of communication, and in 
particular a philosophy of communicative ethics. To do so, let us focus on three elements 
within Whitman’s poetry and prose: (1) the to-come structure of democracy; (2) the role 
of the poet in inaugurating this democracy to come; and (3) the fragmentary nature of 
language that the poet must take up in this democratic project.  
The democracy about which Whitman offers hints and suggestions in 
“Democratic Vistas” is not a democracy we readily see. This democracy did not exist 
during Whitman’s time and it is no more present today. Let us be reminded of Whitman’s 
warning: “The United States are destined either to surmount the gorgeous history of 
feudalism, or else prove to be the most tremendous failure of all time.”65 I for one am still 
holding out hope for the former, even if at times we appear to still be on the verge of utter 
disaster. The democracy for which Whitman and we still hold out hope is a democracy to 
come, residing in the future, and now just in its embryonic condition. Consequently, “we 
presume to write, as it were, upon things that exist not, and travel by maps unmade, and a 
blank.”66 It is unclear whether Whitman believed this democracy would ever come into 
existence, but that makes his writing no less powerful. For our purposes, we can approach 
Whitman’s understanding of democracy as a kind of utopian longing that pulls us 
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forward into the future and gives us a sense of what needs to be accomplished. 
Conditions for democracy offer us constellations by which we might guide ourselves. In 
this sense, and drawing our insights once more from Derrida, democracy takes on a 
messianic or quasi-transcendental structure. Democracy, like testimony, has the structure 
of a promise, a promise that can never be actualized in full. Democracy harbors within it 
the idea of perfectibility—the perfectibility of relations between every other as equal and 
just, perfect sovereignty—that cannot be realized. The realization is always 
hyperbolically beyond the conditions at hand, and for Derrida ontologically so. These 
relations are never perfected because they are always open to change, open to the 
singularly other that cannot be made equal with all. In other words, for a democracy to 
function, it needs to be open but in its openness it cannot ever be perfected but always 
only reiterated. Such openness is predicated within the structure of democracy, yet 
likewise it precludes its possibility. We see glimpses of this in Whitman’s prose. He 
writes in “Democratic Vistas” that two principles are at work: (1) the principle of the 
average and (2) the principle of individuality. The average refers to the levelling function 
of democracy—the making of each equal to another regardless of their differences. 
Individuality is its counterpart. Individuality, “the pride and centripetal isolation of a 
human being in himself—identity—personalism,” marks the absolutely singular 
uniqueness of any given individual.67 These two tendencies within democracy exist 
constantly in a state of tension, and if we take Derrida’s position on this, this tension 
makes democracy itself impossible. Moreover, it is the promise of democracy, in its 
impossibility, that pulls us forward in attempt after attempt to make good on that promise. 
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As a promise, it calls upon us, appeals to us, and asks that it be realized. It asks that 
together we bring it into existence.  
But what exactly is calling upon us? For Whitman, democracy is not a political 
form of governance, not something that could be seated in a nation’s capitol, but rather a 
way of comporting oneself towards others. Democracy is an ethic of responsibility which 
each individual would need to take up as his or her own. It is predicated on the openness 
of oneself toward others as a position of vulnerability and exposure. Democracy relies on 
the “copious production of perfect characters among the people.”68 A challenging task, 
indeed. To begin examining what such a perfect character could look like, let us turn 
once more to the figure of the poet.  
In his expansive thought, and like Emerson, Whitman has a particular 
understanding of the role and function of the poet. The poet, for Whitman, is the maker of 
a nation. Ever committed to championing the highborn as equally as the low, Whitman 
argues that it is the poet—and not the politician or the reformist—who inaugurates a 
nation, and in particular a democratic nation. The poet draws together the sympathies of a 
people and amid these sympathies (these instances of being-together) calls forth a kind of 
national ethos. In the poet, 
past and present and future are not disjoined but joined. The greatest poet forms 
the consistence of what is to be from what has been and is. He drags the dead out 
of their coffins and stands them again on their feet…he says to the past, Rise and 
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walk before me that I may realize you. He learns the lesson…he places himself 
where the future becomes present.69  
In other words, the poet is historical—she or he in their very dwelling culls together the 
ecstasies of time, gives justification to the past so that the dead will have not died in vain, 
and makes room for the future. Not only makes room for the future but, on Whitman’s 
account, stands as the space where the future becomes present. In this way, the poet puts 
the world in place. Said within the language of this project, the poet acknowledges the 
hyperbolicity inherent in the temporality that we are and announces it to the world.  
Furthermore, the poet brings forth a prophetic literature, turning us again to the 
nature of democracy to come. Such literature shows “the elevating and etherealizing 
ideas of the unknown and of unreality must be brought forward with authority, as they are 
the legitimate heirs of the known, and of reality, and at least as great as their parents.”70 A 
fiction, and experiment, as we have been saying all along, has as great a weight (and if 
not more so) than any reality. Everything needs to be re-stated and re-sung in a manner 
fitting to our condition, and we must, if necessary, use the lies of art when correct words 
will not do. For perhaps Nature will indeed mirror Art after all.  
The poet sings not about herself, as one might imagine in a poem such as 
Whitman’s “Song of Myself,” but the poet brings something into existence, in this case a 
clarification of being-together with others. That is to say, in singing about oneself, one 
comes to see that she is always already with others. Indeed, “Song of Myself” is foremost 
a kind of cataloguing the poet makes of those he finds around him, from the “little one 
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asleep in its cradle” to the runaway slave, from the fare-collector to the bride, from the 
opium-eater “with rigid head and just-open’d lips” to the suicide, even noting where the 
pistol had fallen.71 Whitman leaves no member of society unrecognized as all are with us, 
always, even if they are often overlooked. His very articulation of their presence is in 
some sense a political act, as poetry is for everyone, not for an elite few. The word 
applies equally to all. In this way Whitman highlights the conception of being-with or 
being-together that we find at work in fundamental ontology, it is simply said in a more 
democratic tone.  
Recalling Vattimo, the poet also provides an aperture of being. The poet speaks 
the tradition that she is. Through their exposure and radical openness, the poet voices all. 
The poet “leaves room ahead of himself” so as to be the open space for the disclosure of 
new worldly understanding.72 In this respect, the poet is not so far from the prophet 
(which, perhaps, is among the reasons why Whitman claims with a robust national poet 
priests will no longer be needed). Moreover, the poet attempts to articulate, in a way that 
might be understandable to more than a few, the underlying tendencies of a population—
in Whitman’s case, he highlights the democratic capacity within everyone. A poet could 
certainly choose an alternative theme, Hölderlin for example focused on a sense of 
homeland with regard to the ancient Greek context. Nevertheless, Whitman gives voice to 
the democratic project in such a way that highlights the role of voice and the 
contributions each has to the making of a great nation. We shall return to this theme 
shortly.  
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Let us pause for a moment, however, as Whitman is not claiming that this is what 
poets have done. On the contrary, not all who call themselves poets genuinely are. 
Instead, he is articulating that of which poets are capable. The poet, as the lover of 
language, has the power to speak in a way that extends beyond everyday communicative 
exchanges. However, as we saw with Emerson, the mark of the poet is not the 
conventions of a particular genre—it is not the ability to write in verse, or even so-called 
prose poems—instead, poetry is liberated to a variety of communicative situations. 
Philosophy of a certain kind is poetry. An artwork might be poetic. So too with literature. 
Whitman carries this further, we ourselves can be poetry. He writes, in the preface to 
Leaves of Grass in a litany that offers a series of new commandments: “your very flesh 
shall be a great poem and have the richest fluency not only in its words but in the silent 
lines of its lips and face and between the lashes of your eyes and in every motion and 
joint of your body.”73 Poetry, and living poetically, means cultivating oneself in a manner 
loving, receptive, and just. In other words, the very cultivation of ourselves is an 
attestation and a poetic event. Our concept of testimony takes from Whitman this vital 
lesson: the other whom we face in conversation must be taken as she is—conversation is 
a companionship, a traveling the way together rather than a leading ahead. The other is as 
much a poem as we are.  
For a nation to be prosperous and properly democratic three conditions must be 
met on Whitman’s account: first, there need to be recorded foundational political rights 
for all people; second, a material prosperity that accounts for the physical well being of 
others; and lastly and with his most unique insight, arising from these two conditions a 
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third, a “native expression-spirit” or a national literature.74 National literature need not be 
understood as a kind of patriotic, propagandistic project but a style of language.  
We see, fore-indicated, amid these prospects and hopes, new law-forces of spoken 
and written language—not merely the pedagogue-forms, correct, regular, familiar 
with precedents, make for matters of outside propriety, fine words, thoughts 
definitely told out—but a language fann’d by the breath of Nature, which leaps 
overhead, cares mostly for impetus and effects, and for what it plants and 
invigorates to grow—tallies life and character, and seldomer tells a thing than 
suggests or necessitates it.75  
This readiness for language of a new force is a readiness for hyperbole, an 
acknowledgment that we are always stretching beyond ourselves, ever wandering beyond 
the confines of our conditions.  Returning to our quasi-transcendental theme, this 
stretching is transcendence in the sense that we extend beyond ourselves, but 
simultaneously fully within immanence. The Other who is with whom we extend beyond, 
is the radically other who we encounter everyday. Remaining open to them is, thus, the 
practice of democracy as a communicative ethic. It is in such a spirit that Whitman 
dreams in a dream of a city of friends. Encountering the other is a practice of love, a 
loving struggle to be sure, as we learned from Jaspers, but a love all the same. As 
Whitman writes, it is this love “seen every hour in the actions of the men in that city,/And 
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in all their looks and words.”76 The communicative ethics that testimony suggests 
highlights this being-together in loving struggle.  
 Whitman, through both his philosophy of poetry as well as his poetic practice, 
gives voice to the fragmentary nature of communication as testimony. In “Democratic 
Vistas,” Whitman time and again utilizes hinting and fragmentary language. He writes, 
“Let us, even if fragmentarily, throw forth a short direct or indirect suggestion” of 
another America.77 “The clues are inferential…at best we can only offer suggestions, 
comparisons, circuits,” he says, giving credence to the value of hints.78 What does a hint 
do, such that we might see it as a exemplar of testimony? A hint offers a vantage point, a 
vista of possible interpretations for its meanings, but it does not demand a single reading. 
A hint is hermeneutically ambiguous and flexible as a result. Hints provide just enough 
for us to work through their meaning on our own (which is to say together, as our habits 
of interpretation are intersubjective and historical through and through). The hint remains 
open and is, as a hint, unable to be closed; likewise with clues and glimpses—they put us 
on our way, they provide a passage for understanding, but they do not complete the task 
themselves.  
 We see this at work especially in the sensuous language Whitman employs 
throughout his poetry. For our purposes we shall focus in the main on “Song of Myself,” 
but nearly all of his poems are characterized by a sensitivity to the way in which world is 
disclosed. The song that launches from his tongue circles around through all of his 
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senses—nothing is left untouched by poetry. He breathes in the fragrance of himself and 
lets the atmosphere fill his mouth, its power nearly drives him mad. He asks of his reader 
that they join him and allow themselves to see and hear of their own accord. Whitman 
does not offer a ready-made understanding of the world that surrounds him, but provides 
an invitation for each to determine it for herself. He notes what he sees and leaves 
nothing unrecorded, even and especially that to which we are prone to turn our eye. He 
hears “what living and buried speech is always vibrating here” and allows it to resonate 
with him.79 It is this living and buried speech, always vibrating, to which we too must 
turn our ears. It is the vibration of tradition and testimony, the vibration of being-together. 
The world appears to him also as a series of hieroglyphs, “all are written to me, and I 
must get what the writing means.”80 The poet of democracy is hermeneutic all the way 
down. He comes to understand these hieroglyphs—this meaning that was made by 
others—and translates them into a new tongue more suitable for his time. Such is the 
responsibility we all bear.  
Moreover, when the poet testifies, the “voice goes after what my eyes cannot 
reach, with the twirl of my tongue I encompass worlds and volumes of worlds.”81 The 
poet speaks that which is beyond her and in doing so brings it near. Yet the condition of 
language, of words is such:  “Wider and wider they spread, expanding, always expanding, 
outward and outward and forever outward.”82 Like the circles about which Emerson 
spoke, and the extravagance of Thoreau, for Whitman the world continually promulges 
                                                
79 Whitman, “Song of Myself,” 32.  
80 Whitman, “Song of Myself,” 42. 
81 Whitman, “Song of Myself,” 48. 
82 Whitman, “Song of Myself,” 71. 
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from itself in ever greater expanses. What he witnesses is always in excess of his senses 
of it, he gets but a hint that points to the larger mystery beyond him. Meaning is 
boundless, limitless, and always already on its way waiting for someone to come along to 
give it voice. “Urge and urge and urge,/ Always the procreant urge of the world” 
Whitman writes.83 It is into this space, the space wherein we make sense in common, the 
space wherein the world calls upon us to give it voice, that we must turn ourselves over 
with abandon.
                                                
83 Whitman, “Song of Myself,” 27.  
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION, OR OPENING ONCE MORE 
Testimony highlights the uncertainty at the heart of communication. With the 
death of god and the consequent lack of foundation upon which to ground our judgments, 
uncertainty and ambiguity permeate our dwelling in the world. Our responses to this 
uncertainty has, in the main, been two-fold: (1) a strengthening commitment to orthodoxy 
and certainty in light of its absence—fundamentalism and (2) a resignation to uncertainty 
beyond one’s self certainty and a deep abiding sense of suspicion—cynicism. We find 
ourselves oscillating between these poles and in need of a more fitting response. Both 
fundamentalism and cynicism shape our interpretations of our dwelling-together, 
consequently shaping our ethical and political engagements with each other. It is against 
this hermeneutic backdrop that we must twist-a-way.  
 The way we have articulated in this project, one way among many others, is to 
reorient our thinking about communication. In particular, we have emphasized the 
testimonial core within communication. As we learned from Heidegger, communication 
and judgment are closely linked; as a result, I am hopeful that in thinking about 
communication otherwise we will disclose additional resources for judgment. In order to 
make a judgment, or at least a judgment wherein we feel a sense of fortitude in our 
decision, we desire full knowledge about the issue. This full knowledge, however, will 
never arrive. It is in the face of this uncertainty that we testify. Ricoeur speaks to this
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when he writes attestation is “a kind of understanding, but one that cannot be reduced to 
knowing something.”1 By this we understand that in testifying we rely on our 
hermeneutic understanding, an understanding developed from out of our shared existence, 
but this understanding is never certain as our shared existence is always infused with the 
force of finitude. Our testifying, then, is tempered with humility.  
As I have argued, testimony is marked by the structure of the hyperbolic across all 
of its dimensions and it is this hyperbolic force that most clearly discloses the testimonial 
condition of communication. This argument is an ontological one. Communication is 
testimony, it takes on the structure of testifying before any linguistic act takes place. 
However, the uncertainty that results from the dissolution of foundationalist metaphysics 
brings this ontological condition into clear view. In other words, although this has long 
been the case with communication our current historical aperture makes it more readily 
seen. Modernity brings testifying into clearer focus.  
In an effort to summarize and take one more pass at clarifying our communicative 
circumstances, let us move through the moments of a communicative event in a more 
systematic fashion to provide greater analytical clarity. This of course risks reifying a 
dynamic process into a static model; however, let us undertake this task as a heuristic 
rather than an ultimate description. As a general framework for understanding 
communication, we shall take Calvin Schrag’s wonderfully basic account of 
communicative praxis in Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity. Every 
communicative act is grounded in three moments: reference to reality, hermeneutic self-
implicature, and a rhetorical moment. He simplifies this claim in saying that every act of 
                                                
1 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 350.  
  
213 
communication is about something (reference), by someone (hermeneutic self-
implicature) for someone (rhetorical moment). My contribution has been to demonstrate 
that all three of these moments are suffused with hyperbole—understood as the openness, 
excess, and inexhaustibility—and it is through understanding this hyperbolic saturation 
that we can make sense of Derrida’s claim that testimony governs the entire social sphere.  
Every communicative action makes reference to reality, that is, it is about 
something. The about which of communication is what we might call its content. 
However, this reference to reality is radically destabilized by the lack of a foundation to 
knowledge. Rather than the correspondence between word and thing, we have meaning 
caught up in a hermeneutic texture that necessarily exceeds whatever is trying to be said. 
In other words, the horizon of possible meaning is always greater than that which is said 
or decided upon and the possibility of something being meaningful is determined by the 
larger web of reference to which it belongs. Phenomenologically astute hermeneutics has 
shown us why this is the case. What is said is always an interpretation developed from 
out of the lifeworld or the larger hermeneutic horizon against or through which any 
specific utterance can be voiced. In other words, our communicative acts find their 
direction and are buoyed within this horizon. Furthermore, our testimonies always push 
up against the limits of speech in attempt to exceed them, regardless of the content of 
what is being said. In this way, language takes on a quasi-transcendental—i.e., 
hyperbolic—condition. As our early examination of Derrida’s différance disclosed, our 
saying is always deferred and differed; there is no pure presence but a dispersion of 
meanings and traces that are thrown beyond presence and make any understanding of 
presence and absence possible. What the hyperbole at work in communication discloses 
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is that there is no ultimate meaning beyond the circulation of meaning that takes place 
between each of us in our interactions with one another.  
Every communicative action involves hermeneutic self-implicature, that is, it is 
undertaken by someone. Here perhaps the testimonial condition of communication is 
most apparent as someone must testify to their experience. However, the hyperbolic is at 
work in multiple ways. Like the reality to which we refer, the subject who speaks has 
been radically decentered—such was the work of fundamental ontology and 
philosophical hermeneutics. No longer a stable cogito but a more hermeneutically 
embodied figure, the speaker herself is the occasion for speaking into/as the world. As 
Schrag writes, of the subject “it is not an entity at all, but rather an event or happening 
that continues the conversation and social practices of mankind and inscribes its 
contributions on their textures.”2 The subject is not the ground of what is said, but what is 
said is spoken through her. As did Heidegger, so too did Emerson and Whitman help us 
understand this claim. Language, which exceeds our subjectivity, speaks through us and 
in the process of that speaking the speaker is implicated in what is said. Furthermore, as 
the projection of one’s possibilities, the self who speaks also speaks into the space of 
actions yet to be taken. The self is, so to speak, always on its way. Said otherwise, the 
self never has a last word.  
Every communicative action involves a rhetorical moment; it is for someone. Our 
discussion of hermeneutical self-implicature has already made this clear as the self is 
always implicated via its co-constitution with others. Said differently, the self comes into 
                                                
2 Calvin Schrag, Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity (West Lafayette: 
Purdue University Press, 2003), 121.  
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being as being-with. We are always already outside of ourselves (if we think the self as 
an encapsulated cogito) in our relation to others. As Jaspers helped us to see, I am only 
because we are. Yet philosophy still needs to be rethought, again and again, from the 
position of the “we” and “with” rather than the “I.” As Nancy puts it in Being Singular 
Plural, “there is no other meaning than the meaning of circulation. But this circulation 
goes in all directions at once, in all the directions of all the space-times opened by 
presence to presence.”3 Meaning is because it is the finitude shared between us. This 
between is a stretching and a tending—a movement toward limits—wherein meaning 
occurs as finitude, each time irreducibly singular as the disclosure of being. None of this 
is possible without us already being-together.  
Testimony marks the inexhaustibility of communication. When we testify it is 
clear to us that what we wish to say might be said in many ways but that we must 
nevertheless choose a way, this way. We thereby acknowledge that there is no final word, 
but an endless series of beginnings and openings. In this way, testimony takes on an 
aphoristic hue. Testimony begins with the mystery that we are—the mystery that we are 
as openness—and from out of this mystery makes meaningful the world. It is this 
mystery to which language returns again and again and that makes anything like speaking 
a dictum (or exchanging facts) possible.  
Dwelling in the world together, being-with, communicative ethics, democracy—
by whatever name they go—all are suffused with testimony. Moreover, it is in 
acknowledging this truth, this fundamental openness to the world, that we might find a 
                                                
3 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. 
O’Bryne (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 3.  
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space to twist-a-way. The democracy of which Whitman spoke, this democracy to come 
wherein we might approach every other as a friend rather than a threat, is an ethical 
relation that allows itself to be buoyed not merely by the weight of factuality, but the 
force of mystery. We have encountered this mystery throughout this project; we found it 
in our thinking about communication and we allowed ourselves to dwell within this space 
in our reading of Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman, taking from them a particular 
philosophical approach to theorizing communication.  
We turned, both in the content of this project as well as the epigraphs which 
guided it to aesthetics. We did so because it is aesthetics (called here by many names: 
hyperbole, aphorism, poetry, and the like), through overstating the case, that we might 
have the chance of glimpsing the truth of our condition. Such has been the lesson we 
have investigated, that the lie of art—be it poetry, literature, or art more broadly 
thought—points us to a greater truth, in this case the truth of testimony and the 
hyperbolic conditions of communication. Acknowledging this condition asks of us that 
we are extravagant in the hope we might give voice to the truths of which we are 
convinced, that we might make sense in common for the sake of the future already on its 
way.  
Let us recall Oscar Wilde once more in his “The Decay of Lying.” He disclosed 
there, through an artistic form of his own, that the relationship between art and nature is 
more complicated than we think. It is not art which mirrors nature, but the opposite: 
nature mirrors art. Nature conforms to the artistic perceptions we have of it, to the 
interpretive habits and questions we bring to it. In other words, the world discloses itself 
through the interpretations (the sense) we make of it. Perhaps this is an exaggeration of 
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sorts and the lavishness of artistic whim. It is an instance wherein Wilde squanders the 
communicative potential with which he finds himself. Yet in its wandering beyond the 
bounds of our daily experiences it offers a source of utopian potential that remains amidst 
the ever narrowing horizons fundamentalism and cynicism. Whatever redemption we 
might seek will need to be sought together. In tempering our understanding of 
communication by turning to testimony as the conditions for its possibility, by bringing 
into relief our dwelling in the world together, by bearing the responsibility of making 
sense in common, and by giving voice to the hyperbole that we are, perhaps—just 
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Communication, 7(1).  
 
Sturgess, J. N. (2014). Death, rebirth, and a sense of ease: Hermeneutic truth after 
Heidegger. Studia Philosophiae Christianae, 50(1), 29-49.  
 
Ramsey, R. E., & Sturgess, J. N. (2011). The strange leisure of the snake-bitten: 







Ramsey, R. E., & Sturgess, J. N. (2015). Speaking freely: Thinking with Camus and 
Beauvoir toward a philosophy of communication. In B. Sleasman (Ed.), Albert 
Camus & Philosophy of Communication: Making Sense in an Age of Absurdity. 
Madison, NJ: Farleigh Dickenson Press. 
 
Sturgess, J. N. (under contract). Despite what we may have heard: Conversations between 
hermeneutics and critical theory. In E. Garrett (Ed.), Communication as Loving 
Struggle: Love, Family, and Social Responsibility in the Technological Age. New 
York, NY: Springer Press.  
 
Conference Papers (* indicates competitively selected) 
Sturgess, J. N. & Ramsey, R. E. (2015, November). Speaking freely: Thinking with 
Camus and Beauvoir toward a philosophy of communication. Paper to be 
presented to the Philosophy of Communication Division at the annual convention 
of the National Communication Association, Las Vegas, NV.*  
 
Sturgess, J. N. (2015, June). “I am a fragment, and this is a fragment of me”:  Emerson, 
Deleuze, and the fragmentation of experience. Paper presented to the 2nd Biennial 
Department of Communication & Rhetorical Studies Philosophy of 
Communication Conference, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA.*  
 
Sturgess, J. N. (2014, November). The courage to understand: A hermeneutic approach 
to advocacy and the Human Library Organization. Paper presented to the 
Philosophy of Communication Division at the annual convention of the National 
Communication Association, Chicago, IL. * 
 
Sturgess, J. N. (2014, November). Doing philosophy of communication with Calvin O. 
Schrag: Roundtable on the influence of a philosopher on the field of 
communication. Paper presented to the Philosophy of Communication Division at 
the annual convention of the National Communication Association, Chicago, IL.* 
 
Sturgess, J. N. (2014, September). Remainders and rejoinders: Communication as 
embodied testimony. Paper presented at the Pittsburgh Continental Philosophy 
Network’s 1st Annual Conference, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA.* 
 
Sturgess, J. N. (2014, June). Book blocs and the safeguarding of study: A critical 
hermeneutic approach to social movement theory. Paper presented at the 13th 
Annual National Communication Ethics Conference, Duquesne University, 
Pittsburgh, PA. * 
 
Sturgess, J. N. (2014, February). Book blocs and the safeguarding of study: A critical 
hermeneutic approach to social movement theory. Paper presented at the Purdue 
Graduate Student Conference on Communication Research, Purdue University, 




Sturgess, J. N. (2013, November). Drawing from Heidegger: Rhetoric, communication, 
and dasein. Paper presented to the Philosophy of Communication Division at the 
annual convention of the National Communication Association, Washington D.C. 
* [Top Student Paper] 
 
Sturgess, J. N. (2013, November). Living hermeneutics: Mikhail Bahktin’s dialogic ethics 
of response. Paper presented to the Communication Ethics Division at the annual 
convention of the National Communication Association, Washington D.C. * 
 
Sturgess, J. N. (2013, February). Shock treatment: Dignity, privacy, and the obscene in 
Wiseman’s Titicut Follies. Paper presented to the Purdue Graduate Student 
Conference on Communication Research, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN. 
* 
 
Sturgess, J. N. (2010, June). We must love understanding to understand love: 
Hermeneutics, critical theory, and communicative ethics.  Paper presented at the 
Communication Ethics Conference, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA. * 
 
Sturgess, J. N. (2009, November). Rethinking truth and rhetoric for the sake of ethics: 
Examining Heidegger’s conception of aletheia. Paper presented to the Philosophy 
of Communication Division at the annual convention of the National 
Communication Association, Chicago, IL. * 
 
Sturgess, J. N. (2009, October). Never again Auschwitz: Pedagogy, liberation, and 
learning to love. Paper presented at the Conference of the Coalition of Women 
Scholars in the History of Rhetoric, East Lansing, MI.* 
 
Ramsey, R. E., & Sturgess, J. N. (2008, November). Nearer than you think: Eleven 
openings to a philosophy of communication. Paper presented at the annual 
convention of the National Communication Association, San Diego, CA. * 
 
Invited Talks 
Sturgess, J. N. (2015, March 19). Taking a hint: Coming home to the art of 
communication. Lecture presented at the Hermeneutics and Homecoming Lecture 
Series at Barrett, the Honors College at Arizona State University at the West 
Campus, Phoenix, AZ.  
 
GRANTS 
PRF Graduate School Summer Research Grant, Purdue University, Summer 2015 
 Includes a half-time summer research appointment, approximately $3000 
Communication Graduate Student Association Travel Grant, Purdue University, Fall 
2014 
 Includes a $100 competitive travel stipend 
  
230 
Communication Graduate Student Association Travel Grant, Purdue University, Fall 
2013 
 Includes a $100 competitive travel stipend 
 
RESEARCH APPOINTMENTS 
Research Team Member, Patrice Buzzanell and Steve Wilson, Fall 2015 
This research project examines ways to help cultivate and support a local culture 
that values and promotes life-long learning among all community members, with 
a special focus on children (ages 6-8). I assisted in collecting qualitative data and 
underwent training for working with children.  
 
Assistant to the Editor, Philosophy/Communication Book Series, Fall 2004-Spring 2007 
During the time of my assistantship, the series was held by Purdue University 
Press. Currently, Duquesne University Press publishes the series. Since the series’ 
inception, Dr. Ramsey has remained the editor.  
 
Research Assistant for Dr. Ramsey Eric Ramsey, Barrett Honors College and Department 
of Communication Studies, Arizona State University at the West Campus, Fall 
2004-Spring 2007. 
 
Research Assistant for Dr. Sharon Kirsch, Department of Communication Studies, 
Arizona State University at the West Campus, Summer 2007. 
 
 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE (* indicates instructor of record) 
Detailed course descriptions and evaluations available upon request 
 
Graduate Teaching Assistant, Purdue University (2013-present) 
COM 217: Science Writing and Presentation*, Fall 2013, Spring 2014, Summer 
2014, Fall 2014, Spring 2015, Fall 2015, Spring 2016 
 COM 204: Critical Approaches to Communication, Fall 2014, Fall 2015 
(Teaching Assistant) 
COM 312: Rhetoric in the Western World, Fall 2013 and Fall 2014 (Teaching 
Assistant), Spring 2016 instructor of record 
 
Faculty Associate, Arizona State University (2011-2012) 
 COM 422: Advanced Argumentation, Summer 2012* 
 COM 454: Television Studies and Criticism, Spring 2012* 
 COM 457: New Media, Spring 2012* 
 COM 394: Storytelling and Oral History, Spring 2012* 
 COM 429: Semiotics and Visual Communication, Fall 2011* 
 COM 225: Public Speaking, Spring 2011, Fall 2011* 





Teaching Fellow, University of Pittsburgh (2009-2010) 
COMMRC 0520: Public Speaking, Spring 2010* 
COMMRC 0520: Public Speaking, Fall 2009* 
 
Teaching Awards: 
Bruce Kendall Award for Teaching Excellence, Purdue University, 2015.  
 
Teaching Certifications: 
Diversity Inclusion Certification, Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, Spring 
2015. 
SafeZone Training, Purdue University, Spring 2016.  
 
Teaching Assistantships: 
COM 204: Critical Perspectives on Communication, Dr. Josh Boyd, Purdue University, 
Fall 2014 and Fall 2015. 
COM 312: Rhetoric and the Western World, Dr. Robin Clair, Purdue University, Fall 
2013 and Fall 2014. 
CMN 294: Communication as the Art of Understanding, Dr. Ramsey Eric Ramsey, 
Arizona State University, Spring 2007.  
HON 294: Conversations Becoming a Community of Scholars, Dr. Ramsey Eric Ramsey, 
Arizona State University, Fall 2005.  
 
Invited Course Lectures: 
“Thinking-with Heidegger on the Truth of Rhetoric” for CMN 598: Communication 
Ethics, Fall 2010.  
“What Stories Do We Have to Tell?: Examining the Force of Narrative” and “Nothing 
Less Than a Story” for HON 171: The Human Event, Fall 2007.  
“Outliving Objectivity:  Reading Linda Weiner and Ramsey Eric Ramsey’s Leaving Us 
to Wonder as an Act of Hermeneutic Survival” for CMN 294: Communication as 
the Art of Understanding, Spring 2007.  
Writing Workshop for CMN 294: Communication as the Art of Understanding, Spring 
2007. 
“Now More than Ever: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and the Necessity of Living Well 
Together” for HON 171: The Human Event, Fall 2006. 
“As Far as We Can Tell: Understanding Narrative by Way of Cinema” for HON 294: 
Conversations Becoming a Community of Scholars, Fall 2005. 
 
 
